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Resolution of Investment Disputes under the TTIP with 
Regard to the Principles of Independence, Impartiality, 
and Qualifications of the Court and its Judges 
 
 
ABSTRACT  
 
The article provides for the judicial analysis of how a typical ISDS mechanism, as 
well as the ICS under the draft texts of TTIP, complies with all the provisions of the 
principles of independence, impartiality and qualification of the court and its judges, 
established under ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure, which 
were adopted by the American Law Institute (ALI) in May 2004 and by the Interna-
tional Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) in April 2004. These 
are the following provisions: judicial independence, impartiality of the court and its 
judges, reasonable tenure in office, transparency, substantial legal knowledge and ex-
perience. 
 
KEYWORDS 
 
resolution of investment disputes, Investor-to-State Dispute Settlement, Investor Court 
System, TTIP 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Since July 20131 the European Union (hereinafter – the EU) has been nego-
tiating a free trade and investment agreement with the United States – the 
                                                 
1 First Round of TTIP negotiations kicks off in Washington DC, [online] http://trade. 
ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/july/tradoc_151595.pdf [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
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Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (hereinafter – the TTIP). 
One of the most controversial elements of the negotiations is the Investor-
to-State Dispute Settlement (hereinafter – the ISDS). The issue of invest-
ment dispute resolution under the TTIP was opened for online public con-
sultation carried out by the European Commission,2 and faced strong criti-
cism from different groups of society.3 Afterwards, the European Commission 
proposed the Investor Court System (hereinafter – the ICS) in the TTIP.4 
The new draft was brought up for negotiations with the United States and 
made public on 12 November 2015.5 As long as there is no final agreement, 
any of the options mentioned above might be reviewed. Thus, the article is 
aimed at the analysis of typical ISDS mechanisms with regards to the EU 
textual proposal of the investment resolution system in TTIP and studying 
its effects on investment activities. 
                                                 
2 Online public consultation on investment protection and investor-to-state dispute set-
tlement (ISDS) in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement (TTIP), 
[online] http://trade.ec.europa.eu/consultations/index.cfm?consul_id=179 [accessed: 13.07. 
2017]. 
3 As examples see the following articles: “200 environmental, consumer and labor groups 
have urged EU and US officials not to include an investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) 
mechanism… ISDS forces governments to use taxpayer funds to compensate corporations 
for public health, environmental, labor and other public interest policies and government 
actions: ISDS has been used to attack clean energy, mining, land use, health, labor, and 
other public interest policies” – Civil society groups say no to investor-state dispute settle-
ment in EU-US trade deal’ (December 2013), [online] http://corporateeurope.org/trade/ 
2013/ 12/ civil-society-groups-say-no-investor-state-dispute-settlement-eu-us-trade-deal 
[accessed: 13.07.2017]; “Concern, however, remains about potential ‘policy freeze’: might 
governments think twice about introducing certain kinds of legislation if they fear po-
tential challenges under ISDS?” – The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and 
the NHS: Separating myth from fact’ (November 2014), [online] http://www.nhsconfed.org/ 
~/media/ Confederation/ Files/ public%20access/TTIP%20briefing%20-%20final%20pdf 
%20for%20website.pdf [accessed: 13.07.2017]; “Investors have used this system not only 
to sue for compensation for alleged expropriation of land and factories, but also over       
a huge range of government measures, including environmental and social regulations, 
which they say infringe on their rights” – The obscure legal system that lets corporations 
sue countries’ (June 2015), [online] http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/ jun/ 
10/obscure-legal-system-lets-corportations-sue-states-ttip-icsid [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
4 Why the new EU proposal for an Investment Court System in TTIP is beneficial to both 
States and investors, [online] http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-6060_en.htm 
[accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
5 “This document is the European Union’s proposal for Investment Protection and Res-
olution of Investment Disputes. It was tabled for discussion with the United States and 
made public on 12 November 2015. The actual text in the final agreement will be a result 
of negotiations between the EU and US” – European Union’s proposal for Investment Protec-
tion and Resolution of Investment Disputes, [online] http://trade.ec.europa.eu/ doclib/ 
docs/2015/november/tradoc_153955.pdf [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
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1. Investor-to-state dispute settlement – what is it? 
 
ISDS is a mechanism included in international investment treaties that al-
lows a foreign investor access to international tribunals, if the host state has 
breached the investment provisions of the treaty. Typically, investment 
agreements include guarantees of minimum standards of treatment, non-
discrimination provisions, compensations for expropriation, and free trans-
fer of capital.6 The European Union’s proposal for Investment Protection 
and Resolution of Investment Disputes (hereinafter – the Draft) establishes 
no expropriation without compensation, the possibility to transfer funds 
relating to an investment, a general guarantee of both fair and equitable 
treatment and physical security, a commitment that governments will re-
spect their own written contractual obligations towards an investor, and     
a commitment to compensate for losses in certain circumstances linked to 
war or armed conflict.7 Another guarantee against nationality-based dis-
crimination is already included in the EU proposal to the United States on 
Trade in Services, Investment and E-Commerce.8 
Investment disputes arise because of an actual or potential breach of the 
above-mentioned provisions and, by its nature, it is no more than a breach 
of contract dispute. That is why no court decision may influence any legisla-
tion adopted by parliament. Invalidating regulation adopted by parliament 
is exclusively a competence of supreme courts or constitutional courts.9  
The state cannot use the ISDS mechanism to lodge a claim against investors, 
because investors are not parties to investment agreements and, thus, can-
                                                 
6 See the following examples: CETA – Article X.9: Treatment of Investors and of Cov-
ered Investments, Article X.11: Article X.10: Compensation for Losses, Expropriation, Article 
X.12: Transfers, [online] http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc 
_152806.pdf [accessed: 13.07.2017]; Germany-Poland BIT – Article 2, Article 4, Article 5, 
[online] http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1393 [accessed: 
13.07.2017]; US Model BIT – Article 6: Expropriation and Compensation, Article 5: Mini-
mum Standard of Treatment, 9 Article 7: Transfers, [online] http://www.state.gov/docu-
ments/organization/188371.pdf [accessed: 13.07.2017]; Ukraine-Germany BIT – Article 2, 
Article 4, Article 5, [online] http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/276_415/print14480 
46711507083 [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
7 European Union’s proposal..., op. cit. 
8 European Commission – Fact Sheet. Reading Guide. Draft text on Investment Protec-
tion and Investment Court System in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) (16 September 2015), [online] http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-
5652_en.htm [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
9 J. Risse, N. Gremminger, The Truth About Investment Arbitration (not only) under 
TTIP – Four Case Studies, “ASA Bulletin” 2015, Vol. 33, Issue 3, pp. 465–484. 
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not be liable for breaching provisions of the treaty. State may bring a claim 
against foreign investors in its own domestic court. An investment dispute 
is aimed at compensation arguably owed by the host state to the investor 
for breaching their contractual duties under the investment agreement.10 
Today the ISDS mechanism is popular in the EU and among its member 
states as well as among non-European Union countries. The EU member 
states concluded almost half of the total number of bilateral investment 
agreements (hereinafter – BIT) that are currently in force worldwide (rough-
ly to 1400 out of 3000). Almost all of them include the ISDS.11 In 2014       
the European Union signed the first two free trade agreements (hereinafter 
– FTA) that include the ISDS, with Canada and Singapore.12 FTA would ulti-
mately replace many of the BITs concluded by member states.13 As for an 
example of non-European Union member states, apart from multilateral 
agreements, Ukraine is a party to 72 bilateral investment treaties for the 
reciprocal protection of the investments.14 
ISDS may be governed under different rules and institutions such as the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules or the rules of the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes of the World Bank. 
Under the Draft, a claim may be submitted to the Tribunal under one of 
the following sets of rules on dispute settlement: 
a) the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States 
and Nationals of Other States of 18 March 1965 (ICSID); 
b) the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States 
and Nationals of Other States of 18 March 1965 (ICSID) in accordance 
with the Rules on the Additional Facility for the Administration of Pro-
ceedings by the Secretariat of the Centre, where the conditions for pro-
ceedings pursuant to (a) do not apply; 
c) the arbitration rules of the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL); 
                                                 
10 Ibidem. 
11 The European Commission concept paper ‘Investment in TTIP and beyond – the path 
for reform. Enhancing the right to regulate and moving from current ad hoc arbitration 
towards an Investment Court’, [online] http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/ may/ 
tradoc_153408.PDF [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
12 Ibidem.  
13 M. Cremona, Guest Editorial: Negotiating the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP), “Common Market Law Review” 2015, Vol. 52, Issue 2, p. 356. 
14 Arbitration in CIS Countries. Current Issues, Antwerpen–Apeldoorn–Portland 2012, 
p. 62. 
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d) any other rules agreed by the disputing parties at the request of the 
claimant;15 
e) the above-mentioned rules on dispute settlement shall apply subject to 
the rules set out in the TTIP.16 
 
2. Investment court system – what is the difference? 
 
Whereas ISDS represents the tribunal made up of three arbiters, one chosen 
by the claimant, one by the defender, and one chosen mutually,17 ICS is         
a two-instance court system composed of a Tribunal of First Instance and 
an Appeal Tribunal. 
The Tribunal of First Instance consists of fifteen judges jointly appointed 
by the EU and the United States. Five of the judges shall be nationals of          
a member state of the European Union, five shall be nationals of the United 
States, and five shall be nationals of the third countries.18 The Tribunal 
hears cases in divisions consisting of three judges, of whom one shall be        
a national of a member state of the European Union, one a national of the 
United States, and one a national of the third countries. Divisions shall be 
chaired by judges who are nationals of the third countries.19 The disputing 
parties may agree that their case is heard by a sole judge who is a national 
of the third countries.20 This would make the access to the system easier for 
small companies.21 
The Appeal Tribunal is composed of six members, of whom two shall be 
nationals of a member state of the European Union, two shall be nationals 
of the United States and two shall be nationals of the third countries.22 The 
judges are to be jointly appointed by the EU and the United States.23 The 
                                                 
15 Article 6 (2), Sub-Section 3, Section 3, Chapter II – Investment of the Draft, [online] 
http:// trade.ec.europa.eu/ doclib/docs/2015/november/tradoc_153955.pdf [accessed: 
13.07.2017].  
16 Ibidem, Article 6 (3), Sub-Section 3, Section 3, Chapter II.  
17 U. Khan, R. Pallot, D. Taylor, P. Kanavos, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership: international trade law, health systems and public health, London 2015, p. 41. 
18 Article 9 (2), Sub-Section 4, Section 3, Chapter II – Investment of the Draft, op. cit.  
19 Ibidem, Article 9 (6), Sub-Section 4, Section 3, Chapter II.  
20 Ibidem, Article 9 (9), Sub-Section 4, Section 3, Chapter II.  
21 The European Commission ’Factsheet on Investment protection in TTIP’, [online] 
http:// trade.ec.europa.eu/ doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153018.5%20Investment.pdf 
[accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
22 Article 10 (2), Sub-Section 4, Section 3, Chapter II – Investment of the Draft, op cit.  
23 Ibidem, Article 10 (3), Sub-Section 4, Section 3, Chapter II.  
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Appeal Tribunal shall hear appeals in divisions consisting of three mem-
bers, of whom one shall be a national of a member state of the European 
Union, one a national of the United States, and one a national of the third 
country who shall chair the division.24 
Furthermore, the Draft establishes a mediation mechanism. The EU agree-
ments are the first investment agreements ever to include a specific provi-
sion on voluntary mediation before the first formal steps of the dispute 
settlement.25 The procedure is confidential. However, any disputing party 
may disclose to the public that mediation is taking place.26 The EU and the 
United States shall jointly compile a list of six mediators.27 Mediators are 
appointed by agreement of the disputing parties or by the President of the 
Tribunal under the parties’ joint requests.28 Mediation is not intended to 
serve as a basis for dispute settlement procedures, thus, a disputing party 
shall not rely on or introduce as evidence in such dispute settlement proce-
dures, nor shall any adjudicative body take into consideration positions 
taken by a disputing party in the course of the mediation procedure; the 
fact that a disputing party has indicated its willingness to accept a solution 
to the measure subject to mediation; or advice given or proposals made by 
the mediator.29 
 
3. Resolution of investment disputes under the TTIP with regard to the 
principles of independence, impartiality, and qualifications of the court 
and its judges 
 
The opinions towards the due mechanism of investment dispute resolution 
are highly controversial. Although public attitudes might be influenced by 
different factors, international standards retain the objective criteria to 
analyze the phenomenon. International standards in civil justice are repre-
sented in ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure (here-
inafter – the Principles), which together with the accompanying commen-
tary was adopted by the American Law Institute (ALI) in May 2004 and by 
                                                 
24 Ibidem, Article 10 (8), Sub-Section 4, Section 3, Chapter II.  
25 The European Commission Fact Sheet ‘Why the new EU proposal for an Investment 
Court System in TTIP is beneficial to both States and investors’ (12 November 2015), [on-
line] http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-6060_en.htm [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
26 Article 6 (3) – Annex I of the Draft, [online] http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/ 
2015/november/tradoc_153955.pdf [accessed: 13.07.2017].  
27 Article 3 (4), Sub-Section 2, Section 3, Chapter II – Investment of the Draft, op. cit.  
28 Ibidem, Article 3 (5), Sub-Section 2, Section 3, Chapter II.  
29 Ibidem, Article 6 (3), Annex I to Chapter II.  
RESOLUTION OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES...  13 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) in 
April 2004. The Principles identify the scopes of their advisory application, 
namely they are considered the standards for adjudication of, inter alia, 
transnational commercial disputes; these Principles are applicable to inter-
national arbitration, to the extent that they are compatible with arbitration 
proceedings, e.g. the Principles related to jurisdiction, publicity of proceed-
ings, and appeal.30 Independence, impartiality, and qualifications of the court 
and its judges (hereinafter – the Principle 1) is one of the core principles. 
The Principle 1 contains a number of provisions, each of which will be ana-
lyzed with regards to the typical ISDS and the EU proposals on the ICS. 
 
3.1. THE COURT AND THE JUDGES SHOULD HAVE JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE TO DECIDE 
THE DISPUTE ACCORDING TO THE FACTS AND THE LAW, INCLUDING FREEDOM FROM 
IMPROPER INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL INFLUENCE 
 
ISDS cases represent highly sensitive political issues. That is why secur-
ing judicial independence is a question of utmost importance. The accom-
panying commentary on the Principles clarifies possible sources of influ-
ences on the court and its judges: external influences may emanate from 
members of the executive or legislative branches of power, prosecutors, or 
persons with economic interests, etc.; internal influence could emanate from 
other officials of the judicial system.31 
The opponents of ISDS mechanism state that ISDS is not necessarily need-
ed in the countries which have a legal system based on the rule of law. How-
ever, the EU Commission pointed to the fact that even countries with strong 
legal systems do not always guarantee adequate protection of foreign inves-
tors. E.g. investors may face restrictions of their rights to bring their cases 
to domestic courts.32 Moreover, even in countries where the rule of law ap-
plies, foreign investors do not always benefit from the same protection as 
domestic investors.33 
                                                 
30 PE Comment to ALI / UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure, [on-
line] http:// www.unidroit.org/english/principles/civilprocedure/ ali-unidroitprinciples-
e.pdf [accessed: 13.07.2017].  
31 Ibidem.  
32 The European Commission memo ‘EU-Canada agree deal to boost trade and invest-
ment’ (26 September 2014), [online] http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-
542_en.htm [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
33 R. Quick, Why TTIP Should Have an Investment Chapter Including ISDS, “Journal of 
World Trade” 2015, No. 49, Issue 2, p. 204. 
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Both the ICSID Convention and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules estab-
lish that the arbitrator shall be independent.34 If three arbitrators are to be 
appointed, each party shall appoint one arbitrator.35 Under the UNICITRAL 
Arbitration Rules, the two arbitrators thus appointed shall choose the third 
arbitrator.36 Under the ICSID Convention, the third arbitrator shall be ap-
pointed by agreement of the parties or by the president of the Tribunal.37 
The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules include a model statement of indepen-
dence, which clarifies what is beyond the scope of independency and impar-
tiality. In particular there might be no past or present professional, busi-
ness, and other relationships with the parties and any other relevant cir-
cumstances which may affect independency and impartiality. 
The Bluebank v. Venezuela case is instructive. The respondent filed     
a proposal for disqualification of the arbitrator on the ground that the arbi-
trator worked in a law firm that represented other claimants in unrelated 
ICSID cases against Venezuela. The proposal was upheld.38 
In the Vivendi v. Argentina case an arbitrator lacked knowledge about     
a potential conflict. As far as arbitrators are to investigate whether conflicts of 
interests exist, the arbitrator was not excused from disclosure procedures.39 
Thus, the practice proves the effectiveness of independency provisions. 
However, the fact that the arbitrators are chosen by the parties might affect 
the decisions. 
The Draft includes the Code of Conduct for Members of the Tribunal, the 
Appeal Tribunal and Mediators,40 which establishes provisions on inde-
                                                 
34 Articles 14 (1) of the ICSID Convention and Article 9 (1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitra-
tion Rules (with new article 1, paragraph 4, as adopted in 2013), [online] https://www. 
uncitral.org/pdf/ english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules-2013/UNCITRAL-Arbitration-Rules-
2013-e.pdf [accessed: 13.07.2017].  
35 Articles 37 (2) of the ICSID Convention and Article of the UNCITRAL..., op. cit.  
36 Ibidem. 
37 Article 37 (2b) of the ICSID Convention, op. cit.  
38 Blue Bank International & Trust (Barbados) Ltd. v. the Bolivarian Republic of Vene-
zuela case materials, [online] http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ 
italaw3009.pdf [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
39 Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentine Republic 
(ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3) case materials. Available, [online] https://icsid.worldbank.org/ 
apps/ICSIDWEB/cases/Pages/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB/97/3 [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
40 See the following provisions of the Code of Conduct for Members of the Tribunal, 
the Appeal Tribunal and Mediators of the Draft: Article 1: “member” means a Judge of the 
Tribunal or a Member of the Appeal Tribunal established pursuant to Section X (Resolu-
tion of Investment Disputes and Investment Court System); Article 5: Independence and 
Impartiality of Members: 1. Members must be independent and impartial and avoid creat-
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pendence and impartiality of the judges. Moreover, there are other provi-
sions that ensure the independence of the judges. The judges of the Tribu-
nal and the members of the Appeal Tribunal shall be chosen from persons 
whose independence is beyond doubt. They shall not be affiliated with any 
government. They shall not take instructions from any government or or-
ganization with regard to matters related to the dispute. They shall not par-
ticipate in the consideration of any disputes that would create a direct or 
indirect conflict of interest. In addition, upon appointment, they shall re-
frain from acting as counsel or as party-appointed experts or witnesses in 
any pending or new investment protection dispute under this or any other 
agreement or domestic law.41 Unlike ISDS mechanism, the judges would be 
allocated randomly, so disputing parties would have no influence on the 
process.42 
 
3.2. JUDGES SHOULD HAVE REASONABLE TENURE IN OFFICE. NONPROFESSIONAL MEM-
BERS OF THE COURT SHOULD BE DESIGNATED BY A PROCEDURE ASSURING THEIR IN-
DEPENDENCE FROM THE PARTIES, THE DISPUTE, AND OTHER PERSONS INTERESTED 
IN THE RESOLUTION 
 
According to the accompanying commentary, this Principle recognizes 
that typically judges serve for an extensive period of time, usually their 
entire careers. However, in some systems most judges assume the bench 
only after careers as lawyers and some judicial officials are designated for 
short periods. An objective of this Principle is to avoid the creation of ad hoc 
courts. The term “judge” includes any judicial or quasi-judicial official under 
the law of the forum.43 
                                                                                                                   
ing an appearance of bias or impropriety and shall not be influenced by self-interest, out-
side pressure, political considerations, public clamour, loyalty to a Party or disputing party 
or fear of criticism; 2. Members shall not, directly or indirectly, incur any obligation or 
accept any benefit that would in any way interfere or appear to interfere, with the proper 
performance of their duties; 3. Members may not use their position to advance any per-
sonal or private interests and shall avoid actions that may create the impression that they 
are in a position to be influenced by others; 4. Members may not allow financial, busi-
ness, professional, family or social relationships or responsibilities to influence their con-
duct or judgment; 5. Members must avoid entering into any relationship or acquiring any 
financial interest that is likely to affect their impartiality or that might reasonably create 
an appearance of impropriety or bias. 
41 Article 11 (1), Sub-Section 4, Section 3, Chapter II – Investment of the Draft, op. cit.  
42 Ibidem, Article 9, Sub-Section 4, Section 3, Chapter II.  
43 P-1C Comment to ALI / UNIDROIT Principles..., op. cit. 
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The ICSID Convention provides that the arbitrators shall serve for re-
newable periods of six years.44 The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules do not 
contain provisions regulating judges’ tenure in office. 
Under the TTIP the judges and Appeal Tribunal Members are appointed 
for a six-year term, renewable once.45 
 
3.3. THE COURT SHOULD BE IMPARTIAL. A JUDGE OR OTHER PERSON HAVING DECI-
SIONAL AUTHORITY MUST NOT PARTICIPATE IF THERE IS REASONABLE GROUND TO 
DOUBT SUCH PERSON’S IMPARTIALITY. THERE SHOULD BE A FAIR AND EFFECTIVE PRO-
CEDURE FOR ADDRESSING CONTENTIONS OF JUDICIAL BIAS 
 
The accompanying commentary clarifies that independence can be con-
sidered a more objective characteristic and impartiality a more subjective 
one, but those attributes are closely connected.46 There has been a debate 
on impartiality of investment treaty arbitration. Some argue that invest-
ment arbitration favors the position of foreign investors over respondent 
host states.47 However, the history of investment arbitration in Ukraine48 
proves the opposite. Since Ukraine joined the ICSID Convention, there have 
been 14 claims against Ukraine. Five disputes were decided in favor of Ukra-
ine (Global Trading Resource Corp. and Globex International, Inc. v. Ukra-
ine,49 GEA Group Aktiengesellschaft v. Ukraine,50 Tokios Tokelės v. Ukra-
                                                 
44 Article 15 (1) of the ICSID Convention, op. cit.  
45 See: Article 9 (5), Article 10 (5), Sub-Section 4, Section 3, Chapter II – Investment of 
the Draft, op. cit.  
46 P-1A Comment to ALI / UNIDROIT Principles..., op. cit. 
47 The position is based on, inter alia, the following materials: G. van Harten, Arbitra-
tor Behaviour in Asymmetrical Adjudication: An Empirical Study of Investment Treaty Arbi-
tration, [online] http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 
1036&context=ohlj [accessed: 13.07.2017]; J. Paulsson, Denial of Justice in International 
Law, Cambridge 2005, p. 306; S&D Position Paper on Investor-state dispute settlement 
mechanisms in ongoing trade negotiations, [online] http://www.socialistsanddemocrats. 
eu/ sites/ default/files/position_paper_investor_state_dispute_settlement_ISDS_en_1503 
04_3.pdf [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
48 To compare the amount of cases lodged against the EU member states: Austria – 1, 
Belgium – 1, Bulgaria – 6, Croatia – 4, Cyprus – 2, Czech Republic – 2, Denmark – 0, Esto-
nia – 4, Finland – 0, France – 1, Germany – 2, Greece – 2, Hungary – 12, Ireland – 0, Italy – 4, 
Latvia – 1, Lithuania – 1, Luxembourg – 0, Malta – 0, Netherlands – 0, Poland – 3, Portugal – 0, 
Romania – 12, Slovak Republic – 4, Slovenia – 3, Spain – 25, Sweden – 0, United King-
dom – 0. Cases details see at: [online] https://icsid.worldbank.org/ [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
49 Global Trading Resource Corp. and Globex International, Inc. v. Ukraine, [online] 
https:// icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/cases/Pages/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=AR 
B/09/11 [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
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ine,51 Generation Ukraine Inc. v. Ukraine,52 Bosh International, Inc. and B&P, 
LTD Foreign Investments Enterprise v. Ukraine53), two cases were amicably 
settled (Western NIS Enterprise Fund v. Ukraine,54 Joseph C. Lemire v. Ukra-
ine55), three cases were settled in favor of investors (Inmaris Perestroika 
Sailing Maritime Services GmbH and others v. Ukraine,56 Alpha Projekt hol-
ding GmbH v. Ukraine,57 Joseph C. Lemire v. Ukraine58), three cases are still 
pending (Gilward Investments B.V. v. Ukraine,59 Krederi Ltd. v. Ukraine,60 
City-State N.V., Praktyka Asset Management Company LLC, Crystal-Invest 
LLC and Prodiz LLC v. Ukraine61), and the Poltava Gas B.V. and Poltava Petro-
leum Company v. Ukraine case62 was discontinued pursuant to ICSID Arbi-
tration Rule 43(1). 
The following paragraphs discuss some cases demonstrating the issue, 
namely, Tokios Tokelės v. Ukraine, Joseph C. Lemire v. Ukraine, Generation 
Ukraine Inc. v. Ukraine, Western NIS Enterprise Fund v. Ukraine. 
                                                                                                                   
50 GEA Group Aktiengesellschaft v. Ukraine, [online] https://icsid.worldbank.org/ap-
ps/ICSIDWEB/cases/Pages/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB/08/16 [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
51 Tokios Tokelės v. Ukraine, [online] https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/ 
cases/Pages/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB/02/18 [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
52 Generation Ukraine Inc. v. Ukraine, [online] https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/IC 
SIDWEB/cases/Pages/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB/00/9 [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
53 Bosh International, Inc. and B&P, LTD Foreign Investments Enterprise v. Ukraine, 
[online] https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/cases/Pages/casedetail.aspx? Case 
No=ARB/08/11 [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
54 Western NIS Enterprise Fund v. Ukraine, [online] https://icsid.worldbank.org/ apps/ 
ICSIDWEB/cases/Pages/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB/04/2 [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
55 Joseph C. Lemire v. Ukraine, [online] https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/ 
cases/Pages/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB(AF)/98/1 [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
56 Inmaris Perestroika Sailing Maritime Services GmbH and others v. Ukraine, [online] 
https:// icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/ cases/Pages/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=AR 
B/08/8 [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
57 Alpha Projektholding GmbH v. Ukraine, [online] https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ 
ICSIDWEB/cases/Pages/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB/07/16 [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
58 Joseph C. Lemire v. Ukraine, op. cit. 
59 Gilward Investments B.V. v. Ukraine, [online] https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/IC 
SIDWEB/cases/Pages/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB/15/33 [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
60 Krederi Ltd. v. Ukraine, [online] https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/ca-
ses/Pages/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB/14/17 [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
61 City-State N.V., Praktyka Asset Management Company LLC, Crystal-Invest LLC and 
Prodiz LLC v. Ukraine, [online] https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/cases/Pa-
ges/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB/14/9 [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
62 Poltava Gas B.V. and Poltava Petroleum Company v. Ukraine, [online] https://icsid. 
worldbank.org/ apps/ICSIDWEB/cases/Pages/ casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB/15/9 [access-
ed: 13.07.2017]. 
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Tokios Tokelės v. Ukraine. Tokios Tokeles, a Lithuanian entity, found-
ed Taki Spravy, a subsidiary established under the laws of Ukraine. Taki 
Spravy is in the business of advertising, publishing, printing, and related 
activities in Ukraine and outside its borders. The Claimant, Tokios Tokeles 
claimed that governmental authorities in Ukraine were engaged in the se-
ries of actions related to Taki Spravy that breach the obligations of the bi-
lateral investment treaty between Ukraine and Lithuania (hereinafter – 
‘Ukraine-Lithuania BIT’). Ukraine challenged the jurisdiction of the Tribunal 
to hear claims brought by Tokios Tokeles. 
As far as Tokios Tokeles had no substantial business activities in Lithua-
nia, the nationals of Ukraine owned ninety-nine percent of the outstanding 
shares of Tokios Tokeles and comprised two-thirds of its management, and 
the capital for the investment had also originated in Ukraine. Ukraine ar-
gued that Tokios Tokeles was economic substance-wise a Ukrainian inves-
tor in Lithuania rather than a Lithuanian investor in Ukraine. The Tribunal 
ruled that under the Article 1(2)(b) of Ukraine-Lithuania BIT, an investor is 
any entity established in the territory of the Republic of Lithuania according 
to its laws and regulations. And it was found that Tokios Tokeles was estab-
lished under the laws of Lithuania. The Ukraine-Lithuania BIT stipulates no 
other criteria of foreign investor. Thus, the Tribunal decided that the dis-
pute is within the competence of the Tribunal.63 Afterwards the Tribunal 
found no Ukraine-Lithuania BIT breach committed by the state. Thus, the 
dispute was settled in favor of Ukraine.64 
Joseph C. Lemire v. Ukraine. Mr. Joseph Charles Lemire, the national of 
the United States of America, brought a claim against Ukraine, concerning 
the issuance and operation of radio broadcasting licenses in Ukraine. The 
parties reached an amicable resolution of the dispute according to which 
Ukraine agreed to use its best possible efforts to consider in a positive way 
Gala Radio’s application for the radio frequencies licenses. Additionally, 
Ukraine took the obligations to offer three leasing properties for a beauty 
salon for the Claimant’s consideration. In accordance with Article 50 of the 
Arbitration (Additional Facility) Rules, the Parties agreed to request the 
Tribunal to record the settlement in the form of an award of the Tribunal.65 
                                                 
63 Tokios Tokelės v. Ukraine Case No.ARB/02/18 Decision on Jurisdiction, [online] 
https:// icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=sho 
wDoc&docId=DC639_En&caseId=C220 [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
64 Tokios Tokelės v. Ukraine Case No.ARB/02/18 AWARD, [online] https://icsid.world-
bank.org/ ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC22 
32_En&caseId=C220 [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
65 Joseph Charles Lemire v. Ukraine (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/1) AWARD, [online] 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=sho
wDoc&docId=DC569_En&caseId=C165 [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
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Generation Ukraine Inc. v. Ukraine. The Claimant, a U.S. corporate ve-
hicle owned outright by Eugene J. Laka, a U.S. national, sought damages for 
the spoliation of its alleged investment. It established a local investment vehi-
cle and achieved approval of its specific project by the Kyiv City Administra-
tion. After that the local authorities were impeding and interfering with the 
implementation of that project for six years in a manner which, according to 
the Claimant opinion, was tantamount to expropriation and therefore pro-
scribed under the Ukraine-U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty. The Tribunal 
concluded that the failure of the Kyiv City State Administration to secure the 
Claimant’s use of the adjoining property could not amount to an expropria-
tion. The claim was dismissed.66 
Western NIS Enterprise Fund v. Ukraine. The Claimant, Western NIS 
Enterprise Fund is the US regional private equity fund, which invests in 
small and medium-sized companies in Ukraine. The claimant lodged the 
claim against Ukraine because Ukrainian courts refused to enforce the Ameri-
can Arbitration Association commercial award in favor of the claimant. The 
claim fell within the scope of the United States-Ukraine Bilateral Investment 
Treaty (hereinafter – the US-Ukraine BIT). Under the Article VI (2) and (3) 
of the US-Ukraine BIT, the parties to the dispute shall initially seek a resolu-
tion through consultation and negotiation and than, if the dispute could not 
be settled amicably and if six months had elapsed from the date on which 
the dispute arose, the investor may submit the dispute to ICSID. The tribu-
nal ruled that proper notice of the claim under the US-Ukraine BIT was not 
given, thus, the proceedings was suspended during six months. If a proper 
notice were not given within this period, the claim would have been dis-
missed.67 Afterwards an amicable settlement was reached by the parties 
and proceeding was discontinued at their request.68 
The cases mentioned above demonstrate how ISDS might be not a mere 
mechanism protecting investor’s rights only, but rather a system securing 
the right balance. Moreover, the European Commission in its concept paper 
on investment in TTIP noticed that they have already accomplished some 
reforms of the traditional approach to investment protection and the asso-
ciated ISDS system. As an example they mentioned CETA, a free trade agree-
                                                 
66 Generation Ukraine Inc. v. Ukraine (ICSID CASE No. ARB/00/9) AWARD, [online] http:// 
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0358.pdf [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
67Western NIS Enterprise Fund v. Ukraine (ICSID Case No. ARB/04/2) ORDER, [online] 
https:// icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=sho 
wDoc&docId=DC649_En&caseId=C236 [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
68 Western NIS Enterprise Fund v. Ukraine, op. cit. 
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ment with Canada, setting out clearly defined procedures to follow to en-
sure full impartiality of arbitrators by requiring full disclosure of any situa-
tion which could give rise to real or perceived conflicts of interest. CETA 
provides concrete, clear procedure to determine whether a conflict could 
arise or has arisen. In case arbitrators are found not to comply with the 
code, they will be replaced.69 
As for ICS, the EU proposed wording of investment chapter includes sev-
eral provisions on impartiality. Article 3 (3) requires the impartiality of me-
diators. Both Article (2) and Article (5) command the impartiality of candi-
dates and members of the Tribunal or the Appeal Tribunal. Article 3 (1) set 
forth the obligation for candidates to the Tribunal or the Appeal Tribunal to 
disclose any past and present interest, relationship, or matter that is likely 
to affect their independence or impartiality, or that might reasonably create 
an appearance of impropriety or bias in the proceeding. The candidates shall 
make all reasonable efforts to become aware of any such interests, relation-
ships, or matters.70 
 
3.4. NEITHER THE COURT NOR THE JUDGE SHOULD ACCEPT COMMUNICATIONS ABOUT 
THE CASE FROM A PARTY IN THE ABSENCE OF OTHER PARTIES, EXCEPT FOR COMMU-
NICATIONS CONCERNING PROCEEDINGS WITHOUT NOTICE AND FOR ROUTINE PROCE-
DURAL ADMINISTRATION. WHEN COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE COURT AND A PAR-
TY OCCURS IN THE ABSENCE OF ANOTHER PARTY, THAT PARTY SHOULD BE PROMPTLY 
ADVISED OF THE CONTENT OF THE COMMUNICATION 
 
According to the accompanying commentary, proceedings without no-
tice (ex parte proceedings) may be proper in certain cases, e.g. in initial appli-
cation for a provisional remedy.71 
The arbitration rules stipulate the relevant provisions. Under the UN-
CITRAL Arbitration rules in the event of an oral hearing, the arbitral tribu-
nal shall give the parties adequate advance notice of the date, time and place 
thereof.72 Under the ICSID Convention, if a party fails to appear or to pre-
                                                 
69 Investment in TTIP and beyond – the path for reform. Enhancing the right to regu-
late and moving from current ad hoc arbitration towards an Investment Court’, published 
on the 5 May, 2015, [online] http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/may/tradoc_ 
153408.PDF [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
70 The EU textual proposal of investment chapter, [online] http://trade.ec.europa.eu/ 
doclib/docs/2015/november/tradoc_153955.pdf [accessed: 13.07.2017]. 
71 P-1E Comment to ALI / UNIDROIT Principles..., op. cit. 
72 Article 28 (1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules..., op. cit.  
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sent their case at any stage of the proceedings the other party may request 
the Tribunal to deal with the questions submitted to it and to render an 
award. Before rendering an award, the Tribunal shall notify, and grant          
a period of grace to, the party failing to appear or to present its case, unless 
it is satisfied that that party does not intend to do so.73 Moreover, Article 44 
of the ICSID Convention provides that arbitrations will be conducted in 
accordance with the Arbitration Rules. Under the ICSID Arbitration Rules, 
as soon as the Tribunal is constituted, the Secretary-General shall trans-
mit to each member a copy of the request by which the proceeding was 
initiated, of the supporting documentation, of the notice of registration, and 
of any communication received from either party in response thereto.74 
In TTIP, however, the issue of transparency is regarded broader than in 
usual civil procedures. Given that investment cases under the TTIP is a mat-
ter of money of tax payers, the resolution of investment disputes are of pub-
lic interest. The Draft incorporates the UNCITRAL rules on transparency, 
under which all documents will be made publicly available75 and all hearings 
will be open to the public.76 
 
3.5. THE COURT SHOULD HAVE SUBSTANTIAL LEGAL KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE 
 
According to the accompanying commentary, judges for transnational 
litigation shall be familiar with the law. It does not require the judge to have 
special knowledge of commercial or financial law, but familiarity with such 
matters would be desirable.77 
The ICSID Convention states that the competence in the field of law is of 
particular importance. Arbitrator shall be a person of high morale and rec-
ognized competence in the fields of law, commerce, industry, or finance.78 
The parties may challenge arbitrators on ground of a real or apparent lack 
of, inter alia, competence in the fields of law.79 The UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules, however, do not provide provisions towards legal knowledge and expe-
rience of arbitrators. 
                                                 
73 Article 45 (2) of the ICSID Convention, op. cit.  
74 Rule 30 of the ICSID Arbitration Rules, [online] http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/ 
icsid/icsid/staticfiles/basicdoc/partf-chap04.htm [accessed: 13.07.2017].  
75 Article 2, Article 3 of the UNCITRAL rules on transparency, [online] http://www. un-
citral.org/ pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/Rules-on-Transparency-
E.pdf [accessed: 13.07.2017].  
76 Ibidem, Article 6. 
77 P-1F Comment to ALI / UNIDROIT Principles..., op. cit.  
78 Article 14 (1) of the ICSID Convention, op. cit.  
79 Ibidem, Article 57.  
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TTIP establishes requirements for high qualification towards the judges. 
The judges shall have technical and legal qualifications, comparable to those 
required for the members of permanent international courts such as the 
International Court of Justice and the WTO Appellate Body.80 Under the Draft, 
the judges of the Tribunal of First Instance shall possess the qualifications 
required in their respective countries for appointment to judicial office, or 
be jurists of recognized competence; and the members of the Appeal Tribu-
nal shall have the qualifications required in their respective countries for 
appointment to the highest judicial offices, or be jurists of recognized com-
petence. They shall have demonstrated expertise in public international 
law. In particular, it is desirable that they have expertise in international 
investment law, international trade law, and the resolution of disputes aris-
ing under international investment or international trade agreements.81 
The text also provides for giving the judges a monthly retainer fee in order 
to secure highly qualified individuals and ensure their availability at short 
notice.82 
As for the mediators, TTIP provides for the mediators the same require-
ments as the ICSID Convention establishes for the arbitrators – mediator 
should be a person of high morale and recognized competence in the fields 
of law, commerce, industry, or finance.83 
 
Conclusion 
 
Notwithstanding strong public opposition, typical ISDS mechanism as well 
the ICS under the draft texts of TTIP complies with the principles of inde-
pendence, impartiality and qualification of the court and its judges, estab-
lished under UNIDROIT: 
1. Under UNIDROIT, the court and the judges should have judicial inde-
pendence. Both the ICSID Arbitration Rules and the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules establish that an arbitrator shall be independent. The cases prove the 
effectiveness of those provisions. The TTIP draft goes even further – the 
judges shall be allocated randomly so that disputing parties would have no 
influence on it. 
                                                 
80 See: European Commission – Fact Sheet. Reading Guide..., op. cit. 
81 Article 9 (4), Sub-Section 4, Article 10 (7), Sub-Section 4 – Investment of the Draft, 
op. cit. 
82 European Commission – Fact Sheet. Reading Guide..., op. cit.  
83 Article 3 (4), Sub-Section 2, Section 3, Chapter II – Investment of the Draft, op. cit.  
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2. UNIDROIT requires that judges should have reasonable tenure in of-
fice. According to the ICSID Convention the arbitrators shall serve for re-
newable periods of six years. Under the TTIP draft, the judges and Appeal 
Tribunal Members are appointed for a six-year term, renewable once. 
3. UNDROIT provides the principle of impartiality of judges. There has 
been debate on impartiality of investment treaty arbitration on the ground 
of the argument that investment arbitration favors the position of foreign 
investors over respondent host states. However, the case analysis proves 
the opposite. Ukraine appears to be a leader among post-soviet countries in 
acting as a respondent in ICSID cases. Five of fourteen cases lodged against 
Ukraine were decided in favor of Ukraine. Two cases of fourteen were ami-
cably settled. All the cases were controversial; however, all the decisions 
are unbiased. 
4. UNIDROIT requires transparency in communication between the par-
ty and the judge, inter alia, the due notice of hearings. The UNCITRAL Arbi-
tration as well as the ICSID Convention includes the relevant provisions.    
In the draft of the TTIP the issue of transparency is regarded even broader. 
The draft incorporates the UNCITRAL rules on transparency, under which 
all documents will be made publicly available and all hearings will be open 
to the public. 
5. Under UNIDROIT judges for transnational litigation shall be familiar 
with the law. The ICSID Convention establishes higher standards – the arbi-
trators should have recognized competence in the fields of law, commerce, 
industry, or finance. Under the draft of the TTIP, the judges shall have tech-
nical and legal qualifications, comparable to those required for the mem-
bers of permanent international courts such as the International Court of 
Justice and the WTO Appellate Body. 
Thus, both ISDS and ISC provide the right balance of maintaining public 
interest and securing the rights of investors. 
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ABSTRACT  
 
The article focuses on the very topical, and hotly debated in the last three decades, 
issue of the United Nations Security Council reform. The author briefly describes the 
historical roots of the Security Council, its establishment in 1945 and the enlarge-
ment that took place in 1965. The second part of the paper outlines the systemic 
flaws of the current composition of the Council and presents the existing projects of 
its reform proposed by the UN bodies or groups of states. The final part provides the 
ranking of current members of, and aspiring candidates to, the Security Council. The 
author describes the methodology used for this ranking and its utility for better un-
derstanding of the complexity of the problem. 
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Introduction 
 
The United Nations is a global international organization established in 
1945 after the World War II. It replaced the largely ineffective League of 
Nations and has had similar goals – to maintain international peace and 
security, increase international cooperation, and, simply speaking, avoid the 
next global war. The UN’s structure is to some extent based on that of the 
League of Nations. It has five principal organs, and the primary responsibil-
ity for the maintenance of international peace and security, according to art. 
24 of the UN Charter,1 is conferred on one of those organs – the UN Security 
Council. 
                                                 
1 Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI. 
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The UN Security Council has been created in a way that requires a con-
sensus among its permanent members in order to effectively perform its 
duties. Such institutional arrangements may have been seen necessary in 
1945 and may have helped to avoid a global military conflict between the 
permanent members during the Cold War era, in which the League of Na-
tions had failed. On the other hand, it has become evident that the UN Secu-
rity Council has fundamental flaws, and often cannot adequately react to 
modern conflicts and challenges, and cannot effectively maintain interna-
tional peace and security.2 Thus, the ideas to reform the UN Security Council 
have been actively discussed for years now. 
 
1. Historical Overview 
 
The ideas to establish a “world government” can be traced far back to the 
late 17th century. William Penn had proposed an idea of the world parlia-
ment, which would settle arising conflicts by a three-quarters vote and 
would have the authority to enforce peace by the use of force; Immanuel 
Kant had also argued in his “Perpetual Peace” for the establishment of the 
league of peace.3 
During the Napoleonic wars, the four powers, Britain, Austria, Russia, and 
Prussia, came to an agreement to overthrow Napoleon and to remain in 
alliance for the following twenty years after Napoleon’s defeat. This ar-
rangement was signed as the Treaty of Chaumont in March 1814. In the 
next year, after Waterloo, another treaty was signed which confirmed and 
renewed previous arrangements. Article 6 of that treaty provided that the 
four powers “have agreed to renew their meeting at fixed periods for the 
purpose of consulting upon their common interests, and for the considera-
tion of measures most salutary for the repose and prosperity of Nations and 
for the maintenance of the peace of Europe.”4 This article “formed the basis 
for the Concert of Europe and contained the germ of international govern-
ment.”5 Between 1814 and 1914 there were numerous meetings in order to 
                                                 
2 The most recent examples of the UN Security Council’s inability to react to a threat 
and accept any decision are the civil war in Syria, war against ISIS and the Ukrainian-
Russian conflict in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. 
3 Ch. J. Tams, League of Nations, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 
[online] http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-978 019 
9231690-e519 [accessed: 31.05.2017]. 
4 R. Hiscocks, The Security Council. A Study in Adolescence, New York, 1973, p. 24. 
5 Ibidem. 
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resolve disputes peacefully, and maintain peace in Europe. At least 8 con-
gresses (meetings of heads of governments or foreign ministers) and 18 
conferences (meetings of ambassadors) took place during that period.6 
The World War I and its horrible experiences became a decisive argu-
ment for the establishment of international organization and, thus, strength-
ening and enhancing the international cooperation. Several ideas had been 
developed in this regard, including the preparatory reports of British and 
French committees, chaired by Lord Phillimore and Leon Bourgeois respec-
tively, the famous Fourteen Points of Woodrow Wilson, as well as the pam-
phlet The League of Nations: A Practical Suggestion by the South African 
General Jan Smuts.7 The League of Nations was established by the Treaty of 
Versailles on 28 June 1919 and the Covenant of The League of Nations was 
signed on the same day. 
The League of Nations comprised of three main organs: the Assembly, 
the Council, and the permanent Secretariat (art. 2 of the Covenant).8 The 
Council of the League of Nations is the direct predecessor and prototype of 
the United Nations Security Council. It consisted, according to art. 4 of the 
Covenant, of Representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers 
(permanent members – T. L.), together with Representatives of four other 
Members of the League (non-permanent members). The Covenant also pro-
vided a possibility to increase the number of permanent members of the 
Council (“with the approval of the majority of the Assembly, the Council 
may name additional Members of the League whose Representatives shall 
always be members of the Council” – art. 4 (2)), which is, in a way, a more 
progressive solution than that provided by the UN Charter. But on the other 
hand, the decision-making process required a unanimous agreement of 
the Council (and of the Assembly as well), except the matters of procedure 
(art. 5). Such an order made the decision-making process in the League of 
Nations extremely complicated and cumbersome; unfortunately, a similar, 
to some extent, design was established for the UN Security Council (so-
called “veto right” by the permanent members), which is the reason of its 
inability to adopt many necessary decisions. 
Despite its systemic problems and inability to prevent another great 
war, the achievements of the League of Nations should not be belittled. As 
Christian Tams puts it, “in the immediate aftermath of the Great War, the 
                                                 
6 Ibidem, pp. 25–26. 
7 Ch. J. Tams, op. cit. 
8 Covenant of the League of Nations, 28 June 1919, [online] http://www.refworld.org/ 
docid/3dd8b9854.html [accessed: 31.05.2017]. 
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League idea generated an unprecedented level of hope and faith in interna-
tional progress. The League itself became the first international organiza-
tion with general competence and, for at least 15 years, functioned as a per-
manent forum of international co-operation.”9 Francis Paul Walters also de-
scribes the founding of the League of Nations as “a forward leap of unprece-
dented extent and speed, accompanied by extraordinary changes in the con-
duct of international relations.”10 
The United Nations was established on 24 October 1945 after World 
War II and was largely designed upon the structure of the League of Na-
tions. The General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social 
Council, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice, and the 
Secretariat have been established as its principal organs (art. 7 of the UN 
Charter). The Security Council originally consisted of eleven members, five 
of them permanent (US, UK, France, the Republic of China, and the USSR) 
and six nonpermanent members elected by the General Assembly for a two-
year term (art. 23). 
In 1965 the UN Charter has been amended in response to the growing 
number of new states becoming the members of the UN. Article 23 was 
amended to enlarge the Security Council from 11 to 15 members (of which 
5 are still permanent, and 10 are non-permanent), and article 27 was amend-
ed to increase the required number of votes from seven to nine (to reflect 
the enlarged number of the Security Council members).11 Besides these, 
rather formal amendments, some structural changes have also appeared 
without the amendments of the Charter. In 1971, the People’s Republic of 
China was recognized by the Resolution 275812 as the lawful member of the 
UN and assumed the permanent seat at the Security Council (the Taiwan-     
-based Republic of China was expelled from the UN); and in 1991, the Rus-
sian Federation assumed the permanent seat in the Security Council after 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
Practically since the establishment of the UN, there have been many pro-
posals to reform the organization, including the proposals and debates around 
                                                 
9 Ch. J. Tams, op. cit. 
10 F. P. Walters, A History of the League of Nations, London 1952, p. 1. 
11 Resolution 1991 (XVIII) Question of Equitable Representation on the Security Coun-
cil and the Economic and Social Council, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 17 De-
cember 1963, [online] http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/18/ares18.htm [accessed: 
31.05.2017]. 
12 Resolution 2758 (XXVI) Restoration of the Lawful Rights of the People’s Republic of 
China in the United Nations, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 25 October 1971, [on-
line] http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/26/ares26.htm [accessed: 31.05.2017]. 
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the Security Council reforms. Even inside the UN itself, some bodies have 
been established specifically for that purpose, such as the Special Commit-
tee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the 
Role of the Organization (established in 1975), or the Open-ended Working 
Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in 
the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related to the 
Security Council (established in 1993). There are also many projects and 
proposals designed by states or group of states, as well as non-governmental 
international organizations. The following part of the paper will explore the-
se projects in more details. 
 
2. Projects to Reform the UN Security Council 
 
2.1. THE IDEA TO REFORM THE COUNCIL 
 
The UN Security Council has been heavily criticized for its imperfect com-
position and lack of transparency of working methods and decision-making 
process. Due to the limits of this paper, the focus of the research will be put 
on the analysis of the composition of the Council and projects to reform it. 
The main arguments against the current composition are as follows: 
- the Council is too limited, it consists of 15 members out of 193 member 
states (comparing to 15 members out of 117 member states in 1965 
when the last and only enlargement of the Council has taken place); 
- European countries are overrepresented having two permanent seats (the 
UK and France), two non-permanent seats for the Western European 
and Others Group, one non-permanent seat for the Eastern European 
states, comprising in total to 5 seats out of 15 (plus, the permanent seat 
of the Russian Federation may also be viewed as a European seat); 
- Africa and Asia, in contrast, are underrepresented having only 3 seats 
(one of which is permanent) for Asian countries (while they represent 
more than a half of world’s population) and 3 seats for African countries 
(representing 54 member states); 
- the concept of permanent seats is criticized from two opposite points: on 
the one hand, it is criticized as a non-democratic and anachronistic prin-
ciple, on the other hand, there is a number of states that aspire to receive 
the permanent seat in the Council and criticize it for inadequate repre-
sentation of the modern geopolitical situation.13 
                                                 
13 See more: P. Teixeira, The Security Council at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century. 
To What Extent Is It Willing and Able to Maintain International Peace and Security?, Ge-
neva 2003, pp. 11–12. 
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The ideas to reform the Security Council have been developed for a long 
time by the UN itself (including the UN University), numerous NGOs (the 
Center for UN Reform Education, the Global Centre for the Responsibility to 
Protect, the International Coalition for Responsibility to Protect, Global Policy 
Forum, Security Council Report, the United Nations Reform Study Group of 
the International Law Association etc.), and academics.14 Since most of the 
projects and ideas developed before 200015 are either outdated or have not 
been discussed anymore, the article will analyze only the newest proposals 
from the twenty-first century and the last decade of the twentieth century. 
 
2.2. INTENSIFYING THE REFORM DEVELOPMENT (1992–2003) 
 
After the Cold War era, Germany and Japan started to increasingly push 
their candidacies as new permanent members of the UN Security Council; 
they were later joined by India and Brazil. These countries formed an in-
formal group called G4 and they explained their aspirations by their grow-
ing role in international politics, by their territory and population, involve-
ment in UN peacekeeping operations, and contributions to the UN budget. 
At the same time, their regional rivals (Italy, South Korea, Pakistan, Mexico, 
Argentina, and others) tried to block these aspirations and pushed the idea 
of increasing the number of non-permanent seats instead (these countries 
formed so-called “Coffee Club,” later changed to “United for Consensus.”)16 
In 1992, Boutros Boutros-Ghali was elected a Secretary-General of the 
UN and shortly thereafter published An Agenda for Peace where he argued 
for restructuring the Security Council and reforming it.17 As more and more 
countries raised this issue, the 1992 Security Council Summit included it on 
its agenda and, in 1993, the Open-ended Working Group on the Question 
of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Se-
curity Council and Other Matters related to the Security Council (hereinaf-
                                                 
14 See for instance: Y. Z. Blum, Proposals for UN Security Council Reform, “The Ameri-
can Journal of International Law” 2005, Vol. 99, pp. 632–649. 
15 See more on the projects developed from 1945 till 2000: D. Bourantonis, The History 
and Politics of UN Security Council Reform, Routledge 2005; E. C. Luck, UN Security Coun-
cil. Practice and Promise, Routledge 2006; Governing and Managing Change at the United 
Nations. Reform of the Security Council from 1945 to September 2013, Vol. 1, New York 
2013.  
16 Ibidem, pp. 2–3. 
17 Th. G. Weiss, The Illusion of UN Security Council Reform, “The Washington Quarterly” 
2003, Vol. 26, No. 4, p. 150. 
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ter – the Working Group) was established by the General Assembly.18 In the 
following years several proposals were developed, including the proposals 
to increase the number of permanent and non-permanent seats, as well as 
limit the veto right of permanent members. 
Bardo Fassbender provides the statement of the Vice-Chairman of the 
Working Group in which he summarized the state of the debate as of Sep-
tember 1995: 
 
Discussions showed that there was an agreement in the Working Group on the need 
to strengthen the effectiveness of the Security Council by an increase in its member-
ship in order to reflect more accurately the important international changes that have 
taken place, including the substantial increase in the membership of the United Na-
tions, especially of developing countries. Discussions further showed that there was 
an agreement on the need to review the Council’s composition, its working methods, 
and other matters related to its functioning.19 
 
In 1997, the General Assembly President and, at the same time, the Work-
ing Group chairman, Ismael Razali, proposed an ambitious three-stage re-
form plan, which provided for the enlargement of the Security Council from 
15 to 24 members, including the addition of five new permanent members. 
To counteract the Razali-proposal the Non-Aligned Movement and Italy 
successfully lobbied the adoption by the General Assembly of the resolution 
A/RES/53/30 on 23 November 1998. This resolution stipulated that any 
future resolutions on enlarging the Security Council would require a two-
thirds majority vote. This requirement is applicable to even minor adjust-
ments and has made decisions on Council enlargement extremely difficult 
ever since.20 
 
2.3. LATEST PROPOSALS OF THE REFORM (SINCE 2003) 
 
In 2003, the then Secretary-General Kofi Annan established the High 
Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, which delivered a report     
A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility21 in December 2004. In the 
report, the authors proposed two models of the Security Council reform. 
                                                 
18 UN Doc. A/Res/48/26, 3 December 1993. 
19 B. Fassbender, Un Security Council Reform and the Right of Veto. A Constitutional Per-
spective, Kluwer Law International 1998, p. 234. 
20 Governing and Managing Change…, op. cit., p. 5. 
21 Report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A/59/565, [on-
line] https://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/1202report.pdf [accessed: 31.05.2017]. 
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Model A provides for six new permanent seats, with no veto being cre-
ated, and three new two-year term non-permanent seats, divided among 
the major regional areas as follows:22 
 
Table 1: Model A of the Security Council reform 
Regional 
area 
Number  
of states 
Permanent 
seats  
(continuing) 
Proposed 
new perma-
nent seats 
Proposed 
two-year 
seats (non-
renewable) 
Total 
Africa 53 0 2 4 6 
Asia and 
Pacific 
56 1 2 3 6 
Europe 47 3 1 2 6 
Americas 35 1 1 4 6 
Total 191 5 6 13 24 
Source: Report of the High Level Panel on Threats..., op. cit., p. 67. 
 
Model B provides for no new permanent seats but creates a new catego-
ry of eight four-year renewable-term seats and one new two-year non-
permanent (and non-renewable) seat, divided among the major regional 
areas as follows:23 
 
Table 2: Model B of the Security Council reform 
Regional 
area 
Number  
of states 
Permanent 
seats  
(continuing) 
Proposed 
four-year 
renewable 
seats 
Proposed  
two-year  
seats (non-
renewable) 
Total 
Africa 53 0 2 4 6 
Asia and 
Pacific 
56 1 2 3 6 
                                                 
22 The data is valid as of 2 December 2004. 
23 The data is valid as of 2 December 2004. 
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Europe 47 3 2 1 6 
Americas 35 1 2 3 6 
Total 191 5 8 11 24 
Source: Report of the High Level Panel on Threats..., op. cit., pp. 67–68. 
 
Additionally, the authors proposed for the General Assembly 
 
to elect Security Council members by giving preference for permanent or longer-term 
seats to those States that are among the top three financial contributors in their rele-
vant regional area to the regular budget, or the top three voluntary contributors from 
their regional area, or the top three troop contributors from their regional area to 
United Nations peacekeeping missions.24 
 
In 2005, the African states formed an “Ezulwini Consensus” and called 
for two permanent seats. They argue that, even although the main focus of 
the Security Council activities is directed towards the African states, the 
continent has no permanent representative. The two permanent members 
should be chosen by the African Union member states themselves, and the 
main contenders for the positions are Egypt, South Africa, and Nigeria, with 
strong claims also from Ethiopia, Senegal, Algeria, and Tanzania.25 
Another prominent proposal of the Security Council reform is the one de-
livered in 2015 by the Elders,26 “A UN Fit for Purpose” which, among others, 
proposed a new category of members of the Security Council and called upon 
 
[…] the states which aspire to permanent membership accept instead, at least for the 
time being, election to a new category of membership, which would give them a much 
longer term than the two years served by the non-permanent members, and to which 
they could be immediately re-elected when that term expires. This would enable 
them to become de facto permanent members, but in a more democratic way, since it 
would depend on them continuing to enjoy the confidence of other member states.27 
                                                 
24 Report of the High Level Panel..., op. cit., pp. 68. 
25 Governing and Managing Change..., op. cit., p. 4. 
26 Informal and independent group of global leaders which was founded by Nelson 
Mandela and has included Kofi Annan, Jimmy Carter, Desmond Tutu, Fernando H. Cardoso 
and others. 
27 A UN Fit for Purpose, The Elders. Independent global leaders working together for 
peace and human rights, [online] http://theelders.org/un-fit-purpose [accessed: 31.05. 
2017]. 
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The biggest rivalry, concerning the Security Council reform, is currently 
present among the already mentioned groups of states that have interests 
in taking new seats in the enlarged Security Council. Those main groups 
are: the Group of Four (G4) – Japan, Germany, India and Brazil; United for 
Consensus (UfC) – Italy, Spain, South Korea, Canada, Mexico, Argentina, 
Turkey, Pakistan, Colombia, Costa Rica, Malta, and San Marino; the Ezul-
wini Consensus – representing the positions of the African Union. The plans 
of these groups may be described as follows: 
 
Table 3: Plans of the Group of Four (G4), United for Consensus (UfC),  
and the Ezulwini Consensus  
Plans Description 
G4 
The G4 plans envisage a Council with a total membership of 25, 
including six new permanent members (Brazil, Japan, Germany, 
India and two African countries) and an additional  
three elected seats. 
UfC 
UfC called for a 25-member Council, which would be achieved by 
adding “no permanent members to the Council, but would  
rather create new permanent seats in each region, leaving it  
to the members of each regional group to decide which  
Member States should sit in those seats, and for how long”. 
Ezulwini Consensus 
The Ezulwini Consensus proposes two permanent seats and two 
additional elected seats for Africa. Under the proposal, the  
permanent members would be granted “all the prerogatives and 
privileges of permanent membership including the right to veto”. 
Source: P. Nadin, United Nations Security Council Reform, Our World, United Nations Uni-
versity, [online] https://ourworld.unu.edu/en/united-nations-security-council-reform [ac-
cessed: 31.05.2017]. 
 
To further illustrate how complicated is the process of reforming the UN 
Security Council and how many opposite interests different states and 
groups of states have, it would be useful to describe other, not yet men-
tioned in the text, less active groups of states28 that have proposed various 
projects of the Council reform: 
                                                 
28 Timeline UN Security Council Reform (1992–2015), provided by Lydia Swarf for the 
Center for UN Reform Education, [online] www.centerforunreform.org/sites/ default/ 
files/Timeline%20November%202015%20final.pdf [accessed: 31.05.2017].  
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1) The African Group / C10. Although the African Group represents        
a common position during the inter-governmental negotiations, it has seri-
ous internal divisions and competing candidacies. Despite the fact that they 
have formed the “Ezulwini Consensus” in 2005, South Africa and Nigeria 
tried to converge with the G4 group. In response to this, the Committee of 
10 (C10) was established to act as a focal point on the Security Council re-
form and alliances with other regional groups. The C10 consists of Algeria, 
Congo Brazzaville/Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Kenya, Libya, 
Namibia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Uganda, and Zambia; 
2) ACT (Accountability, Coherence, and Transparency) consists of 25 
members including Austria, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
Gabon, Ghana, Hungary, Ireland, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mal-
dives, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Portugal, Rwanda, 
Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland and Uruguay. They do not par-
ticipate in inter-governmental negotiations as a group but instead had 
worked together to develop a Code of Conduct by which its endorsers pledge 
not to vote against credible resolutions of the Security Council aimed at 
preventing or ending genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. 
By November, it had gained support from 106 countries, including France 
and the United Kingdom, but not the other three permanent members. Be-
sides this group, Belize, the Netherlands, Spain, and Ukraine also participated 
in the development of the above-mentioned Code of Conduct; 
3) L69. The group of about 40 developing countries: G4 members Brazil 
and India, 11 African countries, small island states, Caribbean Community 
States and several states from Latin America; 
4) The Arab group advocates for its own permanent seat; 
5) Eastern European states propose a second non-permanent seat for 
themselves; 
6) Some states have proposed a joint permanent seat for the European 
Union, instead of two permanent seats of UK and France (a proposal rather 
not actual anymore, having in mind the recent Brexit developments); 
7) Small island developing states are in favor of special cross-regional 
rotating non-permanent seat in exchange for their support of new perma-
nent seats. 
Such a variety of opposing interests illustrates the complexity of the Se-
curity Council reform. And it is only one aspect of the reform – enlargement 
of the Council. As Lydia Swarf puts it: 
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A successful vote for new permanent members – with or without veto rights – may 
not be easy to bring about, however. There is a complex and large variety of options 
on the table. There are likely to be last-minute changes in national positions result-
ing from external pressure or new understandings. And most of all, there seems to 
be lack of genuine political will among the wider membership for a solution that will 
mostly benefit just a handful of countries whose relative power may change over 
time. Longer-term and renewable seats seems the most feasible and flexible option, 
but a vote for such a solution would likely fail too at this time. Neither a text without 
real negotiations or untimely votes will bring results. Only compromise can.29 
 
3. Who Should Receive the Permanent Membership of the UN Security 
Council? 
 
Given the political complexity of the issue, it may be useful to provide some 
quantitative data that may clarify the problem and provide some objective 
information on which countries should actually receive the permanent seat 
in the Security Council (or long-term renewable seat) in case of eventual 
enlargement. To answer this question, a few indicators will be taken into 
account: firstly, the population of a state, and its GDP; next, budget contri-
butions to the UN and the number of peacekeepers from a given state; and, 
additionally, the nuclear arsenal of a state. 
Statistics on the following countries will be analyzed: current permanent 
members of the Security Council (USA, UK, France, the Russian Federation, 
and the People’s Republic of China) and countries that either aspire to re-
ceive the seat or are regional leaders (Germany, Italy, Japan, India, South Ko-
rea, Pakistan, Indonesia, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Canada, South Africa, 
Nigeria, Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia). The countries will be ranked by 
every indicator and will be awarded points depending on their place in the 
rank (1st place = 1 point, 2nd place = 2 points and so on). In the end, all the 
points from the ranks by different indicators will be summed up and the 
states with the least numbers of points will be those who most deserve        
a seat in the Security Council. Those countries that possess nuclear arsenal 
will be awarded 1 point irrespectively of the number of warheads, those 
that do not possess it – 2 points. 
The methodology may be also used for a bigger number of states (in-
cluding Canada, Spain, Australia, Iran, Ethiopia etc.), as well as with addi-
tional indicators (territory, defense budget, index of democracy and/or 
human rights protection etc.) but for the purpose of this research only the 
above-mentioned ones will be taken into account. 
                                                 
29 Ibidem. 
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The main goal of such quantitative approach is to provide the audience 
with some objective quantitative information on different states that are   
or aspire to become the members of the Security Council. As may be seen   
in the Table 4 below, if the Security Council would have been established 
nowadays based on the objective criteria (in this case: population, GDP, and 
nuclear arsenal, as well as involvement in the UN activities, such as contri-
butions to the UN budget and number of peacekeepers from each country) 
the permanent five members of it would be China, USA, India, Brazil, and 
Japan. The next five countries in the ranking are, respectively, Germany, 
France, UK, Indonesia, and Italy. The use of this methodology provides us 
with the clear understanding that the claim of G4 countries (India, Brazil, 
Japan, and Germany) for the seat in the Security Council is the most reason-
able and well-grounded. Among the African states, the highest position in 
the ranking belongs to Nigeria (13), which would make it the primary can-
didate for the “African” seat. 
Unfortunately, the reform and alleged enlargement of the Security Coun-
cil will, most likely, be based not upon the objective criteria but on political 
reasons and self-interests of states and groups of states. 
 
Table 4: Ranking of the permanent members of and potential candidates  
to the UN Security Council 
No. State 
Population30 
(millions) 
GDP31 
(billions $) 
Budget  
contribution  
to the UN32 (%) 
Number of  
peacekeepers33 
Nuclear 
arsenal34 
Points 
Overall 
position 
1. USA 326,474 (3) 18,036 (1) 22 (1) 73 (18) + 1 24 2 
2. UK 65,511 (14) 2,861 (5) 4,463 (6) 528 (13) + 1 39 8-9 
3. France 64,938 (15) 2,418 (6) 4,859 (5) 846 (10) + 1 37 7 
                                                 
30 Source of the information: Countries in the world by population (2017), [online] http:// 
www.worldometers.info/world-population/population-by-country/ [accessed: 31.05.2017]. 
31 Source of the information (as of 2015): The World Bank, [online] http://data.world 
bank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?year_high_desc=true [accessed: 31.05.2017]. 
32 Source of the information (budget for 2017): United Nations, Contributions to the 
UN budget, [online] http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=ST/ADM/ SER. 
B/955 [accessed: 31.05.2017]. 
33 Source of the information (as of April 2017): United Nations, Numbers of peace-
keepers by countries, [online] http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/ 
contributors.shtml [accessed: 31.05.2017]. 
34 Source of the information (as of 2017): International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear 
Weapons, [online] http://www.icanw.org/the-facts/nuclear-arsenals/ [accessed: 31.05. 
2017]. 
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4. Russia 143,375 (8) 1,365 (11) 3,088 (9) 95 (17) + 1 46 11 
5. China 1,388,232 (1) 11,064 (2) 7,921 (3) 2,509 (5) + 1 12 1 
6. Germany 80,636 (12) 3,363 (4) 6,389 (4) 728 (11) + 2 33 6 
7. Italy 59,797 (16) 1,821 (8) 3,748 (8) 1,272 (9) + 2 43 10 
8. Japan 126,045 (10) 4,383 (3) 9,68 (2) 123 (15) + 2 32 5 
9. India 1,342,512 (2) 2,088 (7) 0,737 (15) 7,648 (1) + 1 26 3 
10. S. Korea 50,704 (18) 1,377 (10) 2,039 (10) 625 (12) + 2 52 14 
11. Pakistan 196,744 (6) 
271,049 
(20) 
0,093 (20) 7,111 (2) + 1 49 12 
12. Indonesia  263,510 (4) 
861,933 
(13) 
0,504 (16) 2,722 (4) + 2 39 8-9 
13. Brazil  211,243 (5) 1,803 (9) 3,823 (7) 1,284 (8) + 2 31 4 
14. Argentina  44,272 (19) 
584,711 
(16) 
0,892 (14) 464 (14) + 2 65 19 
15. Mexico 130,222 (9) 1,143 (12) 1,435 (11) 32 (19) + 2 53 15-16 
16. S. Africa 55,436 (17) 
314, 571 
(19) 
0,364 (17) 1,395 (7) + 2 62 18 
17. Nigeria 191,835 (7) 
486,792 
(17) 
0,209 (18) 1,686 (6) + 2 50 13 
18. Egypt 95,215 (11) 
330,778 
(18) 
0,152 (19) 2,895 (3) + 2 53 15-16 
19. Turkey 80,417 (13) 
717,879 
(14) 
1,018 (13) 117 (16) + 2 58 17 
20. 
Saudi 
Arabia 
32,742 (20) 
646,001 
(15) 
1,146 (12) - (20) + 2 69 20 
Sources: Countries in the world by population, [online] http://www.worldometers.info/ 
world-population/population-by-country/; World Bank, [online] http://data.worldbank. 
org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?year_high_desc=true; United Nations, [online] http://www. 
un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=ST/ADM/SER.B/955; http://www.un.org/en/ 
peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml; International Campaign to Abolish 
Nuclear Weapons, [online] http://www.icanw.org/the-facts/nuclear-arsenals/. 
 
Conclusion 
 
There is a general understanding for the need to reform the UN Security 
Council which includes the improvement of the working methods and deci-
sion-making process, increasing transparency of the Council, restraining 
veto powers, and reconfiguration of the Council according to the current 
political configuration in the world. The reality has changed fundamentally 
since the World War II and the UN Security Council does not adequately 
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represent the world anymore. Most active in claiming their right to receive 
the seat in the Council are the so-called G4 countries: India, Brazil, Japan, 
and Germany. But their claim is strongly resisted by their regional competi-
tors who formed the United for Consensus group (Italy, South Korea, Paki-
stan, Argentina, and others). There is also a group of African states who 
argue that their continent is the most underrepresented in the Council. 
Besides the competition among the aspiring states, there is also discus-
sion on the type of enlargement with two main approaches. The first ap-
proach proposes to increase the number of permanent seats in the Council 
(with or without the veto right), while, according to the other approach, the 
“quasi-permanent” long-term renewable seats should be added. The second 
approach becomes more and more popular since many states are reluctant 
to increase the number of permanent members of the Council. They claim 
that in a few decades some permanent members may lose some of their 
influence (as has happened with some current members of the Council, 
notably Russia, France, and, to some extent, UK) while the other states may 
arise as global or regional leaders (as has happened with G4 countries). 
Therefore, the establishment of “quasi-permanent” seats is more reasonable 
and more democratic. 
Another major obstacle to the UN Security Council reform is the repug-
nance and unwillingness of the current permanent members to revoke or 
even restrain the veto right. The veto is usually used to protect the self-
interests of states, although very often to the detriment of international peace 
and security or human rights. But since the veto right in the Security Coun-
cil is a major advantage in international relations, it is highly doubtful it 
may be restrained in the near future. 
Opposing interests of states and groups of states and unresolved issue 
with the veto right make the attempts to reform the UN Security Council      
a truly “Sisyphean work.” The intensive work on this problem has started in 
the UN after the Cold War but there has not been a major progress since 
then. While many interested groups proposed numerous projects of re-
forms, there is not a single one that has gained the support of the majority 
of states. It is a “Gordian knot” the international community has so far not 
been able to either untie or cut. 
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The Regulation of Counterfeiting Money  
in the German Criminal Code 
 
 
ABSTRACT  
 
The crime of counterfeiting is probably as old as the use of money. The right to coin-
age and to issue money has always belonged to the privileges of the monarch and the 
state. Its risky nature lies in the fact that it affects the trust and confidence towards 
state-issued money. Franz von Liszt stated that counterfeiting is a mixed crime which 
breaches two legal objects: on one hand the individuals’ interest of property, and on 
the other hand it attacks the security of cash-flow. The purpose of this paper is to com-
pare the statutory provisions of the Hungarian and German Criminal Code, the legal 
practice, and criminal statistics of both countries. With the comparative law approach, 
we can learn from the German criminal legal system and give proposals for the Hun-
garian regulation and court practice. The first part of the study deals with a brief le-
gal history of counterfeiting money. The second and main part of the study analyzes 
the in-force regulations of the German Criminal Code regarding counterfeiting money. 
The contribution has a comparative law approach. The third and last part of the study 
deals with the criminal statistics and the conclusions. 
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counterfeiting money, Germany, Criminal Code 
 
 
Introduction – Brief legal history of counterfeiting money 
 
The crime of counterfeiting is probably as old as the use of money. The right 
to coinage and to issue money has always belonged to the privileges of the 
monarch and the state. Its risky nature lies in the fact that it affects the trust 
and confidence towards state-issued money. Karl Binding a German legal 
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scholar stated “that invention of money lead to the invention of counterfeit-
ing.”1 
The Code of Hammurabi was one of the first written laws which punished 
counterfeiters. The specific sanction is not known, just the sacramental 
nature of it: “if he abolish the judgments which I have formulated, overrule 
my words, alter my statues, efface my name written thereon and write his 
own name… as for that man… whoever he may be, may the great god, the 
father of the gods… take from him the glory of his sovereignty, may he 
break his scepter, and curse his fate!”2 
Among the ancient Greeks, Solon was the first who made a law against 
counterfeiters. The law passed in Athens in 594 B.C. contained capital pun-
ishment for counterfeiting money. With this law he intended to protect the 
Greek currency and make it more trustworthy than the Persian currency.3 
Not just in Athens, as according to a note from the 3rd century B.C., in the 
town of Dimi four counterfeiters were punished by death.4 
In Rome Marius Graditianus was the first to punish counterfeiters in       
a written law. He established investigation offices which controlled the 
genuineness of the money.5 Under the reign of Constantine the criminal act 
of counterfeiting was seen as treason and thus was punishable by death. 
The acquittal was only possible if the offender voluntarily withdrew from 
the crime.6 
The concept that counterfeiting money is treason remained in the mid-
dle ages. Counterfeiting was punishable by cruel sanctions under the Ger-
man customary and written law. A written collection of the German cus-
tomary law, the Sachsenspiegel, which was written by Eike von Repgow in 
1230, contained capital punishment.7 The perpetrators of this crime were 
executed by burning at stake. If the offender counterfeited lesser amount of 
money, then there was an option for the court the punish him “only” by 
                                                 
1 K. Binding, Lehrbuch Des Gemeinen Deutschen Strafrechts: Besonderer Teil, Band 2, 
München–Leipzig 1904, p. 306.  
2 M. Kröner, Der Schutz des Furo durch die Geldfälschungstatbestände unter der be-
sonderen Berücksichtigung des Talbestandsmerkmals “Inverkehrbringen als echt” – mit 
Hinweisen zu den Geldfälschungstatbeständen in der Euro-Zone, Marburg 2009, p. 29. 
3 Ibidem, p. 29. 
4 H. Voigtlaender, Falschmünzer und Münzfälscher, Münster 1976, p. 32.  
5 Th. Mommsen, Römisches Strafrecht, Leipzig 1899, p. 673.  
6 W. Rein, Das Criminalrecht dér Römer von Romulus bis auf Justinianus, Leipzig 1844, 
pp. 787–788.  
7 I. Kajtár, Egyetemes állam- és jogtörténet, Budapest–Pécs 2005, pp. 119–120. 
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cutting off his hands.8 An example from the written law, the Constitutio 
Criminalis Carolina, which was written by Johan von Schwarzenberg in 
1532, valued counterfeiting as treason. It had a differentiated regulation 
whit having three perpetration conducts.9 Counterfeiting was only punish-
able by death in the most serious cases, otherwise it carried a pecuniary 
penalty.10 
Comparing the German and Hungarian legal history we can establish that 
counterfeiting was also valued as treason. For example, the customary law 
collection of Hungary, the Tripartitum, which was written by István Wer-
bőczy in 1514, prescribed that “who coins counterfeit money or uses coun-
terfeit money in high numbers shall be responsible for treason.”11 
In the aspect of humane regulation regarding counterfeiting the Allge-
meines Landrecht (ALR) from 1794 was progressive. The casuistic Prussian 
Code did not contain capital punishment for counterfeiters. In the most 
serious cases offenders got punished by lifelong imprisonment. 
The Bayern Criminal Code, written by Anselm Feuerbach in 1813, had     
a very clear and precise terminology and at that time it was a role model for 
other German provinces. The Code has been written in the spirit of the en-
lightenment age. We can see from the title of the chapter – Verbrechen wie-
der öffentliche Treue und Glaube – that the legal object of counterfeiting 
money was primarily the public trust in the legal tender.12 According to the 
Code, the most serious case was when somebody intentionally distributed 
counterfeit money. In this case the punishment was 8 to 12 years of im-
prisonment.13 
The Prussian Criminal Code from 1851 regulated counterfeiting in a sepa-
rate chapter titled coin felonies and coin misdemeanors. Even though the 
title only mentioned coins, it also punished the counterfeiting of banknotes 
with between 5–15 years of imprisonment. Furthermore the counterfeiting 
of foreign money was also punishable.14 The imperial German Criminal 
Code from 1871 was mostly based on the above mentioned Prussian Crimi-
                                                 
8 E. Balogh, A pénzhamisítás bűncselekménye a XIX. század első felének néhány német 
kódexében és a korabeli magyar büntetőtörvény-könyv, [in:] Emlékkönyv Dr. Meznerics Iván 
egyetemi tanár születésének 80. évfordulójára. Szerk, ed. K. Tóth, Szeged 1988, pp. 21–22. 
9 I. Kajtár, op. cit., p. 120. 
10 E. Balogh, op. cit., pp. 21–22. 
11 M. Tóth, Gazdasági bűnözés és bűncselekmények, Budapest 2000, p. 322.  
12 E. Balogh, op. cit., p. 22. 
13 Ibidem, p. 23. 
14 G. Beseler, Kommentar über das Strafgesetzbuch für die Preußischen Staaten, Leip-
zig 1851, pp. 282–289.  
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nal Code. This was first Criminal Code of the unified Germany and it came 
into effect in 1st of January of 1872. The legal scholars from the 19th century 
valued counterfeiting as a financial crime.15 This Act regulated counterfeit-
ing in the chapter titled crime against the state. Counterfeiting of foreign 
and national currencies were punishable. Securities were valued as the 
same as banknotes. The Code consisted of main and extension type of con-
ducts: 
1) Main type of conducts were: 
- imitation of money with the purpose of distribution, 
- the amendment of the money so that appears it has a higher value or 
money withdrawn money from the circulation has the appearance of 
money in circulation. 
2) Extension type of conducts: 
- distribution, procuring and import of counterfeit money, 
- giving away of counterfeit money, 
- coin debasement. 
In the main cases the Code prescribed a minimum 2 years imprisonment.16 
There were attempts to reform the German Criminal Code in the Weimar 
Republic, but in the and they failed. The national socialist Germany disre-
garded the principles of nullum crimen sine lege and nullum poena sine lege 
and the prohibition of analogy. The numbers of executed capital punish-
ments have risen drastically. After the second world war a reform plan was 
developed for criminal law regulations, which were realized in the 70s. The 
statutory provisions of counterfeiting money were amended largely in 
1975. The current in-force provisions preserve that state to a large extent, 
and 2003 was the last time when they were modified.17 
 
1. The place of counterfeiting money in the current  
German Criminal Code 
 
Counterfeiting money is regulated in Chapter 8 of the German Criminal Code 
titled Counterfeiting of money and official stamps. The regulation of the Ger-
man Criminal Code was a possible role model for the Hungarian lawmakers 
                                                 
15 G. Molnár, Gazdasági bűncselekmények, Budapest 2009, p. 449; M. Tóth, op. cit.,     
p. 371; I. A. Wiener, Gazdasági bűncselekmények, Budapest 1986, p. 252. 
16 P. Angyal, A magyar büntetőjog kézikönyve, Budapest 1940, p. 17.  
17 M. Kröner, op. cit., pp. 50–53. 
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due to the fact that the new Hungarian Criminal Code has a very similar 
chapter, with almost exactly the same crimes. The in-force regulation reads 
as follows: 
 
Section 146 
Counterfeiting money 
(1) Whosoever 
1. imitates money with the intent that it be brought into circulation as genuine or that 
such bringing into circulation be facilitated, or alters money with such intent, so that 
it appears to be of a higher value; 
2. procures or offers for sale counterfeit money with such intent; or 
3. brings counterfeit money which he counterfeited, altered or procured under the 
provisions of No. 1 or 2 above into circulation as genuine, 
shall be liable to imprisonment of not less than one year. 
(2) If the offender acts on a commercial basis or as a member of a gang whose pur-
pose is the continued counterfeiting of money the penalty shall be imprisonment of 
not less than two years. 
(3) In less serious cases under subsection (1) above, the penalty shall be imprison-
ment from three months to five years, in less serious cases under subsection (2) above, 
imprisonment from one to ten years. 
 
Section 147 
Circulation of counterfeit money 
(1) Whosoever brings counterfeit money into circulation other than in cases under 
section 146 shall be liable to imprisonment not exceeding five years or a fine. 
(2) The attempt shall be punishable. 
 
2. The legal object of the crime 
 
The legal object of counterfeiting money is the security of cash-flow, the 
trust in money and the state monopoly of issuing money.18 According to the 
prevailing concept of the German legal scholars, counterfeiting is a crime 
against assets.19 Two observations should be made regarding this. On one 
hand we can see from the classification of the crime that counterfeiting 
breaches individual interest. On the other hand, the concept of the legal 
object shows us that counterfeiting also breaches the communal interest. 
Franz von Liszt – the father of the mediation school of criminal law – sum-
marized this by stating the following: “counterfeiting is a mixed crime which 
                                                 
18 Th. Fischer, Strafgesetzbuch und Nebengesetze. Beckliche Kurzkommentare, Mün-
chen 2013, p. 1059. 
19 R. Schmidt, K. Priebe, Strafrecht besonderer teil. II. Straftaten gegen das Vermögen. 
11. Auflage, Hamburg–Berlin 2012, pp. 333–340. 
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breaches two legal objects on one hand the individuals interest of property 
and on the other hand it attacks the security of cash-flow.”20 
Hungarian prevailing concept21 is a little different, because Hungarian 
legal scholars consider counterfeiting as an economic crime. In contrast of 
this concept András Kondorosi says – similarly as Franz von Liszt – that the 
criminal act of counterfeiting money firstly breaches the communal legal 
interest and secondly the individual legal interest.22 However it is important 
to note that it is hard to distinguish the class of economic and financial 
crime and there is no significant difference between the two.23 
Counterfeiting is a high risk crime to the society and to the economy, and 
thus the sanction is considerably high. In the basic case the sanction is be-
tween 1–15 years imprisonment. Due to the high risk of this crime there is 
an omission to report for who has credible information about the planning 
or the commission of the crime to the authorities otherwise the defaulter 
can be sanctioned by imprisonment.24 
Many German authors highlight that counterfeiting is a special case of 
the crime of public document forgery.25 This concept in the Hungarian legal 
literature can be found in the writings of László Fayer. 
 
3. The perpetration object of the crime 
 
The perpetration object of the crime is money. Money in a criminal legal 
sense consists of 
- money in circulation (banknotes and coins) 
- and securities: bearer and order bonds which are parts of an entire is-
sue, if the payment of a specified sum of money is promised in the bonds; 
                                                 
20 P. Angyal, op. cit., p. 34. 
21 J. Gula, A pénz- és bélyegforgalom biztonsága elleni bűncselekmények, [in:] Magyar 
Büntetőjog Különös rész, ed. I. Görgényi, Budapest 2013, p. 582; K. Karsai, A pénz- és bélyeg-
forgalom biztonsága elleni bűncselekmények, [in:] Kommentár a Büntető Törvénykönyvhöz, 
ed. K. Karsai, Budapest 2013, p. 821; B. Kereszty, A gazdasági bűncselekmények (Btk. XVII. 
Fejezet), [in:] A magyar büntetőjog különös része. Korona Kiadó, ed. F. Nagy, Budapest 
2005, p. 699; M. G. Molnár, A pénz- és bélyegforgalom biztonsága elleni bűncselekmények, 
[in:] Büntetőjog II. Különös Rész. A 2012. évi C. törvény alapján, ed. B. Busch, Budapest 
2012, pp. 661–662; M. Tóth, op. cit., p. 371; A büntető törvénykönyv magyarázata. 2. kötet, 
eds. Z. Varga et al., Budapest 2009, p. 1295; I. A. Wiener, op. cit., p. 254.  
22 A. Kondorosi, Gondolatok a pénzforgalom rendjét sértő bűncselekmények kapcsán, 
„Jogelméleti szemle” 2012, No. 7, p. 77. 
23 See further in: L. Kőhalmi, A gazdasági és szervezett bűnözés, [in:] Bevezetés a bű-
nügyi tudományokba. Bíbor Kiadó, ed. V. E. Csemáné, Miskolc 2007, pp. 141–155.  
24 Strafgesetzbuch § 138.  
25 R. Schmidt, K. Priebe, op. cit., p. 333. 
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shares of stock; share certificates issued by capital management compa-
nies; interest, dividend and renewal coupons of the types of securities 
indicated in Nos 1 to 3 above as well as certificates of delivery of such 
securities; traveler’s cheques.26 
 
The concept of money under the German criminal law practice is the follow-
ing: certified money in a legal sense is a value carrier which was issued by 
the state or someone authorized by the state and which is in circulation for 
the public regardless of the general compulsory acceptance.27 It is important 
to note here that foreign currencies and securities are also protected by the 
statutory provisions of counterfeiting money.28 This rule complies with the 
Geneva Convention for the suppression of counterfeiting currency which 
was adopted in 1929 and Germany is part of it. 
Old money and money withdrawn from the circulation are not consid-
ered as money under the German criminal law. So for example if someone 
creates a fake Roman Denarii and sells it as original he commits fraud and 
not counterfeiting money. There is an exception regarding money with-
drawn from the circulation: if the state has obligation to exchange it to 
money in circulation (e. g. in the case of the Deutsche Mark) these are pro-
tected by the statutory provisions of counterfeiting.29 
Before the Supreme Court of Germany there was a case called “Kruger-
rand decision” in 1983. In this case the Supreme Court had to decide if the 
offender committed counterfeiting money when he created fake Kruger-
rand coins. Krugerrand coins are investment gold coins issued by the state 
of South Africa. According to the South African Mint and Coinage Act (No 78 
of 1964) Krugerrand coins were declared as unlimited legal tender. Under 
the German Criminal Code foreign currencies are protected by the statutory 
provisions of counterfeiting. The Supreme Court came to a decision that 
Krugerrands coins are not money in a criminal legal sense and it grounded 
its decision with the International Convention for the Suppression of Coun-
terfeiting 04/20/1929. The court concluded that the German criminal law 
predetermines whether a value carrier fulfills the essential requirements 
for the concept of money and doesn’t depend on the legal system of the 
                                                 
26 Strafgesetzbuch § 151.  
27 J. Wessels, M. Hettinger, Strafrecht besonderer teil 1, München–Landsberg–Frechen–
Hamburg 2014, p. 281. 
28 Strafgesetzbuch § 152.  
29 L. I. Gál, A pénz- és bélyegforgalom biztonsága elleni bűncselekmények, [in:] Új Btk. 
Kommentár, Különös Rész. 7. kötet. Nemzeti Közszolgálati és Tankkönyvkiadó, ed. P. Polt, 
Budapest 2013, p. 197. 
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country.30 In conclusion, according to the German criminal law practice the 
Krugerrand gold coin does not meet the requirement of money due to that 
it only carries its value through the gold fineness.31 
According to the Hungarian legal scholars the object of perpetration is 
controversial. According to some views the object of perpetration is money, 
as well as securities and bank notes that are equivalent to money in the 
criminal law, and therefore considered as money.32 Others pose that not all 
criminal conduct has an object of perpetration because in the case of imita-
tion, the imitated money is not the object of perpetration but the product of 
it.33 The Hungarian Criminal Code regulates the definition of counterfeiting 
money in the interpretation section of the statutory provisions (Section 389 
(5)). According to the Hungarian Criminal Code (Act C of 2012) money in     
a criminal legal sense are the following: 
1. Banknotes and coins, the circulation of which is legally authorized, or 
that will be authorized in the future on the basis of law, European Union 
legislation, or official notice published by an institution vested with the 
privilege of monetary emission, as well as banknotes and coins with-
drawn from circulation, where the issuing national bank is required, or 
agreed, to redeem such withdrawn currency and exchange it to legal ten-
der pursuant to the relevant national legislation or European Union legis-
lation. 
2. Printed securities issued as part of a series shall also be treated as bank-
notes, where the transfer of such securities is not restricted or precluded 
by law or by any endorsement made on the securities. The concept for 
securities otherwise found in the Civil Code.34 
3. Any alteration of money that has been withdrawn from circulation to 
create an impression as if it was still in circulation. 
4. The application or removal of a sign serving as an indication that the 
currency is valid only in a specific country, furthermore, the diminution 
of the precious metal content of the currency. 
5. Foreign currencies and securities are granted protection identical with 
that of domestic ones. 
 
                                                 
30 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Strafsachen, Band 32, Seite 198 [Deci-
sion of the Federal Court of Justice in criminal matter, Volume 32, p. 198]. 
31 J. Wessels, M. Hettinger, op. cit., p. 281. 
32 G. Molnár, Pénz- és bélyegforgalom biztonsága elleni bűncselekmények, op. cit., p. 1456. 
33 L. I. Gál, op. cit., p. 197.  
34 J. Gula, op. cit., p. 583. 
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4. The perpetration conducts of the crime 
 
The statutory provisions of counterfeiting money contains the following 
perpetration conducts: 
- imitation of money (nachmachen), 
- counterfeiting of money (verfälschen), 
- procuring counterfeit money (sichverschaffen), 
- offering for sale counterfeit money (feilhalten), 
- and lastly bringing counterfeit money into circulation as genuine (in Ver-
kehr bringen). 
I will analyze the conducts one by one. 
The essence of “imitation” is creating a new product (counterfeit mon-
ey). Usually criminals use copying machines for this purpose. It is required 
for the imitated money to be deceptive for the unsuspicious and general 
circulation.35 
It is irrelevant if the imitated money is created of original model or not. 
Under the German criminal practice creating for example a 25 euro bank-
note can be also punishable under the statutory provisions of counterfeiting 
money. The criminal practice applies this rule even to fantasy state money. 
It is interesting here to compare the German criminal practice to the 
Hungarian. In Hungary there was a case where an offender bought three 
sheep with a 54 000 Forint denominated banknote. The imitated money 
had the exact same look as the 20 000 Forint denominated banknote only 
the denomination was altered. The Hungarian Court said that imitation can 
only be made on money in circulation. So the verdict stated that 54 000 
Forint banknotes are not in circulation and thus the offender committed 
fraud and not counterfeiting money. This narrow interpretation of the stat-
utory provisions of counterfeiting currency can be criticized due to the fact 
that in this case the criminal clear intention was to bring imitated money 
into circulation. The offender even succeeded with his act and eventually 
breached the security of cash flow. Also this case points out another prob-
lem with the regulation: it was clear that the court intention was to impose 
milder sanction and thus applied the statutory provisions of fraud. The 
lawmaker should give wider options regarding the sanctions of counterfeit-
                                                 
35 Bundesgerichtshof Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, Jahr 1995, Seite 1844 [New Le-
gal Weekly Paper of the Federal Court of Justice, Year 1995, p. 1844]. 
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ing (for example by creating more privileged cases) so the courts would be 
motivated to value the criminal conducts correctly.36 
Another problematic area can be the quality of the imitated money. Ac-
cording to the German criminal practice, it is not required from the counter-
feit money to have good quality but it is important that it can be mistaken 
for the legal tender.37 
The second perpetration conduct is “counterfeiting” where the criminal 
altering the money so that it appears to have a higher value. It is important 
to note that only original money in circulation can be counterfeited.38 It is 
irrelevant how it appears to have a higher value, so not just altering de-
nomination but silvering or gilding can be a perpetration method for the of-
fender.39 In the Hungarian criminal code the only stipulation is made is al-
teration so an absurd case of altering money to have a lower value can be 
also punished. 
The third perpetration conduct is “procuring.” By procuring the counter-
feit or counterfeited money, the offender has the power of disposal, he has 
the right to decide over the fate of it.40 So if someone gets the counterfeit 
money as a depository, he will not commit the crime as perpetrator (the 
person who actually commits the crime) but maximum as accomplice (a per-
son who knowingly and voluntarily helps another person to commit a crime). 
“Offering for sale” is the fourth perpetration conduct. This is basically the 
attempt of bringing counterfeit money into circulation so the concluded 
offense sanction can be applied.41 
The last but most dangerous criminal conduct is to bring counterfeit 
money into circulation as genuine. There are many ways possible for this: 
gifting, purchasing and so on. In one case the German criminal court stated 
that counterfeit money was brought into circulation when someone dis-
posed of it in public so that everyone could easily access it.42 
                                                 
36 A. Kondorosi, op. cit., p. 78.  
37 R. Schmidt, K. Priebe, op. cit., p. 318. 
38 Ibidem. 
39 Bundesgerichtshof Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Steuerstrafrecht, Jahr 2003, Seite 
197 [Federal Court of Justice Journal’s of Economic and Tax related Criminal Law, Year 
2003, p. 197]. 
40 Entscheidung des Rechtsgerichts in Strafsachen 59, 79, und 80 [Judgment of the 
Court of First Instance in Criminal matters number 59, 79, and 80]. 
41 R. Schmidt, K. Priebe, op. cit., p. 320. 
42 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Strafsachen, Band 35, Seite 21 [Deci-
sion of the Federal Court of Justice in criminal matter, Volume 35, p. 21]. 
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The Hungarian Criminal Code has a similar regulation and it contains 
five perpetration behaviors: 
- imitation, 
- the counterfeit, 
- the intentional acquisition, 
- the export, import, or transport through the territory of the country, 
- the distribution of false or falsified money. 
These five are extended with the interpretation section: the application 
or removal of a sign serving as an indication that the currency is valid only 
in a specific country, and any alteration of currency that has been with-
drawn from circulation to create an impression as if it was still in circula-
tion shall be considered imitation of currency.43 
 
5. Subjective side of the crime 
 
The statutory provisions of counterfeiting money do not contain a special 
subject in the German Criminal Code so the perpetrator can be anybody. 
The crime can be committed only intentionally and in the first four perpe-
tration conducts with the intention to bring counterfeit money into circula-
tion as genuine. The last perpetration conduct can be committed with fore-
seeable intent (dolus eventualis) as well, but specific intent (dolus directus) 
is typical in the practice. If the perpetration conduct is procuring it is im-
portant that the offender must know about the origin of money at the mo-
ment when he procures it otherwise section 147 should be applicable. 
In Hungary the regulation of the subjective side of counterfeiting money 
is almost the same. The perpetrator can be anybody. Counterfeiting currency 
can be committed only intentionally. The perpetration conduct of distribu-
tion of counterfeit or falsified currency can be committed with specific in-
tent (if the perpetrator conceives a plan to achieve a certain result) and 
with foreseeable intent (if he acquiesces to the consequences of his con-
duct) as well. Imitation, counterfeiting, acquisition, and the transit type of 
conducts can be committed only with specific intent because the lawmaker 
prescribed in the statutory provision that the offender shall act with the 
purpose of distribution.44 
                                                 
43 K. Karsai, op. cit., p. 818. 
44 P. Polt, Pénz- és bélyegforgalom biztonsága elleni bűncselekmények, [in:] Büntetőjog 
Különös rész II. Rejtjel kiadó, eds. B. Blaskó, Z. Hautzinger, S. Madai, A. Pallagi, L. Schubauer, 
Budapest 2013, p. 278. 
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6. Aggravated and privileged cases 
 
The regulation counterfeiting money consists of two aggravated cases: 
- if the offender acts on a commercial basis, 
- or as a member of a gang whose purpose is the continued counterfeiting 
of money. 
In these two cases the punishment is higher due to the higher risk to the 
society. The minimum level of sanction is raised by one year: two years im-
prisonment. 
The definitions of the aggravated cases cannot be found in the German 
Criminal Code but in the practice of the German courts. According to this 
someone commits the crime on commercial basis if his first or secondary 
source of income is from counterfeiting for a longer period of time. 
The gang consist of at least 3 persons acting in unified will for a longer 
period of time to commit crimes in the future.45 
The regulation of the privileged cases is very different from the Hungarian 
and therefore it is very interesting. There is a so called less serious cases 
section. In the less serious cases of the basic case the sanction shall be be-
tween 3 months to 5 years and paradoxically in the less serious case of the 
aggravated case shall be 1 to 10 years imprisonment. When can this section 
be applied? The category of a less serious case is not defined by the law so 
again we have to call the criminal court practice to enlighten us. According 
to this the courts should take into account every circumstance. For example 
- on the objective side: did the offender commit a crime before this, is he  
a recidivist, 
- on the subjective side: the personality of the offender, etc. 
To show an example of a less serious case: a cashier accepts the counterfeit 
money in order to avoid conflict with the offender and after this he brings it 
into circulation as genuine. 
There is an independent crime called circulation of counterfeit money 
which can be considered as the privileged case of counterfeiting money.46 
The German Criminal Code defines this crime in a negative way: “Whosoev-
er brings counterfeit money into circulation other than in cases under sec-
                                                 
45 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Strafsachen, Band 46, Seite 321 und 
338 [Decision of the Federal Court of Justice in criminal matter, Volume 46, pp. 321 and 
338]. 
46 R. Schmidt, K. Priebe, op. cit., p. 320. 
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tion 146 shall be liable to imprisonment not exceeding five years or a fine.” 
This crime can be established when someone procures the counterfeit money 
without the knowledge that it is counterfeit, but later he realizes it and thus 
brings it into circulation. The attempt of the privileged case is also punish-
able. 
In the Hungarian Criminal Code there are two different aggravated cases: 
- involves a particularly considerable or greater amount of money; or 
- is committed in criminal association with accomplices. 
According to the closing provisions of the Criminal Code particularly con-
siderable amount of money is between 50 million plus one and 5 hundred 
million Forints so the aggravated case of counterfeiting currency can be 
committed above 50 million plus one Forints which is equivalent to about 
161 235 Euros. Criminal association is formed when two or more persons 
are engaged in criminal activities in an organized fashion, or they conspire 
to do so and attempt to commit a criminal act at least once, without, however, 
creating a criminal organization. The state of affairs is stricter compared to 
the previous regulation (The Act IV of 1978). In the aggravated cases the 
punishment can be imprisonment for up to 15 years at maximum (previous 
Criminal Code had 10 years at maximum).47 
The Hungarian Criminal Code has a privileged case too, which is similar 
to the German circulation of counterfeit money. But as opposed to the Ger-
man solution the Hungarian Criminal Code enacts the issue and distribution 
of counterfeit money not as an independent statutory provision, but rather 
within the act of counterfeiting. The actual difference between the two acts 
is that in this case the perpetrator obtains the money legally and “bona 
fide,” and realizes its wrong, disingenuous and sophisticated nature only 
after. Legality refers to the legal pretence of acquisition. Therefore, the  
acquisition is not legitimate if the person obtains the counterfeit money 
through a criminal act. The legal tradition measures this act as a privileged 
case with respect to the cause emerged from the expectations, that the in-
ternational agreement has made feasible and to which it has given poten-
tial. For the security of the money flow (the circulation) the initiation of 
increased protection is reasonable. The distribution of forged or counterfeit 
money of substantial or greater amount cannot be measured as the lack     
of expectations, since the perpetrator is aware of the increased risk, there-
fore the new Criminal Code ensures the possibility for the mitigation of the 
                                                 
47 Z. Nagy, D. Tóth, Computer related economic crimes in Hungary, “Journal of Eastern 
European Criminal Law” 2015, No. 2, pp. 167–168. 
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punishment only in specific cases, tied to a threshold limit (when the value 
of the money is trivial or even less substantial) and with an unlimited miti-
gation of the punishment.48 
 
7. Stages of the crime 
 
The preparation and the attempt of counterfeiting money is punishable. 
Preparatory act under the section of 149 consists of: 
 
Whosoever prepares to counterfeit money […] by producing, procuring for himself 
or another, offering for sale, storing or giving to another plates, frames, type, blocks, 
negatives, stencils, computer programs or similar equipment which by its nature is 
suitable for the commission of the offence; paper, which is identical or easy to confuse 
with the type of paper designated for the production of money […] and especially 
protected against imitation; or holograms or other elements affording protection 
against counterfeiting.49 
 
The sanction for preparation of the crime is lower just as in the Hungarian 
Criminal Code due to not being as dangerous as the completed act. The of-
fender in this cases shall be liable to imprisonment not exceeding five years 
or a fine if he prepared to counterfeit money. 
The German Criminal Code gives the option to the offender to remain un-
punishable if he withdraws from the preparatory acts. 
 
Whosoever voluntarily 
- gives up the commission of the offence prepared for and averts a danger caused 
by him that others continue to prepare the offence or commit it, or prevents the 
completion of the offence; and 
- destroys or renders unusable the means for counterfeiting, to the extent that they 
still exist and are useful for counterfeiting, or reports their existence to a public 
authority or surrenders them there, 
shall not be liable under subsection (1) above.50 
 
The Hungarian regulation also gives the chance for the perpetrator to 
remain unpunished if he withdraws from the preparation of the crime. The 
main difference is that this rule is regulated in the General Part and not in 
the Special Part and it is applicable to all crimes. 
                                                 
48 Based on the justification of the Act C of 2012. 
49 Strafgesetzbuch § 149 (1). 
50 Ibidem, § 149 (2). 
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The attempt of a crime in the German Criminal Code is only punishable if 
the statutory provisions of the special crime expressively contains it. This is 
different in the Hungarian Criminal Code, because every single crime at-
tempt is punishable as stated in the General Part of the Act. 
Under the German Criminal Code attempt is defined as the following:    
“A person attempts to commit an offence if he takes steps which will imme-
diately lead to the completion of the offence as envisaged by him.”51 The 
attempt of the crime has the same sanction as the completed offence but the 
judge has the option to punish the offender more leniently. This regulation 
method is very similar in the Hungary. The main rule is that the sentence is 
applicable to a completed criminal act, but the penalty may be reduced with-
out limitation or dismissed altogether by the court if the attempt has been 
carried out on an unsuitable subject, with an unsuitable instrument or by 
way of unsuitable means. Furthermore, the Section 82 of the Hungarian 
Criminal Code states that in respect of attempt or aiding and abetting, if the 
sentence to be imposed remains excessive, a more lenient sentencing can be 
applied. 
Both Codes give the option to the offender to withdraw his commission. 
The German regulation reads as follows: 
 
A person who of his own volition gives up the further execution of the offence or pre-
vents its completion shall not be liable for the attempt. If the offence is not completed 
regardless of his actions, that person shall not be liable if he has made a voluntary and 
earnest effort to prevent the completion of the offence. If more than one person par-
ticipate in the offence, the person who voluntarily prevents its completion shall not 
be liable for the attempt. His voluntary and earnest effort to prevent the completion 
of the offence shall suffice for exemption from liability, if the offence is not complet-
ed regardless of his actions or is committed independently of his earlier contribution 
to the offence.52 
 
The Hungarian Criminal Code consists of two cases when the offender shall 
not be liable for an attempt: 
- who voluntarily withdraws from the completion of the criminal act, or 
- who attempts to prevent the crime of his own volition. 
Even though it is important to note that if the attempt in itself constitutes 
another crime, the perpetrator shall be liable for prosecution for that crime. 
 
                                                 
51 Ibidem, § 22. 
52 Ibidem. 
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Summary and conclusions 
 
To summarize, the Hungarian and German regulation regarding counter-
feiting money is very similar. It is possible that the Hungarian lawmaker 
used the German Criminal Code as a role model when creating the relatively 
new Hungarian Criminal Code. The following table summarizes the similari-
ties and differences between the two Code: 
 
Table 1: The similarities and differences between the Hungarian and German regulation 
regarding counterfeiting money 
 German regulation  Hungarian regulation 
dogmatic place 
counterfeiting is a crime against 
assets 
counterfeiting is an economic crime 
legal object of 
the crime 
the security of cash-flow, the trust 
in money and the state monopoly of 
issuing money 
same 
perpetration 
objects 
- money in circulation,  
- securities listed in the German 
Criminal Code. 
- Foreign currencies protected 
with the same criminal law 
measures 
- According to the court practice:  
- money withdrawn from the 
circulation: if the state has obli-
gation to exchange it to money in 
circulation. 
- banknotes and coins in circula-
tion; 
- money withdrawn from the 
circulation where the issuing   
national bank is required, or 
agreed, to redeem such with-
drawn currency and exchange it 
to legal tender pursuant to the 
relevant national legislation or 
European Union legislation; 
- printed securities issued as part 
of a series shall also be treated as 
banknotes, where the transfer of 
such securities is not restricted 
or precluded by law or by any 
endorsement made on the securi-
ties 
- Foreign currencies and securities 
are granted protection identical 
with that of domestic ones. 
perpetration 
conducts 
1. imitation of money 
2. counterfeiting of money  
3. procuring counterfeit money  
4. offering for sale counterfeit 
money  
5. bringing counterfeit money into 
circulation as genuine.  
1. imitation of money in circulation 
2. counterfeiting of money in circu-
lation 
3. acquisition of counterfeited 
money 
4. the export, import, or transport 
through the territory of the coun-
try 
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5. the distribution of false or falsi-
fied money 
 
This 5 is extended with the interpre-
tation subsection 
- the application or removal of        
a sign serving as an indication 
that the currency is valid only    in 
a specific country, and  
- any alteration of currency that 
has been withdrawn from 
circulation to create an 
impression as if it was still in 
circulation shall be considered 
imitation of currency 
 
Subjective side 
of the crime 
can be anybody. Can be committed 
only intentionally 
same 
Stages of the 
crime 
The preparation and the attempt   
of counterfeiting money is also 
punishable 
same 
Is there an 
omission to 
report the 
planned coun-
terfeiting to the 
authorities?  
Yes, if someone has a credible 
information about the planning of 
the offense. at a time when the 
commission or result can still be 
averted, and fails to report it in time 
to the public authorities or the 
person threatened, shall be liable to 
imprisonment not exceeding five 
years or a fine. 
No 
aggravated 
cases  
if the offender acts on a commercial 
basis or as a member of a gang. 
if counterfeiting: 
- involves a particularly 
considerable or greater amount 
of money; or 
- is committed in criminal 
association with accomplices. 
Privileged case 
The so called less serious cases and 
the circulation of counterfeit money 
The penalty of any person who 
distributes counterfeit or falsified 
currency of minor value or less, 
obtained as genuine, may be re-
duced without limitation. 
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Sanctions 
- basic case 1–15 years imprison-
ment 
- aggravated case 2–15 years 
imprisonment 
- less serious case of the basic 
case 3 month to 5years 
- less serious case of the aggravat-
ed case 1–10 years imprison-
ment 
- circulation of counterfeit money 
imprisonment not exceeding       
5 years or a fine 
- preparation: imprisonment not 
exceeding 5 years or a fine. 
- basic case 2–8 years imprison-
ment 
- aggravated cases 5–15 years 
imprisonment 
- preparation: not exceeding 
3years imprisonment. 
Source: Act C of 2012 on the Hungarian Criminal Code §§ 389–390, and Strafgesetzbuch  
[German Criminal Code] §§ 146–149. 
 
The following table shows the registered numbers of counterfeiting money 
and official stamps yearly in Germany. The German authorities counts these 
two crimes together but presumably counterfeiting money has a big per-
centage of these numbers.53 
 
Table 2: The registered numbers of counterfeiting money and official stamps 
Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Registered 
numbers of 
crime 
7100 5476 5902 5338 4779 
Source: Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik (PKS) 2015, [online] https://www.bka.de/ DE/ Aktu-
elleInformationen/StatistikenLagebilder/PolizeilicheKriminalstatistik/PKS2015/pks 2015 
_node.html;jsessionid=EFF6F5AD679ED9B2D4B7858F80544242.live0611 (accessed: 20.09. 
2016). 
 
We can draw the conclusion from the statistics that the registered num-
bers of counterfeiting are low. There are only around two to three thousand 
cases a year in Germany where the population is 80 million. Comparing the 
10 million inhabitant Hungary has around 1000–2000 cases yearly. 
                                                 
53 Bundesministerium des Innern, [online] https://www.bmi.bund.de/ SharedDocs/ 
Downloads/DE/Broschueren/2016/pks2015.pdf?__blob=publicationFile [accessed: 20.09. 
2016].  
THE REGULATION OF COUNTERFEITING MONEY...  61 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Even though the low number of counterfeiting cases there are many 
counterfeits withdrawn from the circulation. 
 
Table 3: Numbers of counterfeit money withdrawn from the circulation 
Banknote 5 € 10 €  20 €  50 €  100 € 200 €  500 € All 
together 
Number 991 1526 37916 46567 5608 2032 717 95357 
Percentage  1% 2% 40%  49% 6% 2% 1% 100%  
Source: Deutlich mehr Falschgeld in Deutschland, [online] https://www.bundesbank.de/ 
Redaktion/DE/Pressemitteilungen/BBK/2016/2016_01_22_falschgeld.html [access: 20.09. 
2016]. 
 
All together almost one hundred thousand counterfeit euro banknotes 
were withdrawn from the circulation in Germany in 2015. The perpetrators 
counterfeited particularly the 50 and 20 euro banknotes (89%). The main 
reason for this that they do not want to get caught and these banknotes are 
not as often controlled as for example the 100 euro banknote. 
The worth of the counterfeited banknotes withdrawn from the circula-
tion were about 4.4 million euros. 
Even though counterfeiting is not primarily a quantity but a quality 
problem of crime. The real threat of this crime is the damage it can cause to 
the economy. High numbers of fake money in the circulation can destabilize 
the economics relations, and the trust in a country’s money. 
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Third Party Funding in International Arbitration –  
Legal Problems and Global Trends  
with a Focus on Disclosure Requirement 
 
 
ABSTRACT  
 
This article deals with the problem of third party funding in international commer-
cial and investment arbitration. It analyses the basic concept of third party funding, 
identifies the main areas of challenge as well as presents recent changes and innova-
tions associated with this concept. The article concentrates on transparency and dis-
closure requirements, which is, according to us, the major issue that influences fur-
ther development and use of funding arrangements. The conducted analysis and case 
study drive us to the conclusion that third party funding is “here to stay” in interna-
tional arbitration and will progress to the benefit of the arbitral community, but up-
on a condition of regulated, imposed and observed principle of disclosure. 
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Introduction 
 
Third party funding (hereinafter: TPF) is not only one of the hot topics1 of 
civil litigation and international arbitration but also one of the legal phe-
nomena that is still much hidden under a veil of secrecy. Despite the long-
lasting debate on the concept of TPF,2 this concept is still hard to define due 
to a lack of legal regulation and existence of privacy-oriented international 
practice. 
Since TPF is a result of development of international arbitration com-
munity, the relevant regulation (national arbitration laws and arbitration 
rules) has not yet caught up with it.3 In fact, TPF rises a number of specific 
ethical and procedural issues both in international commercial and invest-
ment arbitration. These particular issues include i.a. the funders’ relation-
ship with parties and counsels in managing the dispute, attorney ethics 
(attorney-client privilege), allocations of costs and security for costs, trans-
parency and disclosure of the funding arrangements, and finally arbitrators’ 
conflicts of interest.4 
                                                 
1 M. Scherer, A. Goldsmith, Third Party Funding of International Arbitration Proceed-
ings – A View From Europe: Part 1 – Funders’ Perspectives, “International Business Law 
Journal” 2012, No 1, pp. 217–218, [online] https://ssrn.com/abstract=2348737 [accessed: 
15.07.2017].  
2 Compare for example: M. Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third-Party Litiga-
tion Funding, “University of Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper Number” 2011, 11–31, 
pp. 1268–1338; E. de Brabandere, J. Lepeltak, Third Party Funding in International In-
vestment Arbitration, “Grotius Centre Working Paper” 2012, No. 1, pp. 1–19; J. Kalajdzic, 
P. Cashman, A. Longmoore, Justice for Profit: A Comparative Analysis of Australian, Cana-
dian and U.S. Third Party Litigation Funding, “The American Journal Of Comparative Law” 
2013, Vol. 61, pp. 93–148; W. Park, C. Rogers, Third-Party Funding in International Arbi-
tration: The ICCA Queen-Mary Task Force, “The Pennsylvania State University The Dickin-
son School Of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper” 2014, No. 42, [online] http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2507461 [accessed: 15.07.2017]. 
3 As was shown in the Queen Mary University of London and White & Case 2015 In-
ternational Arbitration Survey, Improvements and Innovations in International Arbitra-
tion, [online] http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/docs/164761.pdf, [accessed: 15.07.2017]. 
The Survey is analyzed below.  
4 Prof. W. Park, a member of the International Council for Commercial Arbitration 
and London’s Queen Mary School of Law Task Force on “Third-Party Funding in Interna-
tional Arbitration”, during the keynote of 14th Annual ITA-ASIL Conference on Third-
Party funding, held in Washington, D.C. on 12 April 2017, identified four “musketeers” of 
TPF that should be addressed: (i) transparency; (ii) attorney-client privilege, (iii) costs; 
(iv) and finally “d’Artagnan” issue – the question of definitions – who or what exactly is  
a third party funder. As to the report from the Conference, see: J. E. Vernon, Taming the 
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Therefore, the main objective of this article is to review the up-to-date 
knowledge about this concept, particularly in light of recent innovations and 
changes introduced by the international arbitration community, as well as 
recent cases where the problem of TPF emerged and was decided. The arti-
cle consists of three parts. Chapter I seeks to introduce a definition of TPF, 
examine the legal characteristics of this concept, and identify the pros and 
cons of its use in practice. Chapter II explains why TPF is important in in-
ternational arbitration, what challenges it brings and which areas of con-
cern can be identified. Chapter III focuses on the disclosure requirement. In 
particular, by an in-depth analysis of recent arbitration regulations and case 
law, it seeks to answer the questions as to what extent the disclosure is 
important from the perspective of TPF as well as how and why this princi-
ple should be implemented in order to strike the balance between the right 
to privacy and the right to public access in arbitration. 
 
1. Concept of Third Party Funding 
 
TPF originally emerged firstly in civil litigation where it was conceived as    
a method of financing litigation and hence as a tool to reduce or eliminate 
the risk associated with potentially unfavorable outcome of the litigation.5 
The TPF takes place when a third party, external to the parties and not in-
volved in the legal relation between them, agrees to pay for the one party’s 
(usually the claimant) legal fees, such as costs of lawyers, experts, outside 
counsels, any other costs that may be relevant or needed in the civil litiga-
tion in accordance with a stipulated agreement and stipulated budget, in 
exchange for an agreed return. The funder may additionally agree to pay 
the opposing party’s costs if the funded party is so ordered and provide 
security for the opponent’s costs.6 One of the main characteristics is that the 
                                                                                                                   
“Mercantile Adventurers”: Third Party Funding and Investment Arbitration – A Report 
from the 14th Annual ITA-ASIL Conference, Kluwer Arbitration Blog 21.04.2017, [online] 
http:// kluwerarbitrationblog.com/ 2017/ 04/ 21/ taming-the-mercantile-adventurers-
third- party- funding-and- investment-arbitration- a-report-from-the-14th-annual-ita-asil-
conference/ [accessed: 15.07.2017].  
5 M. de Morpurgo, A Comparative Legal And Economic Approach To Third-Party Litiga-
tion Funding, “Cardozo Journal Of International & Comparative Law” 2011, Vol. 19, p. 350.  
6 S. R. Garimella, Third Party Funding in International Arbitration: Issued and Chal-
lenges in Asian Jurisdiction, “AALCO Journal of International Law” 2014, Vol. 3, Issue 1,   
p. 48; V. Sahani, Harmonizing Third-Party Litigation Funding Regulation, “Cardozo Law 
Review” 2015, Vol. 36, pp. 860–861; eadem, Reshaping Third-Party Funding, “Tulane Law 
Review” 2017, Vol. 91, No. 3, pp. 415–421. 
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agreement between a funded party and the funder usually is to be kept in 
secret. As a result, the doctrinal and legal analysis is greatly reduced and      
a number of concerns, raised by both practitioners and academics, remain 
unsolved. 
The problems with defining the concept of TPF are, according to W. Park 
and C. Rogers, that: “economic interests in a party or a dispute can come in 
many shapes and sizes. Arrangements may be structured as debt instru-
ments, equity instruments, risk-avoidance instruments, or as full transfers 
of the underlying claims. Some agreements permit or require active partici-
pation of the third party funder in key strategic decisions in the case, while 
other agreements are limited to periodic updates.”7 According to these au-
thors: “The terms ‘third-party funder’ and ‘after-the-event-insurer’ refer to 
any person or entity that is contributing funds or other material support    
to the prosecution or defense of the dispute and that is entitled to receive    
a benefit (financial or otherwise) from or linked to an award rendered in 
the arbitration.”8 
Nevertheless, given the growing recognition of TPF worldwide, the first 
regulatory steps were already made. Under Art. 8.1., Section A, Chapter 8 
(Investment) of CETA: “Third party funding means any funding provided by 
a natural or legal person who is not a party to the dispute but who enters 
into an agreement with a disputing party in order to finance part or all of 
the cost of the proceedings either through a donation or grant, or in return 
for remuneration dependent on the outcome of the dispute.”9 Similarly    
Art. 1.2., Section 3, Chapter II Investment of TTIP, stipulates that: “Third 
Party funding’ means any funding provided by a natural or legal person 
who is not a party to the dispute but who enters into an agreement with      
a disputing party in order to finance part or all of the cost of the proceed-
ings in return for a remuneration dependent on the outcome of the dispute 
or in the form of a donation or grant.”10 
The proposed definitions suggest that the concept of TPF is broad and 
can embrace different relations between a party that has a legal claim and   
                                                 
7 W. Park, C. Rogers, op. cit., p. 4.  
8 Ibidem, p. 5.  
9 The Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement (CETA), a free-trade agreement 
between Canada and the EU, revisited in 2016, [online] http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/ 
in-focus/ceta/ceta-chapter-by-chapter/ [accessed: 15.07.2017]. 
10 Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, currently negotiated trade and 
investment deal between the US and EU, the information about the process and content 
of the TTIP is available at: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/about-ttip/ 
[accessed: 15.07.2017]. 
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a funder that seeks opportunities to invest capital and earn. The main ad-
vantage of TPF is granting access to justice for those who could not, due to 
financial reasons, bear costs of expensive, often unpredictable and lengthy 
civil proceedings (or international or investment arbitration). In this situa-
tion, accepting external financial help may be the only option for the claimant 
to pursue meritorious claim. Whereas for a funder it is a way of gaining 
capital. What is more, TPF serves as a risk-management tool by sharing of 
risk associated with the civil litigation (arbitration) between a party and      
a funder. It allows for a better stand against unpredictable situations in the 
litigation. In addition, funders are interested in strong and grounded claims 
that offer high predictability of refund. They will conduct a due diligence 
and legal analysis to properly assess the risk of pursuing the case. This can 
assist the claimant to shape its strategy and prepare a well-grounded claim, 
which can even be decided on pre-judicial stage through settlement.11 
On the other hand, TPF has also several disadvantages in particular: a suc-
cessful claimant has to pay a significant proportion of his or her recover-
ies to the funder as a remuneration for funding the litigation (arbitration); 
claimant may to a certain extent lose autonomy in favour of the funding 
party (in particular when considering settlement) since it may reserve the 
right of approval of the settlement; claimant may bear substantial costs 
when packaging the case for presentation to a funder. These costs will be 
wasted if the application for funding is unsuccessful.12 
Another unresolved issue relates to the allocation of costs of the litiga-
tion. Taking into account that the funder does not appear as a party in the 
litigation it is questionable if the costs that the opposing party (usually the 
respondent) bears can be demanded directly from the funder in the event of 
the adverse costs order.13 
 
                                                 
11 C. R. Flake, In Domestic Arbitration: Champerty or Social Utility?, “Dispute Resolu-
tion Journal” 2015, Vol. 2 (70), pp. 115–117. 
12 E. de Brabandere, J. Lepeltak, op. cit., pp. 8–9; C. R. Flake, op. cit., pp. 117–119. 
13 D. Galagan, P. Živković, If They Finance Your Claim, Will They Pay Me If I Win: Impli-
cations Of Third Party Funding On Adverse Costs Awards In International Arbitration, “Euro-
pean Scientific Journal” 2015, (Special Edition), [online] https://ssrn.com/abstract=2604048 
[accessed: 15.07.2017]; S. Brekoulakis, The Impact of Third Party Funding on Allocation 
for Costs and Security for Costs Applications: The ICCA-Queen Mary Task Force Report, 
Kluwer Arbitration Blog 18.02.2016, [online] http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/ 2016/ 
02/18/ the-impact-of-third-party-funding-on-allocation-for-costs-and-security-for-costs-ap-
plications-the-icca-queen-mary-task-force-report/ [accessed: 15.07.2017]. 
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2. Importance of Third Party Funding in International Arbitration 
 
TPF has been widely used in both international commercial and investment 
arbitration, however, due to confidentiality principle still in force in com-
mercial arbitration and to some extent compromised in investment arbitra-
tion, this concept raises a number of concerns and challenges.14 According 
to Queen Marry and White & Case 2015 International Arbitration Survey: 
Improvements and Innovations in International Arbitration, the respond-
ents are generally of the opinion that it should be mandatory in internation-
al arbitration for claimants to disclose the fact of using TPF and the identity 
of the funder, but without revealing the content of the funding agreement.15 
In the Survey, the respondents were asked which aspect of the use of TPF 
should be subject to mandatory disclosure by the claimants. They showed 
widespread support for disclosure of the use of TPF (76%) and the identity 
of the funder (63%). The interviewees commented that the resulting trans-
parency would help check for conflicts of interest and provide the tribunal 
with context as to the financial position of the parties. By contrast, 71% of 
the respondents felt that mandatory disclosure of the full terms of the fund-
ing arrangements was undesirable. Some interviewees, who took the mi-
nority view, asserted that the full terms should be disclosed in order to re-
veal the extent of the influence that the funders may have on the funded 
party. Others, who were opposed to the proposition, commented that such 
disclosure would be irrelevant to the effective management of the arbitral 
process.16 
Taking into account the Survey results, to better address the identified 
and perceived concerns, International Council for Commercial Arbitration 
(ICCA) and Queen Marry University in London jointly created a Task Force 
on Third-Party Funding in International Arbitration in 2014. The Task Force 
is supposed to systematically study and make recommendations regarding 
the procedures, ethics, and related policy issues on TPF in international arbi-
tration. The Task Force is comprised of representatives drawn from all rele-
                                                 
14 Comapre J. von Goeler, Show Me Your Case and I’ll Show You the Money – How to 
Balance Conflicts Between Third-Party Funding and Confidentiality in Arbitration Proceed-
ings, Kluwer Arbitration Blog 21.07.2016, [online] http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/ 
2016/ 07/21/show-case-ill-show-money-balance-conflicts-third-party-funding-aand-con-
fidentiality-iin-arbitration-proceedings/ [accessed: 15.07.2017]. 
15 Queen Marry and White & Case 2015 International Arbitration Survey: Improve-
ments and Innovations in International Arbitration, [online] http://www.arbitration.qmul. 
ac.uk/docs/164761.pdf, [accessed: 15.07.2017]. 
16 Ibidem, pp. 46–48. 
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vant stakeholders, including arbitration practitioners, funders, government 
representatives and academics.17 
The Task Force on Third-Party Funding prepared a working draft report 
presented, for discussion purposes, at the 14th Annual ITA-ASIL Conference 
on Third-Party funding, held in Washington, D.C. on 12 April 2017. In light 
of the Report, the following issues should be addressed: 
1) transparency, without which the legitimacy of the arbitral process could 
be undermined; 
2) privilege (while in the U.K. and the U.S. common interest privilege would 
likely cover a claimant and funder working together on a case, this may 
well not be the case in civil law jurisdictions); 
3) costs (to what extent should the existence of TPF be taken into account 
in allocating costs in an increasingly “loser pays” legal environment? 
Should it be a factor when considering whether to grant an order on se-
curity for costs?) and 
4) definitions (who or what exactly is a third party funder?)18 
Both the Survey and the Task Force report underline the importance of 
regulating TPF for harmonized development of arbitration and integrity of 
the arbitration proceedings. In fact, some of the leading jurisdictions have 
already introduced relevant legislation. For example, as discussed in detail 
below, Hong Kong and Singapore have recently amended their legislation in 
order to create the legal framework for using TPF in arbitration and related 
proceedings.19 
 
3. Disclosure of Third Party Funding in International Arbitration 
 
The existence of TPF faces two major issues with respect to the disclosure. 
First of all, should the parties disclose the existence of TPF and/or identity 
                                                 
17 The Task Force is co-chaired by ICCA Governing Board Member William Park and 
Catherine Rogers, the Professor of Regulation, Ethics and the Rule of Law at Queen Mary, 
and Professor of Law and International Affairs at Penn State Law, and Professor Stavros 
Brekoulakis, Professor of Commercial Law and International Arbitration at Queen Mary. 
Lise Boseman, Executive Director of ICCA, will serve ex officio, see: ICCA – International 
Council for Commercial Arbitration, [online] http://www.arbitration-icca.org/projects/ 
Third_Party_Funding.html [accessed: 15.07.2017]. 
18 J. E. Vernon, op. cit.  
19 In Singapore TPF is regulated by Civil Law (Third-Party Funding) Regulations 2017 
(Regulation to Civil Law Act of 1999), that come into operation on 1 March 2017; whereas 
in Hong Kong the Arbitration and Mediation Legislation (Third Party Funding) (Amend-
ment) Bill 2016 was introduced on 11 January 2017. 
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of a funder, and if so – when and on what basis? Secondly, should the par-
ties disclose the terms and nature of a funding arrangement, and if so – when, 
on what basis, and under which terms? Currently, the parties are not obliged 
to reveal the involvement of a funder in a dispute. Therefore, the presence 
of the funder and the nature of its relationships with the attorneys and the 
parties in an international arbitration case is often unknown. Moreover, the 
funders generally require that their involvement is not revealed and use 
confidentiality agreements to prevent the disclosure.20 
The reasons why the disclosure of TPF may be necessary include the ar-
bitrators’ impartiality requiremenent, the potential conflicts of interest, and 
the transparency, the latter especially in the investment treaty arbitration. 
Even if the funders are not the parties to an arbitral dispute, they still par-
ticipate to certain extent in various stages of an arbitration. Thus, one of the 
potential sources of conflict is repetitious appointment in cases involving 
the same TPF, since generally the frequency of repeated appointments is 
seen as a concern for arbitrator’s independence and impartiality.21 Undis-
closed ties may give rise to grounds for removal of the arbitrator or chal-
lenge to the arbitral award.22 Early disclosure of the presence of TPF is there-
fore worthwhile as a means of eliminating the costly and adverse conse-
quences. 
The recently revised IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in Interna-
tional Arbitration (October 2014) addressed concerns regarding participa-
                                                 
20 M. Scherer, A. Goldsmith, op. cit., pp. 217–218. Discussing TPF disclosure obligations 
in the context of potential arbitrator impartiality issues, the funders baseline preference 
for non-disclosure of funding arrangements was coupled with a suspicion that disclo-
sure could adversely influence an arbitral tribunal. 
21 E. de Brabandere, ‘Mercantile Adventurers’? The Disclosure of Third-Party Funding 
in Investment Treaty Arbitration, “Grotius Centre Working Paper” 2016, No. 059-IEL, 
“Leiden Law School Research Paper”, p. 11, [online] https://ssrn.com/abstract=2846996 
[accessed: 15.07.2017], where this phenomenon is addressed as a ‘repeat arbitrators’. 
Author also identifies the ‘issue conflicts’ situation where an arbitrator may be tempted 
to decide an issue in a way that could benefit a position adopted by that same arbitrator 
acting as counsel in another investment dispute. See also: V. Sahani, Harmonizing…, op. 
cit., pp. 903–904. 
22 See: W. Park, C. Rogers, op. cit., p. 6, indicating the factors that contribute to the 
concerns about potential conflicts of interests, as the increase in the number of cases 
involving TPF, the highly concentrated segment of the funding industry that invests in 
international arbitration cases, the symbiotic relationship between funders and a small 
group of law firms, as well as close relations among elite law firms and leading arbitra-
tors. 
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tion of the funder in arbitration.23 General Standard 6(b) clarifies that if one 
of the parties is a legal entity, any legal or physical person having a control-
ling influence on the legal entity, or a direct economic interest in, the award 
to be rendered in the arbitration, may be considered to bear the identity of 
such party. Given the fact that the funder may have a direct economic inter-
est in the award, as such it may be considered to be an equivalent of the 
party. Moreover, under General Standard 7(a) the parties are required to 
disclose, on their own initiative at the earliest opportunity, any relationship 
with the arbitrator. The duty of disclosure of any relationship, direct or 
indirect, between the arbitrator and the party, has been extended to rela-
tionships with persons or entities having a direct economic interest in the 
award to be rendered in the arbitration, such as an entity providing funding 
for the arbitration, or having a duty to indemnify a party for the award.24 
The 2014 IBA Guidelines for Conflicts of Interest were the vital milestone 
towards transparency, as the first rules that directly address TPF. However, 
it is only soft law and, as the arbitral community is underlying – there has 
been no reported practice on their application to TPF so far.25 
Some authors also state that the broad rule 6(2) of the ICSID Convention 
Arbitration Rules, requiring the arbitrator to declare past and present pro-
fessional, business and other relationships (if any) with the parties and any 
other circumstance that might cause arbitrator’s reliability for independent 
judgment to be questioned by a party, does provide for the disclosure of rela-
tionships with the funder. However, as in the case of IBA Guidelines, such 
an obligation naturally requires knowledge of the funding arrangement.26 
Such an approach was followed by the arbitral institutions, again with 
the aim to pursue overarching strategy to enhance the transparency and 
                                                 
23 As to the outline of the key changes in the revised IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of 
Interest in International Arbitration see: K. Moyeed, C. Montgomery, N. Pal, A Guide to 
the IBA’s Revised Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest, Kluwer Arbitration Blog 29.01.2015, 
[online] http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2015/01/29/a-guide-to-the-ibas-revised-gui-
delines-on-conflicts-of-interest/ [accessed: 15.07.2017]. 
24 IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, adopted by reso-
lution of the IBA Council on Thursday 23 October 2014, Explanation to General Standard 
6(b) and 7(a), pp. 14–15; [online] https://www.ibanet.org/Publications/publications_ 
IBA_guides_and_free_materials.aspx#collapseOne [accessed: 15.07.2017].  
25 See i.a. M. N. Iliescu, A Trend Towards Mandatory Disclosure of Third Party Funding? 
Recent Developments and Positive Impact, Kluwer Arbitration Blog 2.05.2016; [online] 
http:// kluwerarbitrationblog.com/ 2016/05/02/a-trend-towards-mandatory-disclosure- of-
third-party-funding-recent-developments-and-positive-impact/ [accessed: 15.07.2017]. 
26 E. de Brabandere, op. cit., p. 13. 
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predictability of the arbitration process. In February 2016, the ICC adopted 
the Guidance Note for the disclosure of conflicts by arbitrators, as a part of 
the Note to Parties and Arbitral Tribunals on the Conduct of the Arbitration 
under the ICC Rules of Arbitration. Under the general duty of all arbitrators 
to act at all times in an impartial and independent manner, arbitrators should 
in each case consider disclosing relationships with any entity having a di-
rect economic interest in the dispute or an obligation to indemnify a party 
for the award.27 Although important, the approach adopted by ICC is imper-
fect. Not only does it not require mandatory disclosure of TPF, but most 
importantly it does not impose the disclosure obligation on the parties. 
When the party has not disclosed the existence of the funding agreement, 
the arbitrator will not be able to evaluate the potential relationship with the 
funder that might in turn endanger the integrity of the arbitral process. 
In that context, a path taken by Singapore International Arbitration Cen-
tre (SIAC) in recently released Investment Arbitration Rules, offering a spe-
cialized set of procedures for the conduct of international investment arbi-
tration,28 is worth noting. Under Art. 24(l), the Tribunal shall have the power 
to order the disclosure of the existence of a party’s third-party funding ar-
rangement and/or the identity of the third-party funder and, where appro-
priate, details of the third-party funder’s interest in the outcome of the pro-
ceedings, and/or whether or not the third-party funder has committed to 
undertake adverse costs liability. The Rules give the tribunal far-reaching 
legitimacy to order disclosure, the scope of which is wide, covering not only 
the fact of TPF, but also the identity of the funder, as well as details as to the 
funding arrangements. The last information that might be demanded, re-
garding the TPF’s exposure to costs, touches upon highly controversial is-
                                                 
27 Guidance Note for the disclosure of conflicts by arbitrators was adopted unani-
mously by the Bureau of the Court on 12.02.2016, incorporated into the Note to Parties 
and Arbitral Tribunals on the Conduct of the Arbitration under the ICC Rules of Arbitra-
tion, 1.03.2017, p. 6, point 24; [online] https://iccwbo.org/media-wall/news-speeches/ 
icc-court-adopts-guidance-note-on-conflict-disclosures-by-arbitrators/ [accessed: 15.07. 
2017]. As to the critical analysis of the ICC Guidance Note, see: A. Goldsmith, L. Melchion-
da, The ICC’s Guidance Note on Disclosure and Third-Party Funding: A Step in the Right 
Direction, Kluwer Arbitration Blog 14.03.2016; [online] http://kluwerarbitrationblog. 
com/ 2016/03/14/the-iccs-guidance-note-on-disclosure-and-third-party-funding-a-step- 
in-the-right-direction/ [accessed: 17.07.2017]. 
28 Investment Arbitration Rules of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre,  
1st Edition, 1.01.2017. The Rules shall apply by agreement in disputes involving a State, 
State-controlled entity or intergovernmental organization, whether arising out of a con-
tract, treaty, statute or other instrument.  
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sue, namely whether, and if so, to what extent, the funder may be liable for 
the successful adverse party’s costs. It is postulated that since the funder 
exercises great control over the claimant’s behavior in the arbitration pro-
ceedings, often directing the course of the proceedings, the adverse costs 
award should have an effect on the funder. However, currently there is no 
relevant court or arbitral practice to support this position.29 This is due to 
the basic principle of arbitration proceedings – consent. Since arbitration 
cannot extend its effect to the third parties, an arbitral award only binds the 
parties to the arbitration proceedings. The impossibility of an arbitral tri-
bunal to make an adverse costs award against the funder,30 might eventuate 
the successful respondent not being able to recover the legal costs neither 
from the indigent claimant nor from the funder.31 
Recognizing the need for more effective regulation of TPF in interna-
tional commercial and investment arbitration, the issue of disclosure was 
also recently incorporated into free trade agreements. The CETA, revisited 
in 2016, cited above, includes a provision requiring the disputing party 
benefiting from TPF to disclose to the other disputing party and to the tribu-
nal the name and address of the third party funder. The disclosure shall be 
made at the time of the submission of a claim, or, if the financing agreement 
is concluded after the submission of a claim, as soon as the agreement is 
concluded.32 The same provision is included in the TTIP.33 
Both in Hong Kong and Singapore, the national law prescribes disclosure 
requirements in relation to TPF. In Hong Kong the disclosure requires writ-
ten notice by the funded party to the arbitral tribunal and other parties in 
                                                 
29 See: RSM Production Corporation v. Saint Lucia, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/10, As-
senting reasons of Gavan Griffith to decision on Saint Lucia’s Request for Security for Costs, 
13.08.2014, points 12–14, where the position of TPF in the arbitration proceedings that 
in fact only shares in the rewards of success, and risks no more than spent costs in the 
event of a failure, was compared to “a gambler’s Nirvana: Heads I win, and Tails I do not 
lose.” See also: E. de Brabandere, op. cit., p. 18.  
30 See: Art. 38(4) of ICC Rules of Arbitration (as of 1 March 2017), stating that the fi-
nal award shall fix the costs of the arbitration and decide which of the parties shall bear 
them or in what proportion they shall be borne by the parties. The same provision, allow-
ing the tribunal to order the costs only against the parties to the proceedings, might be 
find also in i.a. Art. 42 of UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Rule 35 of the SIAC Arbitration 
Rules (as of 1 August 2016).  
31 Thorough analysis of the third party funder’s liability for the adverse costs awards, 
see: P. Živković, D. Galagan, op. cit.  
32 CETA, Chapter 8 (Investment), Section A, Art. 8.26.  
33 TTIP, Chapter II (Investment), Section 3, Art. 8, the negotiations on the investment 
chapter were finalized in November 2015.  
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the arbitration of the fact the TPF agreement has been made, and the name 
of the funder, upon commencement of the arbitration, or if the agreement 
was entered after the commencement, within 15 days of the agreement.34 
Whereas in Singapore it is the legal practitioner, which conducts any dis-
pute resolution proceedings before a court or tribunal, who must disclose 
to the court or tribunal, and to every other party to those proceedings the 
existence of any TPF contract related to the costs of those proceedings, and 
the identity and address of any funder involved in funding the costs. The 
disclosure must be made at the date of commencement of the dispute reso-
lution proceedings where the funding contract is entered into before the 
date of commencement of those proceedings, or as soon as practicable after 
the funding contract is entered into where the contract is entered after the 
date of commencement of the dispute resolution proceedings.35 
In line with those developments towards greater transparency and in-
tegrity of arbitral proceedings, the importance of disclosure of TPF was also 
underlined in recent investment arbitration cases. Starting point was the 
case Teinver S.A., et al v. Argentine Republic.36 Referring to newspaper pub-
lications, in which it was reported that the alleged majority shareholder of 
some of the Claimants had transferred part of its ICSID claim to the U.S. 
investment fund in exchange for a contribution to pay the costs arising in 
the proceedings, the respondent requested that the ICSID Tribunal required 
the Claimants to provide all available information regarding the matter and 
the content of the agreement that was signed with said investment fund, 
and to also submit all related documentation. The Claimants, on the other 
hand, stressed that they had no obligation to disclose any agreements with 
the third parties regarding the funding of costs in this proceeding, and that 
                                                 
34 However, in Hong Kong failure to disclose does not render the person liable to ju-
dicial or other proceedings, but may be taken into account by any court or tribunal if it is 
relevant. See also: G. Laughton, Third Party Funding in International Commercial Arbitra-
tion Hong Kong and Singapore, Lexlogy 27.03.2017, [online] http://www.lexology.com/ 
library/detail.aspx?g=b87941df-279c-4731-982d-2133f814307a [accessed: 15.07.2017]; 
S. Jhangiani, R. Coldwell, Third-Party Funding for International Arbitration in Singapore 
and Hong Kong – A Race to the Top?, Kluwer Law Blog 30.11.2016, [online] http://kluwer-
arbitrationblog.com/ 2016/11/30/ third-party-funding-for-international-arbitration-in-
singapore-and-hong-kong-a-race-to-the-top/ [accessed: 15.07.2017]. 
35 In Singapore, these additional requirements as to the form and time of the disclo-
sure are provided in the Art. 49A of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 
2015, as amended on 1 March 2017. 
36 Teinver S.A., Transportes de Cercanías S.A. and Autobuses Urbanos del Sur S.A. v. 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/1. 
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Respondent failed to argue the necessity or relevance of its request.37 The 
Tribunal had rejected Respondent’s request at this early stage as it did not 
consider the currently available information on record as sufficient. How-
ever, the Tribunal added that it did not preclude reconsidering a similar re-
quest in the future once the main pleadings had been filed.38 The modest 
reasoning provided by the Tribunal on that point did not involve the poten-
tial for conflicts of interest. 
This approach has changed in the later case Guaracachi America, Inc. et 
al v. The Plurinational State of Bolivia.39 The Respondent requested the 
production of funding agreement and further documentation in order to 
evaluate a security for costs request and to confirm that there were no con-
flicts of interest for the arbitration on account of the funder, whose identity 
remains unknown. The Claimants objected, arguing that Bolivia has not 
demonstrated what the conflict of interest would be.40 The UNCITRAL Tri-
bunal decided not to order the production of the agreement or any further 
documentation. The Tribunal shared the view that the Respondent has 
failed to specify what the conflict of interest created by the agreement would 
be. In any case, the applicable provisions governing conflicts of interest do 
not foresee the production of documents (as requested by the Respondent) 
by the parties, but rather disclosure by the arbitrators upon becoming aware 
of circumstances that could create a conflict of interest. However, since the 
identity of the funder has become known (due to the Respondent’s request 
for security for costs), in order to remove any doubt, the members of the 
Tribunal declared that they have no relationship with the funder, and are 
not aware of any circumstance that could give rise to justifiable doubts as to 
their impartiality and independence on account of the financing of the 
Claimants’ claims.41 Although the request for the production of documents 
was dismissed, the Tribunal still gave careful consideration to the integrity 
of the arbitration proceedings. 
                                                 
37 Teinver S.A., Transportes de Cercanías S.A. and Autobuses Urbanos del Sur S.A. v. 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/1, Decision on Jurisdiction, 21 December 2012, 
para. 24–25. 
38 Ibidem, para. 26. 
39 Guaracachi America, Inc. and Rurelec PLC v. The Plurinational State of Bolivia, UN-
CITRAL, PCA Case No. 2011–2017 (international investment agreement case), [online] 
https://www.italaw.com/cases/518 [accessed: 15.07.2017].  
40 Guaracachi America, Inc. and Rurelec PLC v. The Plurinational State of Bolivia, UN-
CITRAL, PCA Case No. 2011–2017, Procedural Order No. 13, 21 February 2013, para. 6–7. 
41 Ibidem, para. 8–9.  
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In the case Muhammet Çap & Sehil Inşaat Endustri ve Ticaret Ltd. Sti. v. 
Turkmenistan, the ICSID Tribunal made a step forward.42 The Respondent 
requested disclosure of the identity and nature of the involvement of third-
party funder(s) for the Claimants in the arbitration proceedings, arguing 
that this was necessary to ensure there were no conflicts of interest, and 
that such a disclosure may be relevant to a potential security for costs ap-
plication. The Tribunal ordered the Claimants to confirm whether their 
claims are being funded by a third-party funder, and, if so, to reveal to the 
Respondent and the Tribunal the name(s) and details of the third-party 
funder(s), as well as the nature of the arrangements concluded with the 
third-party funder(s), including whether and to what extent it(they) will 
share in any successes that the Claimants may achieve in this arbitration.43 
The Tribunal underlined that the disclosure of funder’s identity will first 
and foremost ensure independence and impartiality of arbitrators. In that 
aspect, the Tribunal invoked its general power to preserve the integrity of 
the arbitral process and the good faith of the proceedings. While, when it 
comes to the full disclosure of the nature of the arrangements concluded 
with the funder, this was vital for the Tribunal to establish the grounds for 
an intended request for security for costs.44 
Finally, in the case South American Silver Limited v. Bolivia,45 the Re-
spondent requested disclosure of the name of the funder on the basis that it 
was necessary to ensure the integrity of the arbitration and ensure the Tri-
bunal’s independence and impartiality. The Respondent also requested the 
terms of the funding agreement in order to determine whether the arbitra-
tion claims had been assigned, and whether the funder had committed to 
pay for an adverse costs order.46 The UNCITRAL Tribunal ordered that there 
is a basis for ordering the disclosure of the name of the funder, but it did not 
find grounds to order the disclosure of the agreement entered into with the 
                                                 
42 Muhammet Çap & Sehil Inşaat Endustri ve Ticaret Ltd. Sti. v. Turkmenistan, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/12/6. 
43 Muhammet Çap & Sehil Inşaat Endustri ve Ticaret Ltd. Sti. v. Turkmenistan, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/12/6, Procedural Order No. 3, 12 June 2015, para. 13. 
44 The case was commented on in E. de Brabandere, op. cit., pp. 13–14 and p. 20, where 
the Author states that this case is remarkable, since it preempts a future request for securi-
ty for costs, and requests full disclosure of TPF in order to enable the Tribunal to properly 
address that future request. 
45 South American Silver Limited v. Bolivia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2013-15; [on-
line] https://www.italaw.com/cases/2121 [accessed: 15.07.2017]. 
46 South American Silver Limited v. Bolivia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2013-15, Pro-
cedural Order No. 10, 11 January 2016, para. 69–70. 
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funder. The latter was rejected because exceptional circumstances required 
to order security for costs were not present. The Tribunal explained that 
the mere existence of the funder was not sufficient to order it. Therefore, it 
was not relevant to determine whether the funder would assume (or not) 
an eventual costs award in favor of Bolivia.47 
To summarize, the recent case law suggests that investment arbitration 
tribunals started to underline the importance of disclosing the identity of 
the funder, emphasizing the transparency and integrity of the arbitration as 
well as independence of arbitrators. However, there seems to be a consen-
sus in the arbitration community as to the lack of obligation to disclose the 
terms of the funding agreement, unless the specifics of the particular case 
provide for that, especially as to the requests for the security for costs. Gen-
erally, the details of the funding arrangements are irrelevant and unneces-
sary to establish possible conflicts of interest. It is also stressed that the 
funding arrangement is a private agreement, unrelated to the merits of the 
underlying dispute, hence its full disclosure should only be demanded in 
exceptional circumstances, as a last resort.48 
 
Conclusions 
 
TPF has steadily grown into the arbitration realm and definitely is here to 
stay. According to some anecdotal reports two-thirds of ICSID cases filed in 
2013 implicated claimants which relayed on resources from a major funder 
on the market.49 This shows the scale of the TPF phenomenon, that shall be 
adequately regulated and put into the legal frames in the interest of the 
arbitration practice, its users and arbitral institutions. 
First and foremost, the existing regime of fragmentary regulation is in-
adequate to ensure the fundamental principle of integrity of the arbitration 
process and impartiality of the arbitrators. Conflicts of interest involving 
                                                 
47 Ibidem, para. 80–81, 84. 
48 V. Sahani, Harmonizing…, op. cit., p. 904. See also: A. Goldsmith, L. Melchionda, op. 
cit., where the Authors state that disclosing the identity of any funder associated with     
a claim does not mean requiring disclosure of the terms of funding, which should be 
considered only upon a demonstration that such additional information is necessary and 
relevant. Abstract invocations of transparency interests would not suffice. See also the 
judgment of the Tribunal in the case South American Silver Limited v. Bolivia (described 
above). 
49 Although no reliable statistics were gathered, the estimation was made by the Task 
Force on the basis of information provided by major funder, see: W. Park, A. Rogers, op. 
cit., p. 3. 
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funders could be prevented and resolved only by the adoption of both broad 
definition of TPF arrangements and disclosure requirement. The recent 
legislative steps taken by Hong Kong and Singapore are noteworthy, since 
they effectively complement the IBA Guidelines, some of the arbitration 
rules and international treaties that also recognized the importance of the 
obligation to disclose the use of funding agreements.50 However, in order to 
secure a greater efficiency, the obligation should be imposed on the funders, 
the parties and/or the counsels, since its imposition only on the arbitrators 
might be hampered by the lack of knowledge of the third party funder’s 
involvement. Finally, as to the scope of the disclosure, it is reasonable to 
argue that disclosing the full identity of a funder is sufficient to meet the 
objective of transparency and integrity of the arbitration proceedings. 
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Hungary Is Campaigning:  
Main Issues of the New Electoral Campaign Legislation 
 
 
ABSTRACT  
 
A number of recent amendments explain the actuality of the topic, since on 26th No-
vember 2012 the National Assembly adopted Act XXXVI of 2013 on Electoral Proce-
dure (hereinafter: Electoral Procedure Act), which introduced radical changes in the 
electoral campaign legislation in Hungary. According to the Act, “campaign methods 
shall include all methods capable of influencing or used in an attempt to influence 
voters’ choices.”1 The most used campaign methods are regulated with more details: 
posters, direct contact by the nominating organization or the candidate, political ad-
vertisements, election rallies. Thus this essay deals with the legal notion of electoral 
procedure, electoral campaign and the campaign finance. 
 
KEYWORDS 
 
electoral campaign, electoral procedure, Hungary, media campaign, campaign finance 
 
Hungary’s moments are quite expensive, 
but enchanting words and grandiloquent declamations are too cheap. 
 
Count István Széchenyi 
 
Introduction 
 
A number of recent amendments explain the actuality of the topic, since on 
26th November 2012 the National Assembly adopted Act XXXVI of 2013 on 
Electoral Procedure (hereinafter: Electoral Procedure Act), which intro-
duced radical changes in the electoral campaign legislation. 
                                                 
1 Section 140 of Act XXXVI of 2013 on Electoral Procedure. 
82  EMESE PÁL 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
The campaign – in its broadest sense – is the commencement of the elec-
toral process that actually begins immediately after the former elections, as 
the loser nominating organizations are preparing for the next elections with 
their activities – even without direct references. The official campaign pe-
riod lasts from the 50th day before the voting until the end of voting on the 
voting day,2 so the period available to popularize party programmes has 
been shortened. 
Sections 141–142 of the Act determines campaign activity: 
 
The following shall be campaign activities: the use of campaign resources in the cam-
paign period, and any other activity in the campaign period aimed at influencing or 
attempting to influence voters’ choices. The following shall not be considered elec-
tion campaign: the activities of election bodies, and personal communication be-
tween citizens as private persons, regardless of its content and form.3 
 
On one hand, “campaigning” is one of the means of persuasion at the 
disposal of the parties competing for political power in order to seek the 
voters’ support to their programme or candidate. On the other hand, elec-
toral campaign should inform the citizens appropriately and prepare them 
to express their opinion in public affairs and to make decisions in political 
disputes. Article 2 of the Fundamental Law declares that “members of the 
National Assembly shall be elected by universal and equal suffrage in a di-
rect and secret ballot, in elections which guarantee the free expression of 
the will of the voters, in a manner laid down in a cardinal Act.”4 This is pro-
tected by the freedom of opinion, of information and of orientation. None-
theless, public administration should observe the law for the sake of these 
freedoms. 
In Hungary, as the political-economic-social framework returned to the 
rule of law after 1989, the legality of public administration became a consti-
tutional requirement. It means legal control over administrative activities, 
i.e. that public administration observes the law and causes its observance 
by others. The legality of public administration includes the realization of 
other conditions too,5 such as the legality of national and local elections, 
which requires the accomplishment of the basic principles of the electoral 
procedure, established by the Electoral Procedure Act as well. 
                                                 
2 Section 139 of Act XXXVI of 2013 on Electoral Procedure. 
3 Section 141–142 of Act XXXVI of 2013 on Electoral Procedure. 
4 Article 2 of the Fundamental Law. 
5 A. Rácz, A közigazgatás törvényességének követelményei, [in:] Szamel Lajos Tudomá-
nyos Emlékülés, ed. F. Csefkó, Pécs 2000, p. 149. 
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During the electoral campaign some of the principles settled by the Act 
shall prevail more efficiently, e.g. the protection of the fairness of the elec-
tion, equal opportunities for candidates and nominating organizations, and 
the exercise of rights in good faith and in accordance with their purpose. 
The last principle shall be given greater importance: although during cam-
paign period candidates and nominating organizations have the right to 
express critiques in respect of each other’s activity and programme (so-
called ‘negative campaigning’), this cannot lead to the infringement of the 
exercise of rights in good faith and in accordance with their purpose. Con-
sequently, it is highly relevant to distinguish between a negative opinion, 
unable to violate individually the electoral legislation, and a statement, 
which, if false, can mislead the voters or, in more serious cases, might trig-
ger criminal consequences.6 The Electoral Procedure Act establishes the 
fundamental criteria which determine whether the campaign observes or 
not the principles of the exercise of rights in good faith and in accordance 
with their purpose and of the equal opportunities. It is worth mentioning 
too that the judgements dealing with negative campaigning have referred 
several times to the practice of the European Court of Human Rights, the 
Constitutional Court, and of the High Court of Justice.7 
The new Electoral Procedure Act – in contrast to the former legislation – 
abolished the institution of the general campaign silence, introducing only  
a prohibition relative to specific places and to campaign methods on the day 
of voting. 
 
Main Details of Electoral Campaign Legislation 
 
In respect of the infringement of campaign silence, Section 41 of the former 
Electoral Procedure Act regulated campaign methods merely hinting at 
some of them. The act in force did not complete the list, yet it modified the 
scheme of the legislation in respect of the fact that campaign silence was 
abolished. 
According to the Act, “campaign methods shall include all methods ca-
pable of influencing of used in an attempt to influence voters’ choices.”8 The 
                                                 
6 Sections 226–226/A–226/B of the Act C of 2012 on the Criminal Code and 36/1994 
(VI. 24.) ABH Constitutional Court Decision.  
7 R. Sasvári, Az új választási eljárási szabályozás gyakorlati tapasztalatai, [online] 
http:// www.kozszov.org.hu/dokumentumok/UMK/UMK_2014_4/16_Sasvari_Robert.pdf 
[accessed: 23.07.2017]. 
8 Section 140 of Act XXXVI of 2013 on Electoral Procedure. 
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most used campaign methods are regulated with more details: posters, 
direct contact by the nominating organization or the candidate, political 
advertisements, election rallies. 
 
1. Campaign methods: Posters 
 
Posters are the most well-known campaign methods, regarding which the 
Act fixes that for the purposes of the election campaign ‘poster’ shall mean 
election placards, legends, flyers, images and emblems regardless of size 
and the surface they are on.9 
The National Election Commission (hereinafter: NEC) established that, 
according to Act CLXXXV of 2010 on Media Services and Mass Media, an 
election poster shall be considered a ‘publication.’10 thus it shall display the 
key editorial and publication data (imprint). The imprint shall display the 
publisher’s name, registered office and the name of the person responsible 
for publishing.11 Consequently – as highlighted by the NEC too – it shall be 
indicated on the election posters and an omission infringes the principle of 
the exercise of rights in good faith and in accordance with their purpose, as 
in this case the exercise of the right to having the poster edited compels the 
violation of the rules relative to the publication.12 
According to the Electoral Procedure Act, in the campaign period nomi-
nating organizations and candidates may produce posters without expressed 
permission or registration. In the campaign period posters may be placed 
without any limitation. In respect of the court practice up until now, this 
provision of the Act is supposed to be one of the most polemic issues. The 
Act states that “posters may not be placed on the walls of buildings and 
fences without the consent of the owner, the tenant or, in the case of property 
owned by the state or the municipality, the consent of the entity that exer-
cises trustee’s rights.”13 Posters may be placed without the owner’s consent 
                                                 
9 Section 144 (1) of Act XXXVI of 2013 on Electoral Procedure. 
10 “Publication: […] any other printed material (address registers, name registers, 
publications containing graphics, drawings or photos, maps; flyers; printed postcards, 
greeting or similar cards; printed pictures, samples, photos; printed calendars; printed 
business advertisements, catalogues, brochures, poster ads and similar items; other textual 
publications)” – Section 203 of Act CLXXXV of 2010 on Media Services and Mass Media. 
11 Section 46 (9) of Act CLXXXV of 2010 on Media Services and Mass Media. 
12 1112/2014 NEC Decision with regard to the complaint submitted by the individuals 
Z. M and A. B. 
13 Section 144 (4) of Act XXXVI of 2013 on Electoral Procedure. 
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– but observing the right to the defence of property – on objects not con-
sidered buildings or fences. 
It is worth mentioning the Curia’s rather controversial practice with re-
gard to the placement of election posters on poles. On 5th March 2014 the 
Curia decided that, according to Section 12 (3b) of Act I of 1988 on Public 
Road Traffic (hereinafter: Road Traffic Act)14 and to Section 3 (2) a) of Gov-
ernment Decree 224/2011. (X.21.) on the rules of placing billboards, adver-
tising media and other carriers of advertisements along public roads,15 their 
placement shall be prohibited.16 In its decision the Curia upheld the NEC’s 
128/2014 second-instance resolution. In the Reasoning, the Curia stated 
that Section 1 of the Decree expressly names the election poster settled in 
Section 144 of the Electoral Procedure Act as a carrier of advertisement. 
Thus, it is rather evident that election posters fall under the prohibition fixed 
both by Section 12 of Road Traffic Act and by Section the present Govern-
ment Decree. 
On the other hand, in its decision passed on 17th March, The Curia estab-
lishes: 
 
According to the right interpretation of Section 144 of the Electoral Procedure Act, 
the placement of election posters shall be regulated exclusively by its own provi-
sions. Election bodies may analyse the observance of these provisions, but they may 
not apply road traffic rules or decrees relative to the placement of billboards, for Sec-
tion 144 of the Electoral Procedure Act composes a closed system. The above-men-
tioned Decree fixes precisely the set of advertisement carriers including election post-
ers, though, its application is excluded by Section 144 (4)-(7) of the Electoral Proce-
dure Act. Thus, this provision may not abrogate the general rule of placement with-
out limits.17 
                                                 
14 “Billboards and any other advertising items may not be placed on poles of street 
lighting, electricity and telephone, regardless of the fact that the pole is erected on the 
part without road surface, pavement, footway or cycle path” – Section 12 (3b) of Act I of 
1988 on Public Road Traffic. 
15 “For the purpose of this Decree, billboards, advertising media any other carriers of 
advertisement (hereinafter: carrier of advertisement): any sign or object which is con-
sidered economical advertisement according to Section 3 d) of Act XLVIII of 2008 on the 
conditions and restrictions of business advertising activity or the scope of which is to 
convince the by-passers on private roads not closed to the public about supporting or 
rejecting certain ideologies, principles, values and conceptions, including the election 
poster mentioned by Section 144 of Act XXXVI of 2013 on Electoral Procedure” – Section 
3 (2) a) of Government Decree 224/2011 (X.21). 
16 Kvk. III. 37. 183/2014/10 Curia Decision. 
17 Kvk. II. 37. 307/2014/3. Curia Decision. 
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Consequently, in these cases the placement of posters on poles does not 
infringe the Electoral Procedure Act. However, in other cases, e.g. if the 
poster covers a road sign, further rules ought to be considered by the NEC. 
Another exception stated by the Electoral Procedure Act: “On certain pub-
lic buildings or on specific parts of public domain, the placement of posters 
and billboards may be prohibited by the municipality, in the Capital by the 
municipality of the Capital for reasons of protection of monuments and the 
environment.”18 Exempli gratia, it is prohibited to place election posters on 
any bridge on the Danube and in any subways.19 Furthermore, “it is pro-
hibited to place posters on or inside buildings that serve as premises for 
public or municipality authorities.”20 In this respect, the Metropolitan Court 
of Budapest upheld 16/2014 (IV.1.) NEC Resolution which declares that 
“healthcare providers shall not be considered state or local authority.”21 
For the sake of the procedural principles of the election, such as the pro-
tection of the fairness of the election and the exercise of rights in good faith 
and in accordance with their purpose, the posters shall be placed in such     
a fashion that they do not cover the posters of other candidates and nomi-
nating organizations, and that they may be removed without causing any 
damage. According to Decree 8. Kpk. 30. 158/2006/2 of the County Court of 
Hajdú-Bihar: “The condition of the poster formerly placed has no impor-
tance, the person who places shall not decide whether the fixed poster of 
other candidate is capable of drawing voters’ attention. The person who 
covers the poster violates the law even if it has been already covered.”22 
The Electoral Procedure Act establishes that “posters shall be removed 
within 30 days after the day of the vote or the costs of the removal shall be 
borne by those who have placed them or those on behalf of whom they have 
been placed.”23 In this respect, the NEC launched a guideline in which it 
fixes that the election committee has no competence to adjudge a complaint 
submitted because the obligation of the removal of the poster within 30 
days after the election has been violated. Furthermore, this body is not au-
thorized to impose fines. Unlawful omission is an issue of public property, 
                                                 
18 Section 144 (5) of Act XXXVI of 2013 on Electoral Procedure. 
19 Section 2 5)–6) of 4/2014 Decision of the General Assembly of Budapest on the 
prohibition of the placement of election posters on certain public buildings and specific 
parts of public zones. 
20 Section 144 (5) of Act XXXVI of 2013 on Electoral Procedure. 
21 16/2014 (IV.1.) NEC Resolution. 
22 Decree 8. Kpk. 30. 158/2006/2 of the County Court of Hajdú-Bihar. 
23 Section 144 (7) of Act XXXVI of 2013 on Electoral Procedure. 
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regulated by Section 13 (1) 2) of Act CLXXXIX of 2011 on Local Governments 
in Hungary.24 
 
2. Campaign methods: Election Rallies 
 
According to Section 145 (1) of the Electoral Procedure Act, “election rallies 
may be held during the campaign period. Election rallies shall be public.”25 
Election rally – despite having all the essential features of an assembly – 
does not come within the scope of Act III of 1989 on the Right to Assembly, 
thus it can be held in campaign period without former registration.26 In our 
opinion, though, it is convenient to make a registration to the police, so they 
can prepare for the protection of the event in case of emergency. 
Article XVIII (1) of the Fundamental Law establishes that “everyone shall 
have the right to peaceful assembly.”27 In consonance with this constitu-
tional requirement, election rallies shall be organized in peaceful manner, 
i.e. participants’ conduct shall not be violent. They may join the rally but 
may not carry firearms, explosives, deadly weapons or any other items 
which can cause considerable harm. However, it would be highly agreeable 
to introduce a specific set of security rules, exclusively dealing with election 
rallies. 
Comparing to the general rules of assembly, in case of an election rally 
the organizers’ group is smaller, as election rallies established by the Elec-
toral Procedure Act may only be organized by a candidate or nominating 
organization taking part in the election, or by the initiator of referendum or 
popular initiative. Consequently, all the unions of the organizers mentioned 
by the Electoral Procedure Act are considered election rallies, both in public 
and on private property. During the campaign period, the election rally can 
be distinguished from the assemblies falling under Act III of 1989 on the 
basis of its purpose: it aims to influence or to attempt to influence voters’ 
choice.28 It is worth questioning, though, whether the scope or the issue of 
the organization have any importance with regard to its classification as an 
election rally.29 
                                                 
24 NEC Guideline 13/2014 on the application of the rules with regard to the removal 
of election posters. 
25 Section 145 (1) of Act XXXVI of 2013 on Electoral Procedure. 
26 Section 3 a) of Act III of 1989. 
27 Article XVIII (1) of the Fundamental Law. 
28 Választójogi kommentárok, ed. A. Cserni, Budapest 2014, p. 271. 
29 B. Hajas, A gyülekezési jog egyes aktuális elméleti és gyakorlati kérdései, Pécs 2012, 
p. 144. 
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On the day of voting, posters may be placed with the limitations fixed by 
law, but election rallies may not be held. With regard to the spot of the rally, 
Section 145 (2) of the Electoral Procedure Act states that “for the purposes 
of the election campaign, state and municipality budgetary agencies shall 
make premises and other necessary equipment available to the candidates 
and the nominating organizations under equal conditions.”30 It is worth 
mentioning that these agencies are only bound towards the registered can-
didates and nominating organizations. This obligation ensures the realiza-
tion of the principle of equal opportunities during the campaign period. “In 
buildings serving as premises for state or municipality authorities, it shall 
be prohibited to carry out campaign activities, hold rallies, except at settle-
ments with less than five hundred inhabitants, provided that no other 
community building is available.”31 Election rallies may not be held e.g. in 
the marriage hall of the mayor’s office32 or in the Deputy Speaker’s office in 
the Parliament.33 
 
3. Campaign methods: Political Advertisements34 – Media Campaign 
 
Section 146 of the Electoral Procedure Act pronounces that 
 
[…] political advertisement shall mean a political message in the media as defined in 
Section 203 (55) of Act CLXXXV of 2010 on Media Services and Mass Media (herein-
after: Media Act) with the difference that party, political movement and government 
shall be interpreted as nominating organization and independent candidate. ‘Politi-
cal advertisement’ shall mean any content published in the press or in the cinema in 
return for consideration, promoting or advocating support for a nominating organi-
zation or independent candidate, or promoting the name, objectives, activities, slo-
gan or emblem of such entities.35 
 
Political advertisements are applied as campaign methods within the 
framework of media campaign and they may be published exclusively after 
the registration of the candidate or the nominating organization. The sub-
stantial difference between the two campaign methods is that political ad-
                                                 
30 Section 145 (2) of Act XXXVI of 2013 on Electoral Procedure. 
31 Section 144 (5) of Act XXXVI of 2013 on Electoral Procedure. 
32 2. Kvk. 20. 711/2006/2 of the County Court of Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg. 
33 23/1998. (IV.6.) NEC Decision. 
34 In Hungarian ‘politikai reklám’ and ‘politikai hirdetés’ (the official English transla-
tion of the Electoral Procedure Act does not indicate this difference: [online] http:// 
valasztas.hu/en/ovi/241/241_1_10.html [accessed: 23.07.2017]).  
35 Section 146 of Act XXXVI of 2013 on Electoral Procedure. 
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vertisement shall be published in the press or in the cinema only in return 
for consideration, while political commercial36 shall be broadcast in the 
media service free of charge. 
 
3.1. BROADCAST OF POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENTS 
 
According to Article IX (3) of the Fundamental Law, 
 
In the interest of the appropriate provision of information as necessary during the 
electoral campaign period for the formation of democratic public opinion, political ad-
vertisements may only be published in media services free of charge, under condi-
tions guaranteeing equal opportunities, laid down in a cardinal Act.37 
 
Political advertisements may be transmitted only on TV or on the radio. 
Section 147 of Electoral Procedure Act contains the general rules with 
regard to the broadcast of political advertisement: 
 
147. § (1) In the campaign period, political advertisements shall be broadcast by 
the media provider with identical conditions – especially with regard to the number, 
appearing order, timeframe and time of broadcast of political advertisements – of-
fered to nominating organisations that put forward candidates and the independent 
candidates. In case of joint candidates the nominating organisations are entitled jointly 
to order political advertisement. 
(2) No opinion, assessing explanation shall be attached to such political advertise-
ments. 
(3) Media content providers shall not demand or accept consideration for broad-
casting political advertisements. 
(4) Those who provide political advertisements to be broadcast in audio-visual 
media shall arrange for the advertisements to be subtitled or supplemented with sign 
language interpreting. (This ensures the unimpeded access to political campaign.) 
(4a) No political advertisement shall be published on ballot day. 
(5) In other regards, the rules of Media Act shall be applied to the broadcast of po-
litical advertisements.38 
 
These rules shall be applied to those local and district media providers 
who are not obliged to announce the broadcast of political advertisement 
and – observing the law – are entitled to transmit political advertisement 
                                                 
36 Politikai reklám (hun). 
37 Article IX (3) of the Fundamental Law. 
38 Section 147 of Act XXXVI of 2013 on Electoral Procedure. 
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with no limitation with regard to duration or timeframe.39 Equal conditions 
shall not be analysed among the singular media providers, but per media 
provider. 
It is the patron who provides the production of the political advertise-
ment: he is banned from influencing media providers and is exclusively re-
sponsible for its content. Launching the political advertisement, the media 
provider is obliged to name precisely its patron, for it is rather questionable 
whether the voter is capable of distinguishing the advertisements of candi-
dates or nominating organizations.40 
The specific rules on the linear media services of public media providers 
and the country-wide available linear media services of media providers not 
falling under the first category are included by Section 147/F of Act XXXVI 
on 2013 on Electoral Procedure. 
 
147/A. § (1) During the campaign period before the general election of members 
of the National Assembly, after the legally binding registration of national lists, pub-
lic media providers shall broadcast in their linear media services political advertise-
ments thereof in the order as determined by the National Election Commission accord-
ing to (2). 
(2) During the campaign period before the general election of members of the 
National Assembly, the timeframe for broadcasting political advertisements shall be 
470 minutes for nominating organizations putting forward party lists and 130 min-
utes for organizations putting forward national minority list. The time available to 
the nominating organizations shall be divided in equal proportions between party 
lists and national minority lists. Time available for nominating organizations shall be 
divided in equal proportions per public media service. 
(3) Political advertisement shall be published by the public media provider in the 
media service with the greatest yearly audience rate. 
(4) The media provider shall broadcast 3 times per day without interruption the 
political advertisements in the timeframes between 6–8, 12–14 and 18–20 o’clock. 
Political advertisement of nominating organizations putting forward party lists and 
organizations putting forward national minority list shall be broadcasted in a row. 
The broadcast order of the political advertisements shall be changed daily for the 
sake of equal opportunity. 
(5) The public media provider shall broadcast the political advertisement in the 
day and timeframe as requested by the nominating organization. The nominating or-
ganization may request the broadcasting of political advertisement in one timeframe 
– for a duration of maximally one minute – only once per day. 
(6) The media provider is only obliged to broadcast the political advertisement if 
the nominating organization hands over its political advertisement latest on the sec-
ond day before the planned broadcast. 
                                                 
39 2/2014 NEC Guideline on the broadcast of political advertisements. 
40 Választójogi kommentárok, op. cit., p. 273. 
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147/D. § During the general elections of the national minority representatives 
on the day before ballot day public media providers shall broadcast the political ad-
vertisements of nominating organizations putting forward national list once, for        
a duration of 30 seconds per political advertisement. Provisions of section 147/A (3) 
and (6) shall be applied to the broadcasting. 
147/E. § The public media provider is not allowed to broadcast any further po-
litical advertisement than those according to 147/A–147/D.41 
 
In this respect, Hungarian Television Non-Profit Private Limited Com-
pany, Hungarian Radio Non-Profit Plc. and Duna Television Non-Profit Plc., 
as public media providers, shall broadcast political advertisements within 
the time limitations settled by law, from the 50th day before the election 
until the day before the election. 
 
147/F. § (1) In the campaign period before the general election, media providers 
with country-wide available linear media services not falling under provisions of Sec-
tion 147/A-147/E shall notify in a declaration the National Election Commission about 
their intention to broadcast political advertisements, also designating the used coun-
try-wide available linear media service/es/, latest by the 50th day before ballot day. 
Failing to comply this deadline shall result in not being allowed to broadcast political 
advertisements. The National Election Office shall publish on its official website the 
declarations of the concerned media providers, their name and the timeframe secured 
for the broadcast.42 
 
Exempli gratia, it is worth mentioning ‘TV2-case’ with regard to political 
advertisements. On 9th March, TV2 broadcasted nine times the Govern-
ment’s advertisements, entitled ‘Hungary is doing better,’ with a duration of 
fifty seconds each. In the complaint submitted to the NEC, according to the 
complainants’ view, the slogan and the audio visual effects of this social 
commercial are similar to the Government’s political advertisements. The 
NEC stated that, according to Electoral Procedure Act, it may not be consid-
ered political advertisement, for it had evidently indicated the Govern-
ment’s authority, but an announcement in the public interest or a social 
commercial, fixed in the Media Act.43 
Subsequently, complainants turned to the Curia pleading that it may clas-
sify the TV programme in question as political advertisement. The Curia 
amended the NEC’s decision and established that transmissions shall be 
                                                 
41 Section 147/A-D of Act XXXVI of 2013 on Electoral Procedure. 
42 Section 147/E-F of Act XXXVI of 2013 on Electoral Procedure. 
43 745/2014 NEC Decision with regard to the complaint of private individuals. 
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categorized on the basis of their content rather than their patron. Populariz-
ing the objective or the slogan of nominating organizations shall be consid-
ered political advertisement too. If the state supports one of nominating 
organizations in the mass media, it might lead to a violation of law.44 
 
3.2. BROADCAST OF POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENTS 
 
Section 148 of the Electoral Procedure Act settles the provisions of broad-
casting political advertisements: 
 
(2) If a press product wishes to publish political advertisements, it shall send to 
the National Audit Office a price list for its advertisement services within five work-
ing days after the call for elections. The National Audit Office shall enter the price list 
into its records and publish it on its website. The press product shall publish the 
same price list on its own website. 
(3) Political advertisements shall only be published by press products which 
have had their price list registered with the National Audit Office. Political adver-
tisements shall only be published in return for the consideration indicated in the reg-
istered price list.45 
 
Consequently, not meeting the deadline for registration, the press may 
not publish political advertisements even if it intends to ensure the publish-
ing free of charge.46 
 
4. Campaign methods: Direct Political Campaigning 
 
The Electoral Procedure Act fixes the rules of direct political campaigning: 
“149. § Election campaign materials may be delivered to voters by direct 
contact in accordance with the provisions of Section 89, with the restriction 
that the use of voters’ personal data – such as mobile phone numbers, e-mail 
addresses – shall require expressed consent.”47 
Direct political campaigning means delivering election campaign mate-
rials to voters by direct contact.48 
The name and address of voters in the polling district electoral register 
shall be supplied on request to the candidate by the election office with         
                                                 
44 Kvk. III. 37. 328/2014/6. Curia Decision. 
45 Section 148 of Act XXXVI of 2013 on Electoral Procedure. 
46 2/2014 NEC Guideline on the broadcast of political advertisements. 
47 Section 149 of Act XXXVI of 2013 on Electoral Procedure. 
48 Választási füzetek 193, ed. I. Pálffy, p. 18, [online] http://www.valasztas.hu/hu/ovi/ 
content/vf/vf_193.pdf [accessed: 14.09.2014].  
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a competence to register them. The above-mentioned data shall be supplied 
on request to nominating organizations by the National Election Office. The 
supply of data shall be conditional on the candidate providing proof of the 
payment of the amount of the monthly minimum wage (101 500 HUF). The 
supply of data shall be conditional on the nominating organization putting 
forward a list providing proof of the payment of the amount of the monthly 
minimum wage per candidate standing for election in the constituency cov-
ered by the list. The data supply fee shall be paid to the account of the Na-
tional Election Office.49 
Nevertheless, in order to protect the right to the protection of personal 
data declared by Article VI of the Fundamental Law,50 voters are entitled to 
prohibit the supply of their data, which, otherwise, would be legal. The data 
shall be supplied by the election office within five days. Subsequently, can-
didates and nominating organizations shall plead electronically the regis-
tration of personal data with the scope of campaigning to the National Au-
thority of Data Protection and Freedom of Information (hereinafter: the Au-
thority), as – according to the Authority’s announcement – political cam-
paign activities do not fall under the exceptions settled by Section 65 (3) of 
Act CXII of 2011 on the Right of Informational Self-Determination and on 
Freedom of Information. 
If the data are supplied by the election office, the candidate becomes       
a ‘data controller’, i.e. is entitled to make and execute decisions concerning 
data processing or have it executed by a data processor (e.g. by a nominat-
ing organization). Evidently, as a data controller, the candidate is responsi-
ble for the damages caused by the data processor in both cases. The candi-
date shall enter into contract with the nominating organization as a data 
processor and inform the voters (data subjects) about the data processor.51 
The supplied data shall be used only for direct political campaigning. 
Other use, copying and handing over to third parties shall be forbidden. 
Candidates and nominating organization putting forward a list shall destroy 
the supplied data not later than on the day of voting, and shall deliver a re-
                                                 
49 Sections 153–154 of Act XXXVI of 2013 on Electoral Procedure. 
50 Article VI (2) of the Fundamental Law: “Everyone shall have the right to the pro-
tection of his or her personal data, as well as to access and disseminate data of public in-
terest”. 
51 Announcement of the National Authority of Data Protection and Freedom of Infor-
mation on the methods of the registration of the data supply used for political campaign, 
[online] http://www.naih.hu/files/A-NAIH-koezlemenye-OKV-2014--3-.pdf [accessed: 
13.09.2014]. 
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cord of the destruction to the election office within three days.52 In case of 
omission, the election office is authorized to impose fine. 
If the nominating organization infringes the rules of data processing, the 
Authority is empowered to launch official investigation on the grounds of 
the infringement of voters’ right to the protection of their personal data.53 
Exempli gratia, campaign activity based on public phone books is consid-
ered violation of law, for the voters’ consent is necessary for the use of their 
phone or mobile phone number in direct political campaigning. 
 
5. Campaign methods: Opinion Polls 
 
The Electoral Procedure Act establishes that: “150. § On the day of voting, 
persons carrying out opinion poll surveys shall not enter the buildings where 
polling stations are located, and shall not in any way harass voters; they 
may only contact voters as they are exiting the polling station. The result of 
such opinion polls (exit polls) shall only be published after the end of voting 
as well.”54 
“While political campaign aims to influence voters’ choice and convic-
tion, publishing of the results of opinion polls does not have this direct ob-
jective”55 – as the Constitutional Court settles in its Decision 6/2007 (II. 27.). 
However, even if opinion polls cannot be considered campaign methods per 
se, publishing these results may influence voters’ choice. 
In 8/2014 Guideline on the time of the end and closing of voting, the Na-
tional Election Commission established that the results of exit polls shall be 
published after 19.00 CET, for this is the end of voting. Consequently, if at 
the end of voting (at 19.00) the local election commission does not close the 
voting because of the voters standing in queue, these voters might be in-
formed about the result of exit polls, which might influence their choice. 
Since persons carrying out opinion poll surveys shall not enter the build-
ings where polling stations are located, the Electoral Procedure Act cor-
rects the former provisions by ensuring the possibility of opinion polls to-
wards the voters exiting the building, rather than those leaving the polling 
station. 
 
                                                 
52 Section 155 of Act XXXVI of 2013 on Electoral Procedure. 
53 Section 52 (1) of Act CXII of 2011 on the Right of Informational Self-Determination 
and on Freedom of Information. 
54 Section 150 of Act XXXVI of 2013 on Electoral Procedure. 
55 Decision 6/2007 (II.27.) of Constitutional Court. 
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6. Partial Campaign Silence 
 
Campaign silence is the period during which exercising influence on voters’ 
choice is banned. In our legislation since 2010, it has been limited to the day 
of voting, as the Electoral Procedure Act had abolished the institution of 
classic campaign silence. Campaign activity – in consonance with the former 
provisions – is limited only on the day of voting with regard to its area and 
to certain campaign methods. 
In its Decision 39/2002 (IX.15.) the Constitutional Court highlighted that 
abolishing campaign silence is not unconstitutional, if the legislator ensures 
the peace of elections with other tools. 
In a seven-point guideline with examples, the National Election Commis-
sion clarified Section 143 of the Electoral Procedure Act about territorial 
campaign silence: “No election campaign activities may be pursued in public 
areas within 150 meters of the designated building’s entrance that is used to 
access the polling station.”56 
11/2014 NEC Guideline on the interpretation of the rules of relative ter-
ritorial campaign silence fixes that the prohibition refers to active campaign 
activity (in this sense, posters legally placed in public areas need not to be 
removed) and that campaign activity shall not be pursued either inside the 
building used to access the polling station or in the polling station itself. 
The Guideline declares that campaign ban within 150 meters generally 
refers to any electoral procedure. Furthermore, it settles that the public area 
of foreign country does not come within Hungary’s jurisdiction, thus it is 
free from relative campaign silence. In other words, on the day of voting, in 
foreign representations, campaign activity pursued within 150 meters from 
the building’s entrance used to access the polling station is not considered 
the infringement of the prohibition. 
On the other hand, Section 143 of the Electoral Procedure Act is violated 
if on the day of voting a vehicle with the posters of any candidate or nominat-
ing organization is waiting within, or passes constantly or regularly through 
the area of 150 meters. Exceptions are means of transport with scheduled 
timetable. Thus, election posters need not to be removed from buses and 
trams, whereas the requirement of impartiality is violated if e.g. on the day 
of voting members of the election commission distribute candidates’ em-
blems or wear the uniform of a nominating organization. 
Law is infringed too if campaign activity is pursued out of 150 meters 
but it can be heard or seen within the area (e.g. if activists use microphones). 
                                                 
56 Section 143 of Act XXXVI of 2013 on Electoral Procedure. 
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The validation of the principles of universal suffrage and direct ballot 
explains the next provisions: “The voter is entitled to get help from another 
person to apply for a mobile ballot box or to get to the polling station.”57 In 
this respect, though, the Electoral Procedure Act introduces the following 
restriction: “No public announcements can be made about applying for mo-
bile ballot boxes or transport to polling station, furthermore using buses for 
(organized) transport to polling stations is not allowed.”58 
As it was necessary to clarify whether this prohibition includes election 
bodies or not, 3/2014 NEC Guideline on the main questions of bus transfer 
on the day of voting established the interpretation of this provision. The 
Guideline declares that this ban includes election bodies, so election offices 
too, which shall pursue activities only determined by the Electoral Proce-
dure Act or by other electoral provision. Section 75 of the Electoral Proce-
dure Act itemizes the competence of election offices, in which publishing 
announcements on transport or bus transfer to the polling station are not 
included. Thus, they do not even have competence for such activities, which, 
furthermore, would be rather unlawful according to Section 143/A (2) of 
the Electoral Procedure Act. 
 
7. Campaign Finance 
 
The provisions of campaign finance are settled by Act LXXXVII of 2013 on 
the Transparency of Campaign Costs related to Election of the Members of 
the National Assembly, observing the principles of the electoral procedure, 
such as equal opportunities for candidates and nominating organizations, 
the exercise of rights in good faith and in accordance with their purpose, the 
protection of the fairness of the national election. 
According to the Act, each representative candidate for a single mandate 
constituency (up to 1 million HUF), party setting up a party list and national 
minority self-governments setting up a national minority list, is entitled to 
support from the central budget. During the campaign period the latter two 
may only use the support to cover real costs related to campaign activities, 
whereas representative candidates may only use it to cover exclusively their 
material expenditures. 
The support of parties setting up a party list shall be based on the product 
of the total number of mandates which can be acquired at the general elec-
                                                 
57 Section 143/A of Act XXXVI of 2013 on Electoral Procedure. 
58 Section 143/A (1)-(2) of Act XXXVI of 2013 on Electoral Procedure. 
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tion of the Members of the National Assembly multiplied by five million HUF 
(995 million HUF). The national minority self-governments shall be jointly 
entitled to support amounting to 30% of the support of parties setting up    
a party list (298, 5 million HUF).59 
The support is placed at the candidate’s disposal by the Hungarian State 
Treasury (hereinafter: the Treasury) after the registration, on Treasury ac-
count, with a Treasury card. The Treasury card may not be used to withdraw 
money, thus the candidate shall make payments from the account or by card. 
In case of representative candidates, the county office of the Treasury with 
competence in the single mandate constituency in question contributes to 
the provision of activities related to the support. Candidates nominated by  
a party are allowed to waive their right to the support for use by the party 
nominating them. 
Candidates shall submit a financial statement to the Treasury within 15 
days after the individual results of the general election. A candidate who 
fails to submit the statement within the deadline shall pay double the amount 
of their support. A candidate who submits the statement but it is not ap-
proved by the Treasury shall pay maximum double the amount of their sup-
port. If a candidate fails to obtain at least 2% of the valid votes cast in the 
single mandate constituency, they shall pay back the total amount of their 
support. On the other hand, the parties setting up a party list who do not 
enter the General Assembly do not have to pay back the amount of their 
support. In case of failure to meet payment obligation within the deadline, 
the Treasury shall propose the collection of the debt by the National Tax 
and Customs Administration of Hungary.60 
Section 9 (1) of the Act establishes that “all candidates and nominating 
organizations shall publish in the Official Gazette of Hungary the amount, 
source, and use of state and other funds spent on election within 60 days 
after the election of the Members of the General Assembly”. The use of state 
and other funds shall be audited by the State Audit Office of Hungary and 
the candidate or nominating organization who has exceeded the financial 
limit (5 million HUF per candidate)61 shall pay back to the central budget 
double the amount by which they have exceeded the total maximum amount 
that may be spent on the election. 
 
                                                 
59 Sections 1 (1), 4 (1) and 5 (1) of Act LXXXVII of 2013 on the Transparency of Cam-
paign Costs related to Election of the Members of the National Assembly. 
60 Section 8 of Act LXXXVII of 2013 on ibidem. 
61 Section 7 (1) of Act LXXXVII of 2013 on ibidem. 
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Conclusion 
 
Analysing the new provisions of the election campaign, it is worth mention-
ing that the legislator has shifted into the background the television cam-
paigns, which are considered more traditional and are getting gradually 
more insignificant in the Western democracies as well. On the other hand, 
the importance and the legal ground of direct campaign methods and others 
based on the personal influencing of voters’ choice and on the communica-
tion via internet, have increased.62 
According to a number of views, as commercial media cannot be obliged 
to broadcast advertisements, they do not allegedly put their programme 
time at the parties’ disposal free of charge. Consequently, most voters can-
not be informed via radio and television about the messages of nominating 
organizations, which violates the freedom of speech.63 
The Act settles precise rules regarding official campaign period, although 
in real life it might be controversial to decide whether some activities are 
already considered or are not still considered campaign activities. Exempli 
gratia, when the posters of mayor candidates had been placed around the 
capital before the opening of official campaign on 23rd August, the National 
Election Office established that this may not be considered campaign activity, 
just mere advertisement to inform people. It indicates the ambivalence of 
the practice, though, that in another community the local election commis-
sion considered unlawful the distribution of posters with the mayor candi-
date before the official beginning of the campaign period. 
Undoubtedly, one of the marginal issues of the new electoral provisions 
is campaign finance. In the constitutional democracy, electoral legislation 
shall ensure that political protagonists are authorized to exercise the public 
power by campaigning with funds which come from transparent resources 
and are used in a controllable way, and by winning at a competition which 
ensures equal opportunities for all participants. According to the survey of 
Transparency International, the new legislation does not promote trans-
parency and affiliated civil organizations are still allowed to campaign with-
out limits and by choosing methods arbitrarily. This, consequently, leads to 
                                                 
62 B. Orbán, Nincs önmagában véve jó vagy rossz választási rendszer, [online] http:// 
arsboni.hu / orban-balazs-nincs-onmagaban-veve-jo-vagy-rossz-valasztasi-rendszer.html 
[accessed: 23.09.2014] 
63 Érzékeny pontok – interview with Zoltán Pozsáry-Szentmiklósy Dr., [online] http:// 
arsboni.hu/erzekeny-pontok-interju-pozsar-szentmiklosy-zoltannal.html [accessed: 22.09. 
2014]. 
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uncontrollable expenses and unregulated campaign activities.64 It is worth 
highlighting the (dramatically) sharp differences between the amount of 
support provided to independent candidates and those nominated by par-
ties, which violates the requirement of equal opportunities to candidates 
and nominating organizations. It leads to further abuses too. Political adver-
tisement tariffs of the written press shall be announced to the State Audit 
Office, whereas the amount spent on the much more expensive billboards 
remains hidden. In other words, the new financial provisions still give way 
to continued corrupt activities. 
Finally, we approve of the opinion according to which the court practice 
regarding campaign prohibition within 150 meters will be one of the key 
legal questions on the day of voting – despite the NEC Guideline on relative 
territorial campaign prohibition.65 
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The Historical Perspective of the Relations Between  
the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court 
 
 
ABSTRACT  
 
This article is about the problem of the jurisdictional dispute between the Constitu-
tional Court and the Supreme Court. It shows the origin of the historical perspective 
of the dispute, analyzing the mutual relations between both judicial authorities since 
the moment when the Constitutional Court was created and its course after the Con-
stitution of 1997 came into force. Possible solutions to the conflict between the two 
entities of highest judicial authority on a normative level were mentioned, in particu-
lar through an amendment to the Constitution. 
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Introduction 
 
The Constitutional Court (hereinafter: CC) and the Supreme Court (herein-
after: SC) are the two judicial authorities whose judicature is of particular 
importance for the application of law by courts and that is why the relations 
between those entities are so significant. The need to protect the citizens’ 
trust in the rights has been repeatedly pointed out by the CC which indicated 
that “the whole social order, mutual coexistence of people, are unthinkable 
without taking into account the category of trust as a psychological and 
sociological element. It also relates to the field of law, if its rational nature is 
assumed. Confidence in law allows a citizen to plan and anticipate in the 
long term.”1 In its judicature the Supreme Court notes that the “uniformity 
                                                 
1 The ruling of the Constitutional Courts of 2nd March, 1993, ref. no. (K. 9/92). 
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of judicial decisions undoubtedly exposes the legal certainty of law enforce-
ment,”2 because it should be remembered that the juridical aspects of the 
uniformity of court decisions are as important as the social ones, namely 
the uniformity of decisions in the public perception is an important value, 
because it is unthinkable for the citizens to accept that different decisions 
are passed on the basis of the same provisions of law.3 
Looking at the mutual relations between the CC and the SC, one cannot 
miss the conflict between these judicial authorities which has existed since 
the beginning of the establishment of a separate body responsible for the 
constitutionality of the law. A prime example of mutual antagonisms is the 
Constitutional Court's judgment of 27 October 2010 in which it condemned 
the resolution of seven judges of the Supreme Court dated 20 December 
2007, ref. no. (I KZP 37/07)4 and the resolution of seven judges of the Su-
preme Court dated 17 December 2009 which was given the power of the 
legal principle of interpretation concerning the judgments of the Constitu-
tional Court.5 However, due to the time frame set by the Editorial Board the 
analysis regards the relations between the Constitutional Court and the 
Supreme Court before the Constitution of the Republic of Poland came into 
force.6 
Looking at the relations between the CC and the Supreme Court, a ques-
tion arises of the origin of the dispute, its course and the possibilities for 
further cooperation between the two judicial authorities. An answer should 
be also found to the question of whether it is a dispute about who should 
bear the palm or a fundamental dispute over the application of law. 
 
Difficult beginnings of the coexistence of the Constitutional Court and 
the Supreme Court 
 
When referring to history, it should be noted that the Supreme Court as       
a judicial authority which was set up on 18 July 1917 by the Provisional 
                                                 
2 Resolution of seven judges of the Supreme Court dated 5th May, 1992, ref. no. (Kw. 
Pr. 5/92). 
3 L. Leszczyński, Jednolitość orzecznictwa jako wartość stosowania prawa [w:] Jednoli-
tość orzecznictwa. Standard – instrumenty – praktyka. Materiały z konferencji naukowej 
Warszawa, red. M. Grochowski, M. Raczkowski, S. Żółtek, Warszawa 2015, p. 13. 
4 Constitutional Court's judgment of 27 October 2010, ref. no. K 10/08. 
5 Resolution of seven judges of the Supreme Court dated 17 December, 2009, ref. no. III 
PZP 2/09. 
6 The Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2nd April, 1997 (O.J.L. 1997 No. 78, 
item. 483). 
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Council of the State of the Kingdom of Poland, whereas the Constitutional 
Court was established by the Act of 26 March 1982 on Amending the Con-
stitution of the Polish People’s Republic7 and in reality the CC actually oper-
ated since 1 January 1986. In the context of this subject, one should first 
outline the evolution of the political position of the Supreme Court over the 
decades. Moreover, what seems interesting is the Supreme Court’s judges’ 
opinion on the necessity to establish a new body which is the CC as well as 
the beginning of its functioning until the Constitution of the Republic of 
Poland came into force in 1997. 
In the interwar period, in the absence of a body such as the CC, the Su-
preme Court found some unconstitutional acts which were refused binding 
force by the highest judicial authority and some unconstitutional acts which 
were considered to be still in force.8 According to Art. 51, paragraph. 1 of 
the Constitution of the Polish People’s Republic,9 the Supreme Court was 
the main judicial authority and it supervised the activities of all other courts 
regarding judgments. On the other hand, under the Act on the Supreme 
Court of 1962,10 this court is the supreme body in the system of the entire 
Polish judiciary system which governed the Social Insurance Court, and the 
Military Chamber of the Supreme Court took over the powers of the Su-
preme Military Court.11 The Act on the Supreme Court adopted in 198412 
stipulated that this authority is the supreme judicial body of the Polish Peo-
ple’s Republic which supervises the activities of other courts regarding 
judgments. Even this short description clearly indicates the privileged posi-
tion of the Supreme Court in the system of judicial power and it is no won-
der that over the years the Supreme Court got used to the fact that Roma 
locuta, causa finita. 
Under the ruling of March Constitution13 and April Constitution14 there 
was no authority responsible for the judicial supervision of the constitu-
tionality of the law, whereas during the Polish People’s Republic a negative 
                                                 
7 O.J.L. of 1982, no. 11, item 83. 
8 M. Zbrojewska, Rola i stanowisko prawne Sądu Najwyższego w procesie karnym, War-
szawa 2013, pp. 15–16. 
9 The Constitution of the Polish People’s Republic adopted by the Legislative Sejm on 
22nd July, 1952 (O.J.L. 1952, no. 33, item 232). 
10 The Act of 15th February, 1962 on the Supreme Court (O.J.L. 1962, no. 11 item 54). 
11 S. Włodyka, Funkcje Sądu Najwyższego, Kraków 1965, p. 25. 
12 The Act of 20th September, 1984 on the Supreme Court (O.J.L. 1984, no. 45, item 241). 
13 The Act of 17th March, 1921 – The Constitution of the Republic of Poland (O.J.L, 
1921, no. 44, item 267). 
14 The constitutional law of 23rd April, 1935 (O.J.L. 1935, no. 30, item 227). 
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attitude to judicial supervision dominated due to the fact that the model of 
constitutional supervision assumed that the value of legal norms depended 
on its relation to the accepted norm of higher order. This solution led to 
eliminating unconstitutional legal acts from the legal system.15 The de-
mands for the establishment of a constitutional judiciary in the Polish legal 
system were brought up by the representatives of the doctrine already in 
the 1970s, however, it was not until the breakthrough of 1980 that it was 
possible for the proposals to establish a body empowered to control the 
constitutionality of the law to take real shape.16 
By choosing a model of control of the constitutionality of the law in Po-
land, a system of control could be adopted from the English model, where 
the supervision is conducted by the common courts; in one variation of this 
model there is a separate SC control chamber of the constitutionality of the 
law. In the USA, within 8 years of the introduction of the Constitution,17 the 
Supreme Court was granted the power to control the constitutionality of 
the federal Constitutions,18 treaties and federal laws. The other model as-
sumes an organizationally and functionally separate body whose main ob-
jective is to control the constitutionality of the law.19 
The idea of establishing a separate body responsible for the control of 
the constitutionality of the law was firmly opposed by the First President of 
the Supreme Court – Włodzimierz Berutowicz. He used his influence in the 
Politburo of the Communist Party to entrust the Chamber of the Supreme 
Court with the control of the constitutionality of the law.20 The skepticism 
about the need for the functioning of the CC as a separate body of the judici-
ary system was also expressed by the First President of the Supreme Court 
– Adam Strzembosz who argued primarily that some of the judges of the 
Constitutional Court21 were appointed by the previous power. 
Prof. Andrzej Zoll rightly notes that the formation of the CC was a failure 
of the concept according to which the Supreme Court’s reputation was to be 
boosted by entrusting it with the tasks in the area of monitoring legisla-
                                                 
15 S. M. Przyjemski, Spory kompetencyjne między organami sprawującymi wymiar spra-
wiedliwości w Polsce, Warszawa 2009, p. 44. 
16 L. Garlicki, Prawo konstytucyjne – zarys wykładu, Warszawa 2006, p. 361. 
17 R. Hauser, J. Trzciński, Prawotwórcze znaczenie orzeczeń Trybunału Konstytucyjnego 
w orzecznictwie Naczelnego Sądu Administracyjnego, Warszawa 2010, p. 15. 
18 B. Banaszak, Prawo konstytucyjne, Warszawa 2008, p. 107. 
19 R. Hauser, J. Trzciński, op. cit., p. 16. 
20 A. Zoll, Trybunał Konstytucyjny i Sąd Najwyższy, [in:] Trybunał Konstytucyjny – Księga 
XV-lecia, red. F. Saddler, A. Jankiewicz, Warsaw 2001, p. 93. 
21 Idem, Zollowie – opowieść rodzinna, Kraków 2011, p. 400. 
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tion.22 It seems that the system of omnipotence of the Supreme Court, which 
existed from the beginning of its creation in 1917 until the CC started to 
operate in the legal system, was supposed to be maintained. 
At the moment of creation of the CC as an organ independent from the 
Supreme Court W. Berutowicz saw the need to develop the mutual relations 
between the two judicial authorities in such a way as to maintain the com-
pliance with the Constitution and internal consistency of the entire legal 
system. As history would show, the development of mutual relations is         
a long-term process full of numerous disputes between the CC and the SC.23 
The first fundamental dispute between the Constitutional Court and the 
Supreme Court occurred already in 1995 on the matter concerning the pos-
sibility of pursuing by the officers of uniformed services claims for payment 
of interest for delays in payment of salaries. In its resolution of 25 January 
199524 the Constitutional Court, presiding in its full composition, ruled that 
the failure to pay salaries to the uniformed officer is a delay in the fulfill-
ment of monetary performances, justifying, pursuant to Art. 481 § 1 of the 
Civil Code, the claim for interest before the common court. However, four 
months later the Supreme Court in the resolution adopted by seven judges25 
ruled that the court procedure to pursue the claim by the police officer be-
fore a common court together with interest is inadmissible. It should be 
noted that the right of the CC in the scope of the universally binding statutory 
interpretation encroaches on the Supreme Court competences since the 
competence of the CC corresponded to the institution of the Supreme Court 
explaining questionable legal provisions or those whose use caused dis-
crepancies in court judicature, so the powers of the Constitutional Court 
and the Supreme Court crossed in this area, so did also the entities which 
may have initiated the proceedings before the Constitutional Court and the 
Supreme Court.26 
As Professor Andrzej Stelmachowski rightly pointed out, the position 
taken by the Supreme Court in the resolution referred to above did not re-
sult from not knowing the CC’s judgment but from the frontal polemic with 
it in terms of binding the Supreme Court and courts of general jurisdiction 
as interpreted by the Constitutional Court. On the basis of this dispute Pro-
                                                 
22 Idem, Trybunał Konstytucyjny…, op. cit., p. 93. 
23 W. Berutowicz, Sąd Najwyższy w Polsce Ludowej, „Nowe Prawo” 1985, nr 5, p. 21. 
24 The resolution of the Constitutional Court dated 25th January, 1995, ref. no. W 14/94. 
25 The resolution of the Supreme Court dated 26th May, 1995, ref. no. Act I PZP 13/95. 
26 B. Szmulik, Pozycja ustrojowa Sądu Najwyższego w Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, War-
szawa 2008, pp. 212–213. 
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fessor Stelmachowski submitted a de lege ferenda postulate for the CC to 
comply with the standards of the rule of law and hold that the rulings on the 
universally binding interpretation of the law are in force from the date of 
their publication in the Official Journal of Laws. According to Professor Stel-
machowski, this solution will reduce tensions between the Constitutional 
Court and the Supreme Court because it would not lead to an undermining 
of the Supreme Court rulings already rendered.27 
Another dispute of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court con-
cerned the meaning of the term “the territory of the Polish State” in the so-
called February Act.28 In its resolution of 30 April 199629 the Constitutional 
Court ruled that Art. 8 paragraph 2a of the February Act refers to – taking 
into account the specified circumstances – “the Polish land” included in the 
territory of the Polish State on 1 January 1944, so also to that part of the 
territory of the Polish State which was located east of the so-called Curzon 
Line according to the borderline agreed in the Treaty of Riga of 18 March 
1921. This position received a lot of academic criticism.30 However, the Su-
preme Court ruled that the territory of the Polish State shall be construed as 
it is in its present borders. The then President of the CC, Professor Zoll tried 
to appease the conflict and suggested a meeting of the judges of the Consti-
tutional Court with the judges of the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court, 
however, this meeting did not bring any results.31 
There was also some misunderstanding around the competence of the 
President of the Constitutional Court to declare the loss of the binding pow-
er by the provision which the ruling of the Constitutional Court concerned 
in the absence of a reaction of the Sejm. It was indicated that the resolution 
of the CC did not fall within the limits of the interpretation of the Act which 
was an encroachment on the powers of the legislature.32 
                                                 
27 A. Stelmachowski, Sąd Najwyższy kontra Trybunał Konstytucyjny, „Przegląd Sądowy” 
1996, nr 2, pp. 4, 9. 
28 The Act of 23rd February, 1991 on recognizing as null and void the judgments issued 
against persons persecuted for their activities on behalf of an independent Polish state 
(O.J.L. 1991, no. 34, item. 149). 
29 The resolution of the Constitutional Court dated 30th April, 1996, ref. no. W 18/95. 
30 See e.g. the critical voices: L. Paprzycki, The Commentary to the resolution of the Con-
stitutional Tribunal dated 30th April, 1996, W 18/95, „Palestra” 1996, nr 9–10, p. 204;   
W. Czapliński, Glosa do uchwały TK z dnia 30 kwietnia 1996 r., W 18/95, „Państwo i Prawo” 
1996, nr 11, pp. 103–106. 
31 A. Zoll, Zollowie…, op. cit., p. 401. 
32 Idem, Trybunał Konstytucyjny…, op. cit., p. 94. 
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It should be noted that previous attempts at cooperating between the CC 
and the SC failed because of the lack of good will. That was the case when 
Professor Zoll was the President of the CC and he suggested a meeting of the 
judges of the Constitutional Court with the judges of the Criminal Chamber of 
the Supreme Court to try to resolve the conflicts that occurred in their mu-
tual relations. Unfortunately this meeting failed.33 
 
Conclusion 
 
When the Constitution of 1997 came into force the CC lost the right to make 
universally binding interpretations of the statutes and since then the rulings 
of the CC have been final and cannot be waived by the Sejm and so some 
normative causes of the conflicts between the CC and the SC went down in 
history. Then a question arises about the nature of the cooperation between 
the two judiciary entities in the present normative state. After more than 
two decades of mutual coexistence of the CC and the SC, have they developed 
a specific framework for cooperation and established a uniform judicature 
or there is still a dispute between the two entities which sometimes calms 
down only to explode in a moment with an even greater intensity? 
The lasting dispute between the CC and the SC in the long perspective 
will damage the trust of the citizens in legal certainty and stability of law.    
It also gives rise to problems of judicature in the courts of lower instances 
and it lowers the reputation of the judicial system. Furthermore, the dispute 
is not about who should bear the palm – the Constitutional Court or the Su-
preme Court – but this is a dispute of fundamental importance for the func-
tioning of a coherent legal system. 
Will the vision of Wojciech Szpara come true? The lawyer wrote 
 
I can see it in my imagination – judges passing judgments in the first or second in-
stance, sitting somewhere at night with rings under their eyes and wondering over 
another coffee which judicature they should rely on: that of the Supreme Court or the 
Constitutional Court. I can see myself too, strenuously elaborating a topic and drafting 
a legal opinion and I can see clients to whom I will not be able to explain why I am 
actually not able to clearly explain some legal issues. It is possible also that lawyers 
will have problems with the interpretation of conflicting rulings in cases in which the 
Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court get in each other’s way!34 
 
                                                 
33 Ibidem, p. 95. 
34 W. Szpara, Sąd Najwyższy kontra Trybunał Konstytucyjny, [online] http://adwokat-
woj-szpara.firmy.net/aktualnosci.html?n=9P43[accesed: 15.06.2015]. 
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De lege ferenda – we should return to the demand to settle in the Consti-
tution the relations between the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court, 
in particular the scope of exclusive cognition of the Constitutional Court to 
rule on the constitutionality of laws and also, and perhaps most importantly, 
binding of the Supreme Court by the findings included in the rulings of the 
Constitutional Court.35 On the other hand, Jerzy Jaskiernia notes that the dis-
pute between the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court has the char-
acteristic features of a conflict of competence which the Constitution does not 
account for, and that is why it should be amended or the relevant laws on 
the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court should be amended.36 
The words of Ronald Dwornik should also be remembered, as he said that 
“the courts are the capitals of the law, and the judges are its princes”37 and 
if so, then noblesse oblige. 
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ABSTRACT  
 
Use of Social Network Analysis (hereinafter as SNA) in crime prevention and law en-
forcement is widely discussed from either practical or theoretical point of view. Alt-
hough its advantages are commonly acknowledged, incorporation of SNA into strate-
gies of combating crime raises various controversies. The main aim of this paper is 
to present risks connected with application of SNA in practice, as a part of policing, 
from the point of view of the human rights system. The assumption is that all of legal 
responses to violence have to be in accordance with the human rights law require-
ments. As this subject matter is exceptionally complex, two main aspects of this issue 
have been chosen on the base of their significance – risk of infringement of the right 
to privacy and of politicization of the use of SNA, especially in the context of so-called 
“suspect communities.” The possibility of indication of prompt solutions to presented 
matters has been discussed. As such, this paper is an introduction to presented sub-
ject area and provides a basis for further research. 
 
KEYWORDS 
 
social network analysis, SNA, human rights, law enforcement, crime prevention, pre-
crime 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the most general form, the subject matter of Social Network Analysis 
(hereinafter as SNA) are social relations, visualized with the use of points 
(as the reflections of individuals or groups, dependent on a research pur-
pose) and lines (as the symbol of various relations between particular 
points). The mathematical graph theory is used to present the network, 
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therefore SNA is more dimensional than pure link analysis. The concept 
that stands behind the SNA is that the mutual relations and connections 
between groups of individuals or collectives reflect the model of structures 
within that group, for example showing the hierarchy or the potential social 
role of the particular entity. However, even though the history of use of SNA 
as a research technique dates back to the early 1970s,1 its usefulness as       
a tool of criminal prevention is still a subject of an ongoing and heated de-
bate. 
Arguments in favor of the use of SNA in prevention of crimes refer to its 
effectiveness due to the multitude of information that SNA may provide to 
the researcher, starting from such data as the hierarchy within the network, 
the impact of the network on an individual, and its role as a risk factor of 
the commission of crime. What is more, due to its universal character, SNA 
may be used in evidence-based policy making in reference to public policies 
of combating various kinds of crime, for example terrorism, gang violence, 
drug dealing and human trafficking. Last but not least, as research has shown, 
SNA may be used to predict the probability of the victimization regarding 
such types of crimes as gun violence.2 
On the other hand, use of SNA in law enforcement rises various contro-
versies. First of all, effective use of this research technique requires gather-
ing of information that may be considered as sensitive and infringing the 
right to privacy. Another issue is connected with boundaries of exchange of 
information between various state agencies in order to improve the effi-
ciency of analysis of particular network. What is noteworthy, improperly 
applied SNA can be used as a tool of political games, either intentionally or 
unconsciously. 
Due to the rising popularity of SNA, recognition of rules of its proper ap-
plication and rising the awareness of its potential risks are exceptionally 
important and should be widely discussed as a subject of scientific debate. 
Taking it into consideration, the main aim of this article is to present risks 
connected with the use of SNA as a tool of law enforcement and prevention 
of crimes from the point of view of the human rights system. Deliberations 
included in this paper are at an abstract level, without focusing on any par-
ticular example of a social network. The assumption is that legal responses 
to violence have to incorporate human rights law and its principles. Due to 
                                                 
1 For the historical roots and the development of SNA read: J. Scott, What is Social 
Network Analysis?, London–New York 2010.  
2 A. Papachristos, Ch. Wildeman, E. Roberto, Tragic, But Not Random: The Social Conta-
gion of Nonfatal Gunshot Injuries, “Social Science & Medicine” 2015, Vol. 125, pp. 139–150. 
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complexity of this problem, the scope of the paper is limited to issues that 
were selected on the basis of their importance and significance to proper 
presentation of subject matter and as such, it provides a basis for further 
research. All of those issues are, either directly or indirectly, connected with 
one particular question – about sources and boundaries of data collection 
for SNA purposes. 
 
SNA and human rights 
 
The use of SNA as a tool of crime prevention is discussed either in reference 
to criminological research or in the process of law enforcement. One of the 
requirements of lawful prevention of crimes is the incorporation of the hu-
man rights system into it. The importance of placing legal responses to vio-
lence within the framework of the human rights system requirements was 
stressed by the United Nations in various documents,3 in reference to all 
types of crimes, including those that are the subject of interest of researches 
using SNA, such as terrorism or drug dealing. 
When it comes to SNA, the risk of infringement of human rights of peo-
ple placed within the social network is noticeable. This risk is complex and 
refers to various rights. One of them is the right to privacy, which will be 
discussed in details in the next part of this article. 
 
a. The right to privacy. Usefulness of SNA as a tool of crime prevention 
 
Among the most controversial issues connected with the use of SNA by law 
enforcement agencies one may find the problem of sensitivity of information 
gathered by researchers and/or law enforcement agencies especially im-
portant. Lines that connect nodes of graphs may refer to various relation-
ships, such as co-offending, friendship, romance, exchange of information. 
What is more, gained information may be collected with the use of many 
different means, for example through collecting of private data from phone 
calls, police statistics, or surveillance of the online activity. Use of some of 
those means, such as the analysis of official police statistics, are less contro-
                                                 
3 For example: Article 11 of United Nations Declaration on Crime and Public Security, 
Resolution of General Assembly number A/51/610, [online] http://www.un.org/ docu-
ments/ga/res/51/ares51-60.htm [accessed: 01.03.2017] or in The United Nations Global 
Counter-Terrorism Strategy Review, Resolution of the General Assembly of UN number 
70/9, [online] http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/291 
[accessed: 1.04.2017]. 
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versial than others. From the point of view of “innocent until proven guilty,” 
use of information that was already acquired during investigations led by 
police forces and marked as criminal activity differs from wiretapping of 
private phone calls in search for a potential wrongdoing. 
However, independently on the source of information, use of those tech-
niques is unavoidably connected with the risk of infringement of the right 
to privacy. This right, as a part of the human rights system, is incorporated – 
inter alia – in Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,4 ac-
cording to which “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his 
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour 
and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against 
such interference or attacks.”5 The aforementioned example of wiretapping 
of private phone calls in search for signs of potential criminal activity is        
a severe interference with one’s privacy at its core. 
Eventual lawfulness of such interference depends on various factors, such 
as necessity of applied solutions and lack of arbitrariness. To elaborate on 
that, “the introduction of the concept of arbitrariness is intended to guaran-
tee that even interference provided for by the law should be in accordance 
with the provisions, aims and objectives of the Covenant6 and should be, in 
any event, reasonable in the circumstances.”7 By “reasonableness” one shall 
understand that “any interference with privacy must be proportional to the 
end sought and be necessary in the circumstances of any given case.”8 
If so, to sum up at this point, lawful use of collection of data for SNA, for 
example in the form of wiretapping, in reference to the right to privacy should 
meet such requirements as: (1) necessity of use of this technique to achieve 
legitimate aim, (2) proportionality, (3) legal base of application of SNA. 
What is more, it should be the least invasive option from those available.9 
Taking this list into consideration, it is crucial to discuss first and fore-
most the usefulness of SNA as a tool of achieving legitimate aims. In other 
words, in reference to the subject topic of this article, it has to be deter-
                                                 
4 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, [online] http://www.un.org/en/ uni-
versal-declaration-human-rights/index.html [accessed: 1.04.2017].  
5 Ibidem.  
6 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  
7 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 16, 23 session, 1988, [online] http:// 
hrlibrary.umn.edu/gencomm/hrcom16.htm [accessed: 1.04.2017].  
8 Communication Number 488/1992 of Human Rights Committee, Toonen v. Australia, 
[online] http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/undocs/html/vws488.htm [accessed: 1.04.2017].  
9 The right to privacy in the digital age, Report of the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, 30th of June 2014, p. 8.  
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mined if the use of SNA may result in the reduction of crime rates as a tool 
of effective crime prevention. 
On the base of preliminary research, it seems that the answer is positive. 
As various research has shown, analysis of social networks enables, among 
others, to evaluate the risk of gunshot victimization,10 to discover the pat-
terns of gang violence,11 to predict leadership roles within criminal organi-
zations,12 to identify structures of criminal networks and their changes over 
time,13 and to gain knowledge about the structure of drug trafficking groups.14 
However, the most significant advantage, connected with application of 
SNA, is that considering the multiplicity of information it may deliver to       
a researcher it is more effective as a tool of gaining scientific knowledge 
about crime patterns than other methods and techniques that are used in 
studies of crime. 
The example of such techniques is link analysis. What primarily differen-
tiates link analysis and SNA is the use of mathematical calculation that ena-
bles analysis of not only links between actors (nodes of the graph), without 
focusing on additional information, but also of mechanisms of creation of 
the network, its structure and changes over time. In the case of SNA obser-
vation and visualization of relations between nodes is rather a tool of fur-
ther research than the goal per se. 
When it comes to further points of the list, the requirements of propor-
tionality and legal base of use of SNA, their fulfilment depends on circum-
stances of a particular case. To exemplify it, on the base of preliminary re-
search it may be noticed that due to its features SNA is particularly useful as 
a tool of crime prevention and law enforcement in relation to organized 
crime. Taking it into consideration, use of SNA with the aim of preventing 
organized crime, such as terrorist nets, would be proportional and legiti-
mated, if its application was adequate to severity of the crime itself and based 
on the legal rule. 
                                                 
10 A. Papachristos, Ch. Wildeman, E. Roberto, op. cit., pp. 139–150. 
11 A. Papachristos, D. Hureau, A. Braga, The Corner and the Crew: The Influence of Geo-
graphy and Social Networks on Gang Violence, “American Sociological Review” 2013, Vol. 78, 
Issue 3, pp. 417–447.  
12 G. Berlusconi, Social Network Analysis and Crime Prevention, [in:] Crime Prevention 
in the 21st Century. Insightful Approaches for Crime Prevention Initiatives, eds. B. LeClerc, 
E. Savona, Cham 2017, pp. 129–141.  
13 Ibidem.  
14 F. Calderoni, The Structure of Drug Trafficking Mafias: the ‘Ndrangheta and Cocaine, 
“Crime, Law and Social Change” 2012, Vol. 58, Issue 3, pp. 321–349.  
116  JOANNA PTAK 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Mentioned example refers to states’ counter-terrorism strategies. Pre-
vention of crimes falling into the category of “terrorism” differs from other 
types of crime. One of such differences is connected with widely approved 
allowance of use of pre-crime as a part of counter-terrorism strategy, which 
will be discussed later. 
This allowance is caused by the particular severity of terrorist activity. 
In fact all of types of organized crime have features that justify state’s ex-
tensive interest in their prevention, such as a multidimensional covertness 
or involvement of many individuals in the criminal activity. If so, use of more 
infringing methods and techniques, such as SNA, seems to be justified as 
proportional to severity of the crime and necessary to achieve legitimate 
purposes. However, in spite of those particularities of organized crime, as it 
was mentioned earlier, detailed evaluation of proportionality and legal base 
of use of SNA requires analysis of features of each of cases. 
Last but not least, when it comes to the issue of invasiveness of SNA, in-
terference into the sphere of privacy of those involved in a particular social 
network is the core of this technique. However, as it is applied mostly to 
those crimes that are based on covertness, hierarchy, social organization 
and fulfillment of particular roles by members of criminal groups, such in-
terference is unavoidable to gain knowledge about the structure of the group, 
its size, or geographical range. Information about those features is crucial to 
ensure effective crime prevention. If so, if other requirements of avoidance 
of violation of the right to privacy are met, application of SNA should be al-
lowed. 
Significantly, to give another example, further potential problem concern-
ing privacy and SNA is the issue of exchange of information between vari-
ous public institutions and state officers, working within the field of law 
enforcement. Christopher Yang and Xuning Tang argue that such exchange 
of knowledge would make SNA more effective.15 They assume that creating 
a complete social network analysis would require collecting all the infor-
mation stored by the law enforcement and other agencies and institutions 
working in area of crime-prevention. Otherwise any SNA would be just par-
tial.16 The issue of such exchange raises various problems with finding a ba-
lance between violation of the right to privacy and the utility of shared in-
                                                 
15 Ch. Yang, X. Tang, Information Integration for Terrorist or Criminal Social Networks, 
[in:] Security Informatics. Outlines the Foundations and Parameters of the Field of Intelli-
gence and Security Informatics (ISIS), eds. C. Yang, M. Chau, J.-H. Wang, H. Chen, Springer 
2010, pp. 41–57.  
16 Ibidem, p. 42.  
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formation. Since anonymized SNA is no longer fully functional, any anony-
mization of data affects its effectiveness as a tool of law enforcement. De-
tailed evaluation of Yang’s and Tang’s proposition of practical solution to 
this problem – sub-graph generalization approach – is out of the scope of this 
paper, but the important conclusion that comes from the analysis of their 
work is that in reference to law enforcement and activity of state officers, 
application of SNA is connected with the risk of infringement of the right to 
privacy at multidimensional level. 
 
b. SNA and the risk of politicization 
 
Another risk, connected with what was discussed before as an issue of variety 
of sources of data and the infringement of the right to privacy, is a potential 
creation of so-called “suspect communities” at the pre-crime level and its 
further consequences. 
An idea of pre-crime as paradigm of crime prevention is not new, as it was 
known before the XXI century.17 However, its rising popularity dates back 
to 9/1118 and the rise of counter-terrorism strategies. Jude McCulloch and 
Sharon Pickering argue that from the point of view of criminology pre-
crime is not a measure of crime prevention.19 They assume that in general, 
in the criminological sense crime prevention is based on the non-punitive 
solutions that refer to, inter alia, reduction of opportunities of crime commis-
sion with reference to the broader social context. Taking it into considera-
tion, McCulloch and Pickering highlight that “counter-terrorism pre-crime 
measures envisage specific serious harms and criminalize those whom it is 
believed will commit these imaginary future harms, while ignoring broader 
social and environmental factors.”20 To elaborate on that, pre-crime measures 
in their most controversial form are connected with the use of state force 
without factual commission of crime; sole suspicion is sufficient. 
Even though such activity does not fit into criminological category of 
crime prevention, it has been used as a tool of law enforcement, especially 
in reference to counter-terrorism strategies. Mentioned authors argue that 
this is caused by the fact that proscribing an individual or an organization 
                                                 
17 For example: L. Zedner, The Pursuit of Security, [in:] Crime, Risk and Insecurity: Law 
and Order in Everyday Life and Political Discourse, eds. T. Hope, R. Sparks, New York 2000, 
pp. 200–214.  
18 J. McCulloch, S. Pickering, Pre-crime and Counter-terrorism. Imagining Future Crime 
in the ‘War on Terror’, “The British Journal of Criminology” 2009, Issue 49, p. 629.  
19 Ibidem.  
20 Ibidem.  
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as “terrorist” is purely a political decision and does not require a confirma-
tion of crime commission in the form of the court verdict.21 
This issue is strictly connected with the topic of this article. The main as-
sumption that underpins pre-crime in counter-terrorism strategies is that 
due to the fact that terrorists’ aim is to create mass causalities, they should 
be stopped from acting prior to their criminal activity in order to reduce hu-
man cost.22 From this point of view, SNA may be a useful tool of counter-
terrorism, as its outcome is – for example – an understanding of structures 
of criminal organization and the role of the leaders, or raising the knowledge 
about the size of the group and its geographical range. In consequence, SNA 
enables disruption and other forms of action directed against a particular 
organization. 
However, this is just one side of the coin. Due to the fact that labelling an 
organization as terrorist is rather a political than judicial decision, use of 
SNA in counter-terrorism is unavoidably connected with the risk of its polit-
icization with all of its further consequences.23 
To elaborate on that, the term “politicization” refers to various processes 
of making an issue political as a subject of interest of political agencies.       
In this context it is possible that through the lenses of counter-terrorism 
strategies SNA would be used against particular groups that had been con-
sidered as politically undesirable as the so-called “suspect communities.” 
This raises the already mentioned question about the boundaries of data col-
lection for SNA purposes. 
According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, “everyone is 
entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without 
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political 
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”24 
What is more, when it comes to the example of counter-terrorism strate-
gies, the UN highlights that “terrorism and violent extremism as and when 
conducive to terrorism cannot and should not be associated with any reli-
gion, nationality, civilization or ethnic group.”25 If so, creation of notion 
about existence of such phenomenon as “suspect community” and, as its fur-
ther consequence, basing a selection of individuals or groups as a subject 
matter of SNA on particular ethnic or religious background would be a seri-
ous violation of the system of human rights. 
                                                 
21 Ibidem, p. 630.  
22 Ibidem, p. 632.  
23 This issue will be explained later with the example of Kurds in the United Kingdom.  
24 Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  
25 The Resolution of the General Assembly of UN number 70/91, op. cit. 
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The presented issue is not only hypothetical. Vicki Sentas argues that due 
to listing of PKK26 as a terrorist organization, Kurds and people of Kurdish 
origin are regarded as the “suspect community” by security policies.27 Alt-
hough her qualitative research is limited to the small sample and placed within 
particular geographical region, it presents various risks connected with 
criminalization on the base of ethnicity or nationality. 
The example of Kurds has been chosen to present this issue, as it is par-
ticularly interesting from the point of view of this article. Labelling of Kurds’ 
self-determination attempts as terrorist is widely discussed.28 Due to the 
fact that PKK has been listed as terrorist organization in the United King-
dom, counter-terrorism strategies in reference to this entity require desig-
nation of boundaries between legal (not connected to PKK) and illegal (con-
nected to PKK) activity. Sentas’ research has shown that the authority to 
make a decision about “legality” or “illegality” of an act belonged to British 
policing organs. One of the conclusions of Sentas’ research is that “inter-
viewees believed that their ‘legitimate’ Kurdish rights were being criminal-
ized simply because they supported the political goals of the PKK.”29 What is 
more, participants of the research considered that disruption strategies af-
fected them due to their ethnicity, not terrorist activity, and were an effect 
of collective attribution of criminal tendencies to all of Kurds. 
The presented example raises questions about the ontological core of 
counter-terrorism strategies, reflected in a shift to criminalization because 
of “being” instead of “doing.” In reference to use of SNA in crime prevention 
and law enforcement, this risk is particularly significant. As it was men-
tioned, effective use of SNA requires data from various sources. SNA reflects 
multiple relations, not restricted solely to “pure” criminal activity. If so, the 
risk of application of this technique to social network because of its ethnicity 
or religion, instead of criminal activity, is particularly serious and may af-
fect multiple members of vulnerable groups. 
When it comes to solution to this problem, contrary to previously de-
scribed issue, in this case I find it impossible to list in details prerequisites 
of avoidance of violation of human rights. Criminalization because of “being” 
instead of “doing” is a matter of application of particular public policies. If 
so, it is important to be aware of such risk, and its unlawfulness because of 
                                                 
26 Kurdistan Workers’ Party.  
27 V. Sentas, Policing the Diaspora: Kurdish Londoners, Mi5 and the Proscription of Ter-
rorist Organizations in the United Kingdom, “The British Journal of Criminology” 2016, Vol. 56, 
pp. 898–918.  
28 In relation to the United Kingdom see: ibidem, p. 903.  
29 Ibidem, p. 907.  
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infringement of human rights, at the level of policy shaping and in the pro-
cess of its further implementation. 
 
Summary 
 
To sum up, use of SNA as a technique of crime prevention and law enforce-
ment has its advantages and drawbacks. Main benefits from its use are con-
nected with its universality and the multitude of information it may provide 
to researchers. Due to those features, SNA is particularly useful in reference 
to those types of crimes that are based on strict organization of human ac-
tivity and indication of particular roles to be fulfilled by those who are in-
volved in them. As such, social network analysis seem to be a crucial ele-
ment of evidence-based policy making in reference to, as an example, ter-
rorism, gang violence, drug dealing, or human trafficking. 
On the other hand, application of SNA raises various controversial is-
sues. The scope of this article was limited only to those aspects of disad-
vantages of SNA that were related to – either directly or indirectly – sources 
and boundaries of data collection for SNA purposes. As it was presented, 
use of SNA in reference to subject matter of this article is connected with 
the risk of infringement of various human rights. One of them is the right to 
privacy, which may be violated at multidimensional level. What is more, 
application of SNA may lead to (or be a tool of) stigmatization of particular 
groups, regarded as “suspect communities.” Furthermore, it may be one of 
the effects of criminalization through “being” instead of “doing.” Once again, 
such policing would be, without any exemptions, against the human rights 
system. As such, it highlights the necessity of avoidance of association of 
criminal activity with particular ethnicity, religion, or nationality. 
If so, from the point of view of the human rights system, a legitimate ap-
plication of SNA in reference to crime prevention and law enforcement is 
unavoidably connected with the necessity of fulfilment of various prerequi-
sites. Some of them, as in the case of infringement of the right to privacy, are 
universal and possible to be listed. However, other requirements are related 
to particularities of the case itself. As such, at the abstract level it is only pos-
sible to indicate risks connected with them, instead of providing detailed 
lists of prompt solutions. 
General conclusion that appears from presented deliberation is that ef-
fective crime prevention and law enforcement require use of various meth-
ods and techniques that derive from different fields of science. However, 
boundaries of application of such measures are provided by law, at either 
national or international level. One of such limitations is the human rights 
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system. As long as the use of particular method or technique fits into the 
requirements of the human rights and legal systems, and is useful to achieve 
the assumed legitimate purpose, its application should be allowable. 
Last but not least, as it was mentioned, the main aim of this article was 
to present various risks and potential weak points connected with the use 
of SNA in crime prevention and law enforcement, related to particular as-
pects. However, I am fully aware that discussed issues are just a peak of an 
iceberg. What should be elaborated further are, for example, diverse aspects 
of making use of results of SNA during court trials, and other processes of 
judicial decision, detailed analysis of types of crimes that may be prevented 
with SNA, practical difficulties with application of this technique by the 
state organs. However, due to the complexity of these subject areas, they 
should be a matter of further research. 
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